

































































New	 York’s	 transit	 system	 serves	 millions	 of	 riders	 each	 day;	 the	 local	
newspapers	complain	about	the	lack	of	funding	for	infrastructure	projects;	and	the	
City	 Council	 regularly	 hosts	 hearings	 about	 Bus	 Rapid	 Transit,	 bike-share,	 road	
safety,	e-hail	taxis,	and	gondolas.	Transportation	issues	matter	to	New	Yorkers,	but	
these	 debates,	 at	 the	 policy	 level,	 often	 focus	 on	 technology,	 budgets,	 and	
regulations	 rather	 than	 the	 needs	 and	 experiences	 of	 passengers.	 This	 focus	 on	




as	 jitneys,	 that	provide	vital	 transportation	 links	 to	more	 than	120,000	 riders	per	
day	 and	operate	beyond	 the	 control	 of	 the	 formal	 transit	 system	governed	by	 the	
Metropolitan	 Transportation	 Authority	 (MTA).	 While	 this	 ridership	 pales	 in	
comparison	to	the	daily	ridership	on	the	subway	or	bus,	it	does	rival	bus	ridership	
in	cities	 like	Dallas	and	Milwaukee	and	dwarfs	the	50,000	peak	ridership	achieved	





to	 a	 geographically	 specific	 problem:	 adequate	 access	 to	 inadequate	 service.	 The	
vans	 thrive	 in	 busy	 transit	 corridors	 where	 MTA-owned	 buses	 come	 too	
infrequently,	 are	 overcrowded,	 or	 are	 regularly	 stuck	 in	 traffic.	 On	 these	 busy	
routes,	the	vans	provide	a	more	reliable	ride	and	alternative	for	transit-dependent	




system,	 traditional	 metrics,	 such	 as	 ridership,	 travel	 time,	 vehicle	 revenue	 miles,	
etc.,	are	not	collected	and	compared	against	the	metrics	of	other	modes	operated	by	
the	MTA.	As	long	as	the	vans	remain	an	unknown	quantity,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	the	
City	and	State	to	serve	transit-dependent	populations	in	Brooklyn	and	Queens.	
In	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 use	 a	 mixed-methods	 research	 design	 to	 probe	 the	
world	of	the	vans	and	argue	that	continued	regulatory	uncertainty,	long	the	friend	of	








































































This	 dissertation	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 without	 the	 help	 and	 guidance	 of	
friends,	 family,	 colleagues,	 and	 the	 people	 I	 have	met	 along	 the	way.	Without	 the	
generosity	 of	 the	 people	 I	 interviewed	 from	 the	 Taxi	 and	 Limousine	 Commission,	
Department	of	Transportation,	Department	of	City	Planning,	New	York	City	Council,	




and	 Jonathan	 Izen	 for	 all	 of	 your	 help	 with	 mapmaking,	 collecting	 surveys,	 and	
computer	 programing.	 Ali	 Rasoulinejad	 always	 came	 through	 with	 historical	 City	
Council	 documents	 and	 transcripts	 when	 I	 needed	 them.	 These	 invaluable	
contributions	allowed	me	to	improve	my	arguments	and	visualize	my	data	clearly.				
My	colleagues	at	Columbia	provided	support,	encouragement,	and	completed	
dissertations	 that	 I	 have	 looked	 to	 for	 formatting	 guidance.	 My	 cohort—Dory	
Thrasher,	 John	 West,	 and	 Banke	 Oyeyinka—provided	 friendship	 and	 room	 for	
intellectual	exploration.	Jigar	Bhatt	and	Lauren	Fischer	always	asked	questions	and	
encouraged	me	as	I	developed	my	ideas.	Laura	Lieto	graciously	read	a	chapter	and	
sent	me	 comments	 all	 the	way	 from	Napoli.	 Jonathan	English	provided	 thoughtful	






and	helped	me	with	my	writing.	 She	also	 inspired	Chapter	Three’s	 title,	 “Hear	me	
Honk.”	Ann	Smith	pushed	me	to	return	to	school	and	pursue	my	doctorate.	Liliana	
Greenfield-Sanders	 took	 on	 the	 unenviable	 task	 of	 editing	 two	 chapters.	 David	
Parker’s	twenty-year	friendship	has	made	me	the	person	I	am.	His	intellect,	critical	
mind,	and	wit	remind	me	that	I	have	a	long	way	to	go.		
My	 committee—Paige	 West,	 Robert	 Beauregard,	 Elliott	 Sclar,	 and	 Steven	
Gregory—engaged	with	my	 ideas	 and	writing	 and	provided	 the	occasional	 kick	 in	
the	 pants	 or	 kind	 word	 when	 I	 needed	 it.	 Each	 of	 them	 helped	 me	 understand	
abstruse	 concepts	 or	 introduced	 me	 to	 entirely	 new	 worlds,	 for	 which	 I	 will	 be	
forever	grateful.		
My	advisor,	David	King,	always	allowed	me	to	go	off	and	pursue	the	ideas	and	








my	 time	 at	 Columbia.	 As	 a	 child,	 I	 watched	 her	 write	 and	 re-write,	 prepare	 her	
classes,	 and	 negotiate	 life	 at	 the	 university	 all	 while	 being	 my	 mom.	 My	 dad’s	
boundless	 curiosity	 and	 enthusiasm	 are	 two	 qualities	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 bring	 to	my	
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Being	 uninformed	 is	 rarely	 a	 virtue.	 Being	 uninformed	while	 regulating	 an	
industry	is	never	a	virtue.	In	this	dissertation,	I	argue	that	the	City	and	State	of	New	
York’s	 current	 regulatory	 approach	 to	 dollar	 vans	 fails	 to	 match	 the	 practice	 of	
dollar	 vans	 in	 portions	 of	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens.	 This	 dissonance	 creates	 an	
opportunity	for	the	City	and	State	to	re-organize	these	sections	of	the	city	to	serve	





While	 the	 vans	 are	 informal	 and	 poorly	 understood	 by	 the	 City,	 every	 few	
years	the	City	tries	to	incorporate	them	into	the	formal	transit	network.	In	2010,	for	
instance,	the	vans	became	a	topic	of	interest	in	local	transportation	debates	because	
the	 Metropolitan	 Transportation	 Authority	 (MTA)	 announced	 widespread	 service	
reductions	 in	 the	 outer	 boroughs	 and	 the	 TLC	 responded	 with	 a	 plan	 to	 deploy	
dollar	vans—re-branded	as	“group	ride	vehicles”—on	five	former	MTA	bus	routes.			
The	 Group	 Ride	 Vehicle	 Pilot	 Project	 failed	 to	 achieve	 the	 TLC’s	 goal	 of	
providing	 affordable	 transit	 service	 to	 New	 Yorkers	 who	 had	 recently	 lost	 bus	
service.	While	 following	 the	 pilot,	 I	 started	 attending	 the	New	York	 City	 Council’s	
Committee	 on	 Transportation’s	 monthly	 meetings	 to	 get	 a	 better	 sense	 of	 the	
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transportation	 issues	 that	 merited	 its	 attention.	 By	 2013,	 I	 had	 begun	 to	 attend	
every	 regularly	 scheduled	meeting	 and	 continued	 to	 do	 so	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2015.	
During	 this	 period,	 I	 monitored	 local	 transportation	 proposals	 and	 listened	 to	
experts	extol	 the	virtues	of	 streetcars,	 a	Utica	Avenue	 subway,	 congestion	pricing,	
bike	 share,	 car	 share,	 e-hail	 taxis,	 ferries,	 Bus	 Rapid	 Transit,	 lower	 fares	 on	
commuter	 rails,	 and	 gondolas.	 It	 appeared	 that	 everything	 short	 of	 teleportation	
would	 be	 considered	 before	 anyone	 thought	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 an	 existing	
resource	with	a	proven	record	of	moving	people,	the	vans.	
Then	on	October	22,	2015	something	exciting	happened.	The	Committee	on	
Transportation	 held	 a	 hearing	 to	 debate	 three	 bills	 related	 to	 licensed	 commuter	
vans.	It	was	never	clear	this	day	would	come,	but	positive	signs	had	been	visible	for	
a	 few	years.	 City	 Council	Member	 I.	Daneek	Miller,	 a	 former	 bus	 driver	 and	 labor	
leader,	 had	 made	 a	 point	 of	 criticizing	 the	 vans	 whenever	 possible.	 Meanwhile,	
Hector	Ricketts	had	spent	the	last	few	years	organizing	his	fellow	van	operators	and	
working	with	Matthew	Daus,	 a	 former	 chair	 and	 commissioner	 of	 the	 TLC,	 and	 a	
group	of	attorneys	to	 lobby	the	City	Council	to	re-examine	the	existing	regulations	
governing	the	vans.		
I	 had	 already	written	 a	 large	portion	 of	my	dissertation	by	 the	 time	of	 the	
hearing,	 but	 I	 observed	 it	 in	 person.	 As	 I	 argue	 and	 document	 throughout	 the	
dissertation,	 the	 regulators	 and	 elected	 officials	 charged	 with	 developing	
transportation	policy	are	poorly	 informed	about	the	vans	they	oversee.	 	This	basic	
level	 of	 confusion	 is	 clearly	 captured	 in	 a	 brief	 back-and-forth	 between	 Council	
Member	 Ydanis	 Rodriguez,	 chair	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Transportation,	 and	Meera	
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Joshi,	 the	 chair	 and	 chief	 executive	 officer	 of	 the	 TLC,	 during	 the	 October	 22nd	
hearing	about	the	number	of	licensed	commuter	vans	in	New	York.1		
Following	 Commissioner	 Joshi’s	 prepared	 testimony	 on	 the	 proposed	 bills,	
Council	 Member	 Rodriguez	 asked	 her	 to	 clarify	 her	 comments	 on	 the	 number	 of	
vans	operating	in	the	city:	“you	said	in	the	first	page	of	your	testimony	that	there	are	
currently	49	authorized	commuter	vans,	but	that	we	have	a	total	of	585	commuter	




In	 an	 attempt	 not	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 Council	 Member’s	 confusion,	
Commissioner	Joshi	outlines	the	metrics	her	agency	collects:		
Yes,	 today	we	 have	 49	 authorizations,	 and	 I	 can	 compare	 that	 with	
2010	when	we	had	50.	So	the	numbers	fluctuated	between,	50,	48,	47.		
We’re	 now	 at	 49.	 The	 number	 of	 vehicles	 attached	 to	 those	
authorizations,	 and	 as	 I	 mentioned	 in	 my	 testimony,	 each	






are	49	 authorizations,	 585	vans	 in	 service,	 and	 a	 cap	of	 675	 total	 vans	 that	 could	
ever	be	in	service	based	on	existing	regulations.			
																																																								
1	It	 is	 the	 chair	 of	 a	 City	 Council	 committee	who	 decides	which	 bills	 a	 committee	will	 debate	 and	
whether	 there	will	be	vote	on	the	proposed	 legislation.	Thus,	 it	 is	 incredibly	 important	 to	have	the	









and	 536	 unlicensed	 vans.	 Rather	 than	 understanding	 the	 difference	 between	
authorizations	 and	 licensed	 vans,	 he	merely	 subtracts	 the	 49	 authorizations	 from	
the	585	vans,	to	calculate	the	536	unlicensed	vans	number.	
Joshi,	once	again,	seeks	to	clarify	her	testimony.	She	explains,	“No…when	we	
say	 authorities,	 that’s	 akin	 to	 a	base.	 	 So	 there’s—it’s	 almost	 like	 there’s	49	bases	
and	 there’s	 585	 vehicles	 attached	 to	 those	 49	 bases.	 It’s	 a	 separate	 license”	 (City	
Council	2015,	p.	30).	Finally,	by	likening	a	commuter	van	authorization	to	a	for-hire	
vehicle	 base,	 Joshi	 finds	 the	 right	 words	 to	 translate	 van	 jargon	 into	 a	 language	
Rodriguez	 understands.	 As	 the	 chair	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Transportation	 and	 a	
former	 livery	 cab	 driver,	 Rodriguez	 knows	 that	 livery	 cabs	 are	 dispatched	 from	 a	
base.	By	Joshi’s	logic	then,	individual	commuter	vans	must	have	an	authorization	to	
operate	 legally	 in	 New	 York.	 While	 these	 differences	 are	 clear	 to	 her,	 it	 is	 not	
obvious	why	anyone	else	would	 intuitively	grasp	these	differences	without	careful	
explanation.	
Finally,	Rodriguez	 is	 satisfied	with	 Joshi’s	answer	about	 licensed	commuter	
vans.	 Now,	 he	 turns	 his	 attention	 to	 the	 unlicensed	 vans:	 “Okay.	 So	what	 is	 your	
estimate	on	how	many	are	operating	without	a	license”	(City	Council	2015,	p.30)?	
Until	 this	 moment	 in	 the	 hearing,	 Joshi	 has	 spoken	 from	 a	 position	 of	
knowledge;	however,	unlicensed	vans	are	beyond	her	area	of	expertise:		
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It’s	 a	 difficult	 question.	 What	 I	 can	 give	 you	 is	 figures	 on	 what	 we	
seize,	and—and	 there	 [sic]	are	 just	 the	portion	of	 illegal	operators.	 I	
actually	 in	 all	 honesty	 think	 that	 if	 you	 speak	 to	 the	 commuter	 van	
operators	 that	 are	working	 everyday	 and	 competing	with	 the	 illegal	
operators,	 you	 will	 get	 a	 truer	 sense	 of	 what	 the	 volume	 of	 illegal	
operators	are	[sic].	But	it’s	safe	to	say	that	it	is	probably—I	don’t	think	








This	 brief	 series	 of	 questions	 and	 answers	 between	 the	 chair	 of	 the	 City	
Council’s	Committee	on	Transportation	and	the	leader	of	the	TLC,	the	entity	charged	
with	 regulating	 the	 vans,	 reveals	 just	 how	 uninformed	 the	 City’s	 transportation	
leaders	 are	 about	 very	 simple	 descriptive	 data	 points	 about	 the	 vans.	 This	 is	
especially	troubling	because	TLC	Chair	 Joshi	knows	that	the	answer	to	the	Council	
Member’s	question	 is	readily	available,	but	requires	someone	to	pose	 it	 to	the	van	
drivers	she	regulates.	On	this	specific	day,	 it	 just	so	happened,	that	scores	of	them	
were	sitting	directly	behind	her	ready	to	submit	their	testimony	on	the	bills	in	front	
of	 the	 committee.	 At	 no	 point	 during	 the	 two-and-a-half-hour	 hearing	 did	 she	 or	
Council	Member	Rodriguez	turn	to	the	van	drivers	and	ask	them	this	question.	
vvv	






This	 research	 engages	 two	 bodies	 of	 scholarship:	 urban	 informality	 and	
transportation.	 By	 examining	 both	 literatures	 side-by-side,	 I	 am	 able	 to	 bring	 the	
informality	 literature	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 transportation	 literature	 and	 vice-versa.	 By	
bringing	 in	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 informality	 literature,	 I	 extend	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
transportation	 literature	 and	 ask	 questions	 about	 equity,	 social	 justice,	 and	
regulation	while	theorizing	about	the	future	of	the	vans	with	frameworks	developed	








is	 exacerbated	 by	 regulations	 that	 fail	 to	 reflect	 daily	 practice	 and	 the	 uneven	
enforcement	 of	 the	 laws.	 For	 example,	 passengers	 flag	 down	 vans	 traveling	 along	






It	 is	 this	 tension	 between	 laws	 and	 practice	 that	makes	 the	 vans	 informal.	
Roy	(2005)	defines	urban	informality	as	“a	state	of	exception	from	the	formal	order	
of	 urbanization”	 (p.	 147).	 Being	 exceptional,	 flouting	 existing	 laws,	 comes	 with	
benefits	 and	 drawbacks.	 In	 the	 short-term,	 barriers	 to	 entry	 are	 limited	 and	
providers	can	adapt	to	the	needs	of	consumers	quickly.	There	are	vans	traveling	up	
and	 down	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 that	 do	 not	 have	 the	 appropriate	 insurance	 and	 are	
operated	by	improperly	licensed	drivers,	but	there	are	also	vans	prospecting	in	new	
neighborhoods	 to	 satisfy	 the	 travel	 needs	 of	 New	 Yorkers.	 These	 markers	 of	
informality	 make	 it	 cheaper	 to	 operate	 a	 van,	 which	 in	 turn	 allows	 those	 with	
limited	 resources	 and	 few	 job	 prospects	 to	 earn	 a	 living.3	Over	 the	 long-term,	
however,	being	exceptional	is	perilous	to	those	operating	under	the	informal	rules.	
Sustained	informality	leads	to	disinvestment	in	social	services	and	devalorization	of	
the	 land,	which	 in	 turn	 provides	 the	 impetus	 for	 policy	 interventions	 that	 trigger	




vulnerability	 to	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law,	 and	 state	 retrenchment	 (Roy	 and	 Al	
Sayyad	2003).	 It	also	provides	a	way	to	theorize	the	 future	of	 the	vans.	As	 long	as	
daily	practice	 and	 the	 laws	diverge,	 increased	 enforcement	of	 existing	 regulations	
will	run	the	vans	off	the	road.	Roy’s	(2009)	work	on	squatters	in	India	underscores	





the	 ability	 to	 criminalize	 informal	 actors	 and	 remove	 them	 from	 the	 land.	 This	
tension	leaves	informal	actors	in	a	fragile	liminal	space.			
Though	 the	 literature	 on	 informality	 grew	out	 of	 experiences	 in	 the	 “Third	
World,”	scholars	have	recently	studied	informality	in	American	cities	(Bromley	and	
Gerry	 1979;	 Rakowski	 1994;	 Mukhija	 and	 Loukaitou-Sideris	 2014).	 Much	 of	 this	
work	 focuses	 on	 similar	 themes,	 such	 as	 housing,	 reclaiming	 space,	 globalization,	
neoliberalism,	and	basic	survival	(Mitchell	2003;	Venkatesh	2006;	Ehrenfeucht	and	






store	 owners,	 have	 a	 weak	 grasp	 of	 the	 laws	 governing	 their	 profession,	 operate	
with	or	without	a	license,	and	their	businesses	are	marginalized	because	they	look	
different.		In	New	York,	advocacy	groups	like	the	Street	Vendor	Project	help	educate	
vendors	about	 their	 rights,	 lobby	 local	government	on	 their	behalf,	 fight	 tickets	 in	
court,	and	create	a	community	of	politically	engaged	vendors	(Street	Vendor	Project	
2003).	There	are	no	equivalent	versions	of	 the	Street	Vendor	Project	 in	 the	dollar	





determine	where	 they	 can	 locate	 on	 a	 specific	 block.	 According	 to	 the	 New	 York	
Administrative	 code,	 the	 rules	 governing	 where	 a	 vendor	 can	 set-up	 are	
unambiguous:		
No	vending	pushcart	shall	be	located	against	display	windows	of	fixed	
location	 businesses,	 nor	 shall	 they	 be	 within	 twenty	 feet	 of	 any	
entranceway	to	any	building,	store,	theatre,	movie	house,	sports	arena	





York	 street.	 Kettles	 (2014)	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 a	 “crystal”	 law,	 a	 law	 that	 limits	 the	




the	 precarious	 nature	 of	 legal	 street	 vending	 when	 he	 describes	 a	 contentious	
encounter	between	the	manager	of	a	McDonald’s	and	a	street	vendor	named	Farha:	
“As	 it	 became	 evident	 to	 Farha	 that	 afternoon,	 her	 own	 spatial	 legitimacy	 and	
business	security	had	little	to	do	with	formal	laws.	A	legal	vending	location	in	front	
of	an	antagonistic	store	owner	was	untenable	thanks	to	fear	and	uncertainty	born	of	
complex	 and	 difficult	 to	 understand	 regulations”	 (p.	 54).	 While	 Devlin	 has	 given	
cover	 to	 the	actors	 in	 this	example	by	describing	 the	 laws	as	 “complex,”	 the	more	
accurate	description	is	that	Farha	was	unsure	of	the	laws.	After	all,	the	McDonald’s	
manager	 either	 lied	 or	was	 uncertain	 about	 the	 law	 himself	 when	 he	 said	 it	 was	
illegal	 for	her	to	sell	 food	near	a	restaurant.	Rather	than	figuring	out	the	details	of	
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the	 law	 or	 continuing	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 harassment	 from	 the	 storeowner,	 Farha	
decided	to	move	to	a	less	burdensome	location.			
Harassment	 is	 not	 always	 confined	 to	 competitive	 disagreements.	 Street	
vendors,	licensed	and	unlicensed,	are	often	hassled	because	of	their	appearance.	In	
Duneier’s	 (1999)	 ethnography	 of	 sidewalk	 vendors	 in	 New	 York,	 he	 interviewed	
Andrew	 Manshel,	 a	 lawyer	 working	 for	 the	 34th	 Street	 and	 Grand	 Central	
Partnership,	 two	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 Business	 Improvement	 Districts	 in	 the	
country.	 During	 the	 interview,	 Manshel	 explained	 that	 his	 group	 opposed	 street	
vendors	because	they	defied	the	image	his	group	wanted	to	promote:		
“It’s	mostly	about	how	 they	 look	as	much	as	what	 they’re	doing.	 It’s	
not	just	that	they’re	selling	things	in	public	space,	but	they	don’t	look	
like	 they’ve	made	a	 capital	 investment	 in	what	 they	are	doing.	They	
are	not	selling	high-quality	goods.	When	they	are	selling	high-quality	
goods,	there	is	an	implication	that	the	goods	are	stolen.	It’s	not	clear	
that	 they	 are	 part	 of	 the	 social	 fabric.	 The	 problem—besides	 that	 it	
looks	disordered	because	of	the	lack	of	capital	investment	and	the	lack	
of	 social	 control	 imposed	 upon	 it—is	 that	 there	 is	 an	 element	 of	
unfairness	with	people	who	are	renting	stores	and	are	selling	similar	
merchandise	 and	 are	 paying	 taxes	 and	 minimum	 wage	 and	 rent.”	
(p.234)	
	
This	 extended	 excerpt	 reveals	 two	 interlocking	 ideas.	 First,	 street	 vendors	 do	 not	
conform	 to	 the	 normative	 values	 espoused	 by	 the	 Grand	 Central	 and	 34th	 Street	
Partnership.	Since	 they	 look	dingy	and	are	not	brick-and-mortar	stores,	 they	must	
be	 trading	 in	 low-value	 goods	 or	 stolen	 goods.	 Nowhere	 in	 this	 response	 does	
Manshel	 mention	 that	 street	 vending	 is	 legal	 and	 thus	 protected	 under	 the	 law	
regardless	of	the	value	of	the	goods	being	sold.	Second,	because	street	vendors	look	
different	 than	Manshel’s	 ideal	retailer,	 it	 is	okay	 to	apply	 the	 law	selectively.	After	
all,	 these	 vendors	 have	 not	 made	 a	 capital	 investment	 or	 paid	 rent	 to	 the	
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landowners	who	pay	dues	to	Manshel’s	organizations.		





the	 street.	 Thus,	 the	 law	 appears	 to	 have	 little	 to	 do	with	 the	 day-to-day	 lives	 of	
street	 vendors	 and	 dollar	 van	 drivers.	 As	 Devlin	 notes,	 street	 vendors	 seek	 out	
spaces	where	 they	 can	operate	without	 fear	of	 harassment	 regardless	of	 the	 legal	












The	 jitneys	 of	 the	 1910s,	 similarly,	 were	 shared-ride	 vehicles	 that	 took	
people	where	they	needed	to	go	for	a	flat	fee.	Not	all	jitneys	were	alike.	As	the	New	
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York	Times	(1915)	 pointed	 out,	 in	 some	 cities	 jitneys	 “maintain	 regular	 routes,	 in	
others	 they	 cruise,	 and	 in	 still	 others	 they	 follow	 the	 street	 car	 lines”	 (n.p.).	 This	
variability	makes	it	difficult	to	develop	a	definitive	description	of	the	jitneys,	but	like	
today’s	 dollar	 vans,	 they	 represent	 a	 flexible	 transportation	 option	 that	 combined	
the	affordability	of	transit	with	the	convenience	of	a	taxi.				
In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 Americans	 in	 cities	 across	 the	 country	







There	 is	no	record	of	an	opening	ceremony	 to	 inaugurate	 the	 launch	of	 the	
first	 jitney.	The	mayor	of	Los	Angeles	or	Phoenix	or	New	York	was	not	on	hand	to	
cut	any	 ribbons,	 take	a	photo,	or	 commemorate	 the	event	by	smashing	a	bottle	of	
champagne	on	the	hood	of	a	used	Ford	Model	T.	According	to	Doolittle	(1915),	the	
jitneys	originated	in	the	southern	and	western	cities	of	North	America	in	1914.	He	
attributes	 their	 development	 to	 the	 novelty	 of	 riding	 in	 a	 car,	 high	 levels	 of	
unemployment,	 advertisements	 in	 local	 newspapers,	 and	 the	 availability	 of	
inexpensive	 secondhand	 cars.	 Suzuki’s	 (1985)	 work	 on	 “vernacular”	 taxis	 shows	
that	jitneys	thrived	in	Chattanooga	after	a	boycott	against	the	city’s	trolley	by	black	
residents.	 Instead	 of	 allowing	 Jim	 Crow	 laws	 to	 define	 their	 travel,	 a	 black	
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entrepreneur	 organized	 “his	 six	 Cadillacs	 and	 Packards	 into	 the	 first	 black	 jitney	
operation	in	the	city”	(p.338).	Extending	the	arguments	of	previous	authors,	Bottles	
(1987)	and	McShane	(1994)	found	overcrowding	and	general	displeasure	with	the	
streetcars	 to	be	 critical	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 jitneys.	Hodges	 (2006)	 concurs	with	 the	
analysis	of	Doolittle,	Suzuki,	Bottles,	and	McShane,	but	offers	a	slight	wrinkle	to	the	
jitney	 origin	 story.	 He	 asserts	 that	 the	 first	 jitneys	 developed	 during	 a	 1913	
streetcar	strike	in	Phoenix.	Whether	the	jitneys	originated	in	Los	Angeles,	Phoenix,	
or	 elsewhere	 matters	 little.4	What	 does	 matter	 is	 that	 the	 jitneys	 took	 hold	 in	
American	cities	because	of	high	rates	of	unemployment,	dissatisfaction	with	existing	
transit	options,	racial	discrimination,	and	the	availability	of	affordable	used	cars.		
The	 jitneys	 strained	 the	 existing	 regulatory	 framework	 of	 transportation	






the	 city’s	 urban	 transportation	 system”	 (Bottles	 1987,	 p.	 69).	 In	 cities	 across	 the	
country,	 the	 legislation	 directed	 at	 jitneys	 sought	 to	 protect	 streetcar	 companies’	
monopoly	over	transit	by	making	it	more	expensive	for	jitneys	to	operate.	The	most	
common	local	ordinances	required	jitney	operators	to	establish	franchises;	charged	





routes	 and	 schedules;	 mandated	 jitneys	 to	 serve	 long	 routes,	 which	 proved	
uneconomical;	proscribed	jitneys	from	operating	along	routes	served	by	streetcars;	
developed	safety	standards,	 such	as	speed	 limits	and	driver	 fitness;	and	 increased	
insurance	 requirements	 (Eckert	 and	 Hilton	 1972,	 pp.	 308-320).	 The	 outcome	 of	
these	regulations	was	dramatic	and	swift,	“Between	1915	and	1918	the	number	of	
jitneys	 operating	nationally	 declined	 from	62,000	 to	6,000”	 (Goldwyn	2014).	 This	
swift	 crackdown	 on	 jitneys	 speaks	 to	 the	 precarious	 position	 informal	 operators	
occupy.	
While	 the	 data	 shows	 that	 regulations	 basically	 eradicated	 the	 jitneys	 by	
1920,	they	re-emerged	in	the	1970s.	Cities	with	large	immigrant	and	black	transit-
dependent	populations,	 such	as	Baltimore,	Boston,	Chicago,	New	York,	Miami,	and	
Omaha,	 supported	 illegal	 jitneys	 that	 adapted	 to	 changing	 development	 patterns	
better	 than	 public	 transit	 authorities	 (Teal	 and	 Nemer	 1986;	 Davis	 1990;	 Suzuki	
1995;	Cervero	1997;	Richmond	2001).	Cervero	(1997)	highlights	the	jitneys’	ability	
to	 help	 transit-dependent	 populations	 to	 spatial	 barriers	 created	 by	 growing	
automobile	 ownership	 rates	 and	 suburbanization	 when	 he	 writes,	 “While	 public	
transit	 authorities	 have	 gotten	 into	 the	 business	 of	 running	 reverse-commute	
services….	 For	 inner	 city	 residents	 who	 cannot	 afford	 to	 own	 a	 car,	 shared-ride	
jitneys	and	vans	 that	provide	 low-priced,	 curb-to-curb	service	are	among	 the	next	
best	thing”	(p.	10).	
Even	as	jitneys	proved	effective	for	some	communities,	municipal	regulations	
continued	 to	 outlaw	 the	 jitneys.	 This	 time	 around,	 however,	 enforcement	 and	
regulations	seemed	uninterested	in	running	the	jitneys	off	the	road.	Without	a	clear	
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enemy	 or	 vested	 interest	 to	 lobby	 local	 officials—by	 this	 time	 the	 federal	
government	 had	 financed	 the	 public	 takeover	 of	 transit	 through	 the	 Urban	 Mass	
Transit	Act	of	1964—this	second	generation	of	 jitneys	developed	on	the	 fringes	of	
established	 transit	 markets	 (Richmond	 2001).	 Suzuki	 (1995)	 speculates	 on	 the	
hesitance	to	uphold	the	laws	prohibiting	“vernacular”	taxis,	another	term	for	jitneys,	
in	 Boston	 when	 he	 writes,	 “There	 have	 been	 some	 attempts	 to	 crack	 down	 on	
vernaculars	in	Boston,	but	with	little	success	to	date.		Perhaps	a	contributing	reason	
for	 relaxed	 enforcement	 is	 that	 vernaculars	 often	 are	 willing	 to	 travel	 to	
neighborhoods	 that	medallion	cab	drivers	 consider	 to	be	 too	dangerous”	 (p.	130).		
Suzuki’s	finding	is	an	important	one	because	it	spatializes	the	jitneys	and	points	to	
the	 uneven	 application	 of	 the	 law.	 Jitneys	 are	 not	 ubiquitous.	 They	 cluster	 in	 the	





I	 describe	 the	world	of	 the	dollar	vans	across	 three	axes.	 	 First,	 I	 place	 the	
vans	circa	2016	into	their	appropriate	context.	This	means	that	I	will	explore	their	
history,	detailing	relevant	 legislative	and	regulatory	actions,	and	answer	questions	
such	 as:	 why	 did	 the	 vans	 originate	 in	 West	 Indian	 neighborhoods	 in	 the	 outer	
boroughs	and	how	did	the	vans	come	to	be	regulated	by	the	TLC?		In	chapter	two,	I	






planners	who	 shape	 transportation	 planning	 and	 policy	 in	 New	 York.	 It	 is	 in	 this	
chapter	 that	 I	 connect	 the	 vans	 with	 issues	 of	 social	 justice,	 gentrification,	 and	
informality.	
Third,	 I	 compare	 the	vans	 to	 conventional	modes	of	 transit,	 specifically	 the	
bus.	 	 In	 chapter	 four,	 I	 situate	 the	 vans	 within	 the	 broader	 transit	 literature.	 By	
surveying	 van	 passengers,	 scraping	 BusTime	 data,	 and	 timing	 van	 rides,	 I	



























Why	do	 van	 passengers	 choose	 the	 vans	 over	 the	 bus;	 5)	What	 are	 the	 operating	
characteristics	 of	 the	 vans	 and	 how	 do	 they	 compare	 to	 the	 bus;	 6)	 How	 are	







2013).	 When	 the	 City	 of	 New	 York	 (2007)	 published	 PlaNYC	 2030,	 its	 long-term	
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sustainability	plan,	it	described	good	access	to	transit	as	being	within	a	half-mile	of	a	
bus	 or	 subway	 station.	 By	 this	 measure,	 which	 is	 generally	 accepted	 within	 the	
discipline,	 the	 neighborhoods	 adjacent	 to	 Flatbush	 Avenue,	 the	 site	 of	 this	
dissertation,	have	robust	access	to	the	bus.	However,	bus	access	and	subway	access	
are	unequal	(Guerra	et	al.	2012).		
	 The	consequences	of	plodding	bus	 service	and	spatial	 separation	are	great,	
especially	when	 other	 areas	 of	 a	 city	 are	 served	 by	 swift,	 dependable	 transit	 that	
eases	access	to	 jobs,	services,	and	everything	else	a	city	has	to	offer	(Handy	1994;	
Handy	2002;	Ross	2000;	Blumenberg	 and	Manville	 2004;	 Julnes	 and	Halter	2000;	
Kawabata	 2003).	 Using	 the	 Regional	 Plan	 Association’s	 (2014)	 Access	 to	 jobs	
interactive	 tool,	 one	 can	 quickly	 visualize	 how	 uneven	 job	 access	 is	 based	 on	
proximity	to	transit	mode.5	When	measuring	job	access	from	Midtown	Manhattan,	a	
30-minute	transit	ride	provides	access	to	nearly	three	million	jobs.	All	of	that	access	
is	 the	by-product,	 in	part,	 of	 a	dense	network	of	overlapping	 subways,	 buses,	 and	
commuter	 rail	 lines.	 When	 one	 uses	 the	 same	 tool	 to	 map	 access	 to	 jobs	 from	
Flatlands,	 Brooklyn,	 an	 area	 served	 by	 the	 vans,	 that	 number	 drops	 to	 roughly	
75,000	 jobs,	 or	 97	 percent	 fewer	 jobs	 [Figure	 1].	 Here,	 Flatlanders	 only	 have	
immediate	 access	 to	 the	 bus,	 which	 explains	 the	 tight	 clustering	 of	 jobs	 when	
compared	to	the	spread	of	jobs	accessible	from	Midtown	Manhattan.		As	a	result	of	
being	primarily	dependent	on	the	bus—Flatlanders	can	connect	 to	 the	subway	via	










The	 vans	 respond	 to	 a	 geographically	 specific	 problem:	 adequate	 access	 to	
inadequate	 transit	 service.	 To	 better	 understand	 why	 the	 City	 and	 its	 residents	
tolerate	unequal	access	to	transit,	I	examined	transportation	planning	methods	and	
policy	 formation	 in	New	York	using	 ethnographic	methods	 to	 gain	 greater	 insight	
into	how	the	vans	are	regulated	and	understood	by	policymakers	(Creswell	2007,	p.	
94).	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 50	 community	 meetings	 and	 semi-structured	 interviews	
with	 policymakers,	 elected	 officials,	 regulators,	 private	 sector	 transportation	
planners,	 van	 drivers	 and	 operators,	 transportation	 advocates,	 community	
organizers,	 and	 an	 extensive	 review	 of	 documents	 from	 the	 City	 of	 New	 York,	 I	
discovered	 that	 transportation	 planning	 in	 New	 York	 is	 often	 ad	 hoc	 rather	 than	
systematic	and	that	political	and	development	pressures	often	guide	decisions	about	
what	is	studied.		
This	 planning	 process	 has	 allowed	 the	 vans	 to	 toil	 in	 obscurity	while	 new	
regulations	have	been	added	in	response	to	specific	crises,	namely	safety	concerns	
or	 the	 reduction	 of	 bus	 service,	 rather	 than	 any	 consistent	 planning	 approach	 to	
understand	the	travel	needs	of	the	communities	served	by	the	vans	or	the	realities	





In	 some	 of	 these	 countries,	 national	 agencies	 issued	 elaborate	
regulations	concerning	the	use	of	forests,	but	were	unable	to	employ	
sufficient	 numbers	 of	 foresters	 to	 enforce	 those	 regulations.	 The	
foresters	 who	 were	 employed	 were	 paid	 such	 low	 salaries	 that	
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accepting	bribes	became	a	common	means	of	supplementing	income.	
The	 consequence	 was	 that	 nationalization	 created	 open-access	
resources	 where	 limited-access	 common-property	 resources	 had	
previously	existed.	(emphasis	in	the	original)(p.	23)		
	
For	 Ostrom’s	 purposes,	 a	 set	 of	 de	 facto	 regulations	 existed	 prior	 to	 states’	
intervention.	While	the	de	facto	regulations	were	flawed,	they	also	safeguarded	the	
longevity	 of	 the	 resource	by	 limiting	 access	 and	 curbing	behavior	 that	 threatened	
the	long-term	viability	of	the	resource.	Once	the	state	overturned	those	century	old	
rules,	however,	 the	 forests	became	open-access	 resources	 that	anyone	could	mine	
without	the	check	of	either	the	old	de	facto	regulations	or	the	new	state-sanctioned	
ones	due	to	the	prevalence	of	bribery.	With	no	enforceable	checks	and	no	certainty,	
individuals,	 she	 argues,	 are	 encouraged	 to	 log	 as	 much	 of	 the	 forest	 as	 possible	







to	 ignore,	 dismiss	 as	 intractable,	 or	 police	 erratically	 (Rios	2014;	Roy	2009).	 This	




transitioned	 from	ubiquitous	 coverage	 to	 serving	 areas	of	 the	 city	 that	 can	 turn	 a	
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profit,	or	be	customized	 to	match	resident’s	willingness	 to	pay,	new	systems	have	
emerged,	 such	 as	 informal	 water	 delivery	 and	 unsanctioned	 transport	 services	
(Suzuki	1985;	Uzzell	1987;	Graham	and	Marvin	2001;	McDonald	2008;	Cervero	and	
Golub	 2007;	Acey	 2010;	 Bhatt	 2014;	Oviedo-Hernandez	 and	Dávila	 2016).	During	
this	 same	 period	 of	 fracture	 or	 “splintering,”	 to	 borrow	 a	 term	 from	Graham	 and	
Marvin	 (2001),	 the	 planning	 literature	 has	 shifted	 its	 focus	 from	 externalities	
created	 by	 polluting	 land-uses	 to	 an	 emphasis	 on	 inequality	 rooted	 in	 social	
disadvantage.	These	types	of	“invisible”	networks,	which	serve	the	same	function	as	
formal	and	state	sanctioned	networks,	represent	attempts	by	disadvantaged	groups	
to	 overcome	neglect	 at	 the	 state	 level	 and	 achieve	 regular	 access	 to	 vital	 services	
(Taylor	1998,	p.148;	Scott	1998).			
The	 growing	 number	 of	 examples	 of	 unplanned	 transport	 systems—
unplanned,	 as	 in	 not	 planned	 by	 the	 state—speaks	 to	 both	 the	 inability	 of	 the	
engineering	 and	 economics	 paradigms,	 dominant	 in	 transportation	 planning,	 to	
account	 for	 the	 rich	 variety	 of	 systems	 that	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 face	 of	 centrally	
planned	transit	systems	and	an	exclusionary	mode	of	governance	that	favors	areas	
of	 cities	 that	 attract	 capital	 investment	 (Walder	 1985;	 Golub	 2003;	 Garrison	 and	
Levinson	2006;	Cervero	and	Golub	2007).	These	networks,	or	“dark	twins”	as	Scott	
(1998)	would	 say,	 and	 the	 spaces	where	 they	 thrive	 embody	 Soja’s	 (1989)	 socio-
spatial	 dialectic.	 Soja	 argues	 that	 social	 relations	 affect	 the	 organization	 and	
production	of	 space	and	 that	 spatial	 arrangements	and	production	 reflect	 existing	
social	relations:	“The	structure	of	organized	space	 is	not	a	separate	structure	with	





These	 attempts	 to	 overcome	 disadvantage	 are	 valuable	 pieces	 of	 feedback	
that	 planners	 can	 learn	 from	 as	 they	 think	 about	 housing,	 food	 systems,	 and	
transport	 (Uzzell	 1990;	 Ferreira	 and	Golub	 2004).	 To	 improve	 transport	 network	
design	 and	 serve	 those	 most	 transit-dependent	 populations,	 it	 is	 critical	 to	
understand	how	people	get	around	and	how	existing	transit	systems	fail	or	succeed	
to	serve	them	(Rogalsky	2010;	Perrotta	2015).			
By	 focusing	 on	 the	 vans,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 study	 transportation	 planning	 and	
policy	 in	New	York	 through	an	 “atypical	 case.”	Rather	 than	 tackling	 the	 sprawling	
MTA,	 the	 owner	 and	 operator	 of	 New	 York	 City’s	 buses,	 subways,	 and	 commuter	
rail,	the	commuter	vans	provided	an	opportunity	to	focus	specifically	on	the	issue	of	




basic	mechanisms	 in	 the	situation	studied.	 In	addition,	 from	both	an	
understanding-oriented	and	an	action-oriented	perspective,	it	is	often	
more	 important	 to	clarify	 the	deeper	causes	behind	a	given	problem	





term	 planning	 exercises	 rather	 than	 describe	 transportation	 planning	 and	 policy	





planning	 and	 policy	 terrain	 in	 New	 York,	 I	 use	 ethnographic	 methods	 to	 bring	
multiple	 viewpoints	 into	 contact	 with	 one	 another.	 Through	 my	 interviews	 and	
regular	attendance	at	 local	meetings,	 I	 strive	 to	add	a	new	voice	 to	 transportation	
policy	 debates—the	 voice	 of	 the	 commuter	 van	 industry—provide	 a	 fuller	
understanding	 of	 people’s	 needs,	 and	 show	 how	 uninformed	 policy	 fails	 entire	
neighborhoods.			
	 Transportation	planning	methods	purport	to	provide	a	comprehensive	view	
of	 the	 world.	 This	 flattening,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 central	 tendencies,	 marginalizes	
difference	and	paints	a	false	picture	of	the	city.	Haraway	(1991)	argues	that	unified	
knowledge	 that	 is	 easily	 filtered	 through	 a	 black	 box	 is	 a	myth,	 and	 that	 instead,	
knowledge	is	inherently	particular,	unique,	partial,	and	situated:		
There	 is	 no	 unmediated	 photograph	 or	 passive	 camera	 obscura	 in	
scientific	 accounts	 of	 bodies	 and	 machines;	 there	 are	 only	 highly	
specific	 visual	 possibilities,	 each	with	 a	wonderfully	 detailed,	 active,	
partial	 way	 of	 organizing	 worlds.	 All	 these	 pictures	 of	 the	 world	












Dollar	vans	developed	 in	 the	1970s	as	 the	City’s	 fiscal	crisis	 threatened	the	
provision	of	public	services,	representing	a	“splintering”	of	transit	options	for	daily	
riders	 (Blumenthal	1975).	 Instead	of	waiting	 for	 the	City	and	State	 to	deliver	vital	
transportation	 services,	 local	 entrepreneurs	 seized	 the	 opportunity	 and	 offered	
faster	 and	more	 reliable	 van	 services.6	I	 reconstruct	 the	 regulatory	 history,	which	
starts	 in	earnest	 in	the	1980s,	 in	order	to	answer	my	first	research	question:	How	
did	existing	van	regulations	come	to	be	divorced	from	daily	practice?	To	answer	this	
question,	 I	used	 two	methods:	 archival	 research	and	semi-structured	 interviews.	 I	




City	 Council	 member	 to	 clarify	 the	 official	 record	 provided	 by	 the	 examined	
documents.		
I	examined	the	TLC’s	archive	of	monthly	meetings	to	see	what	the	TLC’s	staff	
and	 commissioners	 knew	 about	 the	 vans	 during	 key	 regulatory	 moments	 in	 the	
vans’	history.	To	do	this,	I	reviewed	every	monthly	TLC	hearing	between	1990	and	
1999.	The	TLC	first	took	up	regulatory	oversight	over	the	vans	in	the	early	1990s.	I	








the	 vans.	 First,	 I	 read	 every	 single	 transcript	 of	 each	 meeting	 and	 coded	 each	
instance	 the	 vans	 appeared	 in	 the	 transcripts.	 This	 comprehensive	 approach	
allowed	me	 to	 catch	every	 reference	 to	 the	vans	 that	 relied	on	 context	 to	address	
them.	In	addition,	it	provided	me	with	invaluable	insight	into	what	occurred	during	
these	 meetings.	 In	 these	 meetings,	 the	 TLC	 commissioners	 reviewed	 policy	 and	
disciplinary	 actions	 against	 drivers	 who	 had	 violated	 the	 Commission’s	 rules.	
Second,	I	double-checked	my	reading	by	using	a	document	search	for	each	meeting	
that	 included	 the	 terms	 “vans,”	 “dollar,”	 “local	 law	115,”	 “local	 law	83,”	 “Ricketts,”	
and	 “commuter”	 to	 guarantee	 I	 found	 each	 mention	 in	 the	 transcripts.	 Over	 the	
course	of	96	meetings,	a	period	that	saw	the	vans	come	under	 the	rule	of	 the	TLC	
and	a	 lawsuit	 that	redefined	 the	Commission’s	authority,	 the	vans	came	up	briefly	
10	 times.	 In	 three	 of	 these	 instances,	 the	 commissioners	 discussed	 extending	
existing	 yellow	 taxi	 and	 livery	 policies	 to	 the	 vans,	 such	 as	 cell	 phone	 usage	











the	 vans.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	meeting	was	 to	 debate	 proposed	 local	 legislation	 to	
regulate	 the	 vans.	 Through	 a	 contact	 at	 the	 City	 Council,	 I	 acquired	 an	 electronic	
copy	 of	 all	 of	 the	written	 testimony	 and	 transcripts	 from	 the	 hearing.7	I	 read	 and	
coded	 this	 226-page	 document	 in	 its	 entirety.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	 reading,	 I	 also	
tracked	down	two	Department	of	Transportation	reports	that	focused	on	the	vans.	
Since	 these	 reports	 are	 standalone	 documents,	 I	 read	 them,	 took	 notes,	 and	
investigated	relevant	references.	
The	 last	 archival	 source	 I	 consulted	 during	 my	 research	 was	 that	 of	
newspapers	 and	 journals.	 I	 used	 databases	 through	 the	 Columbia	 University	
Library’s	website,	Google,	and	local	newspapers,	including	the	New	York	Times,	Daily	
News,	 New	 York	 Post,	 and	 neighborhood	 newspapers	 in	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens.	 I	
searched	 for	 the	 terms	 “van,”	 “dollar	van,“	 “commuter	van,”	 “local	 law	115,”	 “local	
law	83,”	group	ride	vehicle,”	and	“Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission.”	Any	time	these	
searches	returned	results,	 I	would	 look	at	 the	date	and	 title	of	 the	article	 to	make	




Transportation	 research	 tends	 to	 emphasize	 quantitative	 methods	 that	







asked:	 How	 do	 planners	 and	 policymakers	 think	 about	 the	 vans;	 and	 how	 do	










of	 it;	 we	 will	 investigate	 the	 actual	 practices	 of	 politics,	
administration,	 and	 planning	 before	 their	 rules;	 and	we	will	 not	 be	
satisfied	by	learning	only	about	those	parts	of	the	practices	that	take	
place	 in	 public….	 For	 readers	 who	 stick	 with	 the	 minutiae	 of	 the	
















Modern	 planning	 practice	 is	 a	 social	 and	 political	 process	 in	 which	
many	 actors,	 representing	 many	 different	 interests,	 participate	 in	 a	
refined	 division	 of	 labor.	 Among	 these	 actors,	 the	 more	 important	
ones	 are	 lawyers,	 agronomists,	 economists,	 water	 engineers,	 city	
planners,	 social	workers,	 statisticians,	 systems	analysts,	professional	
soldiers,	 civilian	 defense	 analysts,	 political	 scientists,	 social	
psychologists,	 public	 administrators,	 geographers,	 foresters,	




about	 the	 vans	 and	 the	 practice	 of	 planning	 in	New	York	 than	 I	 otherwise	would	
have	by	focusing	on	a	single	agency	or	one	sector	of	the	industry.		
	 I	 requested	 interviews	with	 planners	 at	 the	MTA,	 TLC,	 DCP,	 and	DOT	who	
had	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 vans	 or	 transit	 planning.	 I	 also	 reached	 out	 to	 elected	
officials	who	had	made	public	comments	about	the	vans	or	served	on	the	Council’s	
Committee	 on	 Transportation.	 I	 interviewed	 private	 sector	 planners	 who	 have	
worked	with	 the	City	and	have	overseen	 their	own	projects.	Finally,	 I	 interviewed	
community	members	 and	 transit	 advocates	who	had	publicly	 discussed	 the	 social	
justice	 implications	 of	 transit.	 While	 setting	 up	 these	 interviews,	 a	 number	 of	
planners	agreed	to	be	interviewed,	but	 insisted	that	I	not	record	the	interviews	or	
reveal	 their	 identities.	 In	 order	 to	 accommodate	 this	 request,	 I	 decided	 to	 take	




that	 I	 wanted	 to	 highlight.	 Once	 I	 asked	 my	 questions	 and	 received	 adequate	
answers,	I	posed	additional	questions	based	on	the	content	of	the	interviews.	I	also	
followed	 up	my	 interviews	with	 subsequent	 interviews,	 emails,	 or	 phone	 calls	 to	
clarify	any	lingering	questions.		
In	addition	to	interviewing	multiple	actors	about	the	vans,	I	wanted	to	learn	
about	 the	 different	 techniques	 and	 skills	 they	 used	 to	 study	 the	 vans	 and	 other	
modes	 of	 transportation.	 During	 my	 interviews	 with	 planners,	 I	 asked	 about	 the	
data	they	collect,	the	planning	process	they	conduct,	the	knowledge	they	value,	and	
the	 obstacles	 they	 face.	 As	 Forester	 (1989)	 wrote,	 “[P]lanning	 analysts	 do	 much	
more	than	‘process	feedback’...they	formulate	problems,	analysts	preempt	decision-
makers;	 they	 define	 and	 select	 the	 feedback	 as	well	 as	 process	 it.	 They	watch	 for	
new	opportunities.	They	 face	uncertainties	 that	are	anything	but	well	defined	and	
that	 cannot	 be	 routinely	 monitored”	 (p.15).	 Planning	 is	 a	 dynamic	 process	 that	
responds	 to	 social	 and	 political	 pressures;	 thus,	 it	 follows	 the	 action	 rather	 than	
unfolding	in	a	neutral	technocratic	vacuum.			
I	also	used	my	 interviews	to	 follow	up	on	events	 I	observed	at	City	Council	
meetings	or	read	about	in	my	archival	research.	In	Brash’s	(2011)	study	of	economic	
development	in	New	York,	he	conducted	interviews	with	local	officials	“to	draw	out	







focus	my	questions	on	precisely	 the	 subjects	 that	were	 important	 to	me	and	 seek	
clarification	where	necessary.	
While	my	 ethnographic	 research	 allowed	me	 to	 dig	 deeper	 into	 the	 policy	
formation	 process,	 it	 also	 revealed	 how	 money	 and	 influence	 shaped	 municipal	
action,	 agendas,	 and	 outcomes.	 During	 the	 TLC’s	 monthly	 meetings,	 meetings	 I	
either	attended	or	watched	online,	it	was	common	to	see	and	hear	from	yellow	taxi,	
livery,	and	paratransit	industry	leaders.	These	leaders	lobbied	the	Commission	and	





between	dollar	van	 interests	 and	 local	officials.	Without	 stronger	 linkages	 to	 local	
government,	 it	 is	no	 surprise	 that	 the	 laws	 regulating	 the	vans	 fail	 to	 reflect	daily	
practice	in	Brooklyn	and	Queens	and	that	local	officials	have	trouble	understanding	
the	difference	between	a	licensed	commuter	van	and	an	authorization.	In	Gregory’s	
(1998)	work	on	political	 activism	and	 the	black	 experience	 in	Corona,	Queens,	 he	




[t]he	greater	 class-based	political	 capital	 at	 the	disposal	of	 residents	
of	 the	East	Side	 [of	Manhattan]	provided	 them	with	 the	capacity	not	
only	 to	 formulate	 their	 interests	more	 effectively	 but	 to	 bring	 those	
interests	 to	 bear	 in	 public	 with	 greater	 authority	 than	 their	
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above,	 the	 Queens	 coalition’s	 general	 objection	 to	 the	 train	 aligned	 with	 the	
Manhattan	 coalition’s	 agenda.	 Both	 groups	 were	 served,	 but	 only	 because	 the	
Manhattan	 coalition	 managed	 to	 frame	 their	 critiques	 in	 a	 language	 the	 Port	
Authority	 understood,	 technical	 jargon	 and	 political	 pressure.	 The	 same	 power,	
class,	and	race	asymmetries	exist	with	the	vans.	For	the	last	twenty-three	years,	van	
operators	 have	 complained	 about	 the	 local	 laws	 governing	 them	 but	 have	 not	
figured	out	a	way	to	marshal	their	resources	effectively	to	change	them.			
The	Survey	and	Operating	Characteristics	
	 The	 primary	 reason	 for	 the	 vans’	 existence	 is	 that	 they	 provide	 superior	
service,	 in	 the	 estimation	of	 their	 riders,	 than	 the	 existing	 transit	 options,	 namely	
the	bus.	To	demonstrate	this	empirically	and	answer	my	fourth	research	question:	
Why	do	van	passengers	choose	the	vans	over	the	bus?	I	administered	over	200	16-
question	 surveys	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2013.	 The	 survey	 asked	 van	 passengers	 their	
thoughts	 about	 the	 vans	 and	 the	 bus	 directly.	 It	 also	 asked	 for	 demographic,	
employment,	 and	 income	 data	 (Appendix	 1).	 Since	 all	 of	 the	 surveys	 were	 taken	
inside	 of	 moving	 vans,	 I	 also	 used	 direct	 systematic	 observation	 to	 record	 trip	
duration,	popular	stops,	and	passenger	turnover	during	rides.	This	additional	data	
set	 allowed	 me	 to	 answer	 my	 fifth	 research	 question:	 What	 are	 the	 operating	




every	 B41	 bus	 along	 Flatbush	 Avenue.9	Since	 BusTime	 does	 not	 store	 its	 data,	 at	
least	 not	 for	 public	 use,	 I	wrote	 a	 program	 that	 downloaded	 every	B41’s	 position	








along	 the	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 corridor	 and	 a	 proposed	 East	 New	 York	 corridor,	 I	
compared	the	operator’s	anecdotal	observations	against	Census	and	MTA	ridership	












	 In	 2014,	 I	 conducted	 extensive	 interviews	 with	 policymakers,	 planners,	
transit	 advocates,	 and	 others	 responsible	 for	 New	 York	 City’s	 transportation	
planning	and	policy.	I	was	fortunate	to	schedule	an	interview	with	a	New	York	City	
council	member	who	 sits	 on	 the	 Council’s	 Committee	 on	Transportation.	 She	was	
the	 perfect	 fit	 because	 of	 her	 deep	 interest	 in	 transportation	 policy	 and	 avowed	
criticism	of	dollar	vans.	Before	concluding	our	interview,	she	posed	a	few	questions	
of	 her	 own,	most	 of	 which	were	 rhetorical:	 “What	 do	 you	 think	would	 happen	 if	
these	 vans	 were	 operating	 in	 Manhattan?	 If	 they	 were	 running	 up	 and	 down	
Broadway	or	Fifth	Avenue	jumping	in	and	out	of	traffic?	Do	you	think	anyone	would	
stand	 for	 that?	Why	are	 these	vans	acceptable	 in	Brooklyn	and	Queens,	but	not	 in	
Manhattan”	(Personal	Interview	2014a)?			
Underlying	this	line	of	questioning	was	an	unstated	but	clear	comment	about	
equity.	 The	 council	 member	 wanted	 to	 know,	 “Why	 do	 black	 and	 brown	
communities,	with	 the	 longest	 commutes,	 have	 to	 put	 up	with	 anything	 less	 than	
high	 quality	 MTA	 bus	 service”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014a)?	 The	 intractability	 of	
unequal	service	for	equal	New	Yorkers	motivates	this	dissertation	and	my	interest	
in	New	York’s	dollar	 vans	more	 than	anything.	While	 the	 council	member	 is	 right	
that	 the	 vans	 that	 thrive	 on	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 would	 be	 unable	 to	 flourish	 in	
Manhattan’s	Central	Business	District,	the	story	is	not	as	simple	as	poor	service	for	
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black	 and	 brown	 people	 and	 higher	 quality	 service	 for	 white	 people.	 Dollar	 vans	
represent	a	different	type	of	transportation	service	from	buses,	subways,	or	taxis.		
	 Throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 explain	 why	 transportation	 researchers,	
planners,	and	policymakers	would	benefit	from	an	understanding	of	the	ambiguous	
terrain	occupied	by	dollar	vans	in	order	to	better	sense	what	passengers	want	and	
how	 demographic	 shifts	 can	 be	 managed.	 Vans,	 as	 opposed	 to	 fixed	 rail	
infrastructure,	 or	 the	 seemingly	 immutable	 routes	 of	 buses,	 can	 and	 should	 be	
recognized	as	a	viable	option	for	improving	access	in	the	outer	boroughs.		I	use	this	
chapter	 to	define	 the	 terms	used	 in	my	dissertation	and	 to	clarify	what	 I	mean	by	
“dollar	van.”	I	draw	a	distinction	between	licensed	“commuter	vans”	and	unlicensed	
“pirates.”	 	 Next,	 I	 will	 provide	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 development	 of	
these	vans	in	New	York	City.			
Dollar	 vans	developed	 as	 the	City’s	 fiscal	 crisis	 threatened	 the	provision	of	
public	 services,	 representing	 a	 “splintering”	 of	 transit	 options	 for	 daily	 riders.		
Instead	of	waiting	for	the	City	and	State	to	deliver	vital	transportation	services,	local	
entrepreneurs	 seized	 the	 opportunity	 and	 began	 to	 offer	 faster	 and	more	 reliable	
van	 services.	 I	 reconstruct	 the	 regulatory	 history	 of	 the	 vans	 through	 a	 careful	
examination	of	historical	documents:	the	TLC’s	archive	of	monthly	meeting	minutes,	
relevant	newspaper	articles,	the	few	City	sanctioned	studies	of	the	vans,	City	Council	
testimony,	and	two	court	cases.	 	Finally,	as	highlighted	 in	Chapter	Three,	 I	 rely	on	
three	interviews	with	a	former	City	Council	member	and	a	current	and	former	TLC	














these	 policies	 have	 hampered	 van	 operators	 without	 improving	 the	 passenger	
experience.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	 poorly	 informed,	 these	 programs	 have	 proven	
unresponsive	to	the	needs	of	the	commuter	van	operators,	drivers,	and	passengers.		
















hire	 transit	 service	 or	 common	 carrier. 11 	Simply	 put,	 dollar	 vans—whether	
operating	without	 a	 license	 (known	as	 pirates)	 or	 licensed	 and	 recognized	by	 the	







11	Common	 carrier,	 a	 legal	 term	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 for-hire	 transit	 operators,	 was	 defined	 by	 the	
Department	of	City	Planning	 (1986)	as,	 “a	person	or	organization	 that	provides,	 for	 compensation,	
transportation	services	[available]	to	the	general	public	on	an	individual	fare	basis”	(p.	53).	
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Prior	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 vans,	 jitneys	 provided	 a	 similar	 service	 in	
American	 cities	 that	 lacked	 adequate	 transit	 service.	 The	 jitneys	 first	 emerged	 in	
American	cities	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century	(King	and	Goldwyn	2014b).		As	
the	market	for	second-hand	cars	developed	and	economic	conditions	declined,	some	
out-of-work	 car	 owners	 turned	 to	 providing	 rides	 in	 their	 personal	 vehicles	 for	 a	
nickel	as	they	looked	for	new	jobs	(Hodges	2006).				
This	new	mode	competed	directly	with	streetcars,	as	they	travelled	along	the	
same	 routes.	 However,	 the	 jitneys	 quickly	 won	 over	 the	 affection	 of	 passengers	
because	they	could	deviate	from	the	route	if	need	be.		Unlike	a	tracked	streetcar,	the	
jitney	 had	 free	 reign	 of	 the	 roadways	 and	 served	 parts	 of	 the	 city	 that	 were	
developing	and	untracked	(Hodges	2006,	p.	254).	This	seemingly	minor	difference,	
in	 addition	 to	 overall	 dissatisfaction	 with	 streetcar	 performance,	 gave	 jitneys	 a	
unique	 advantage	 over	 their	 track-bound	 competition	 (Bottles	 1987;	 McShane	
1994).	Eckert	and	Hilton	(1972)	capture	the	shape-shifting	nature	of	 jitneys	when	
they	describe	 jitney	service	as	a	mixture	of	 “buses,	 taxicabs,	and	delivery	vehicles.	
The	basic	operation	of	the	jitneys	was	as	buses	in	or	out	of	central	business	districts.	
Typically,	 they	 picked	 up	 passengers	 at	 streetcar	 stops	 where,	 obviously,	 people	
demanding	public	transportation	congregated,	and	carried	them	along	the	car	lines”	
(pp.	295-296).	So,	 jitneys	are	mainly	buses	 that	provide	 flexible	 service	and	share	
characteristics	with	taxicabs.	
The	 jitneys’	 trademark	 hybridity,	 which	 combined	 the	 cheap	 fare	 of	 a	
streetcar	 with	 the	 taxi’s	 point-to-point	 flexibility,	 carved	 out	 its	 niche	 in	 urban	
transportation	 markets	 across	 America.	 As	 the	 jitneys	 grew	 in	 popularity	 and	
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challenged	streetcar	companies	for	passengers,	municipalities	responded	swiftly	on	
behalf	 of	 streetcar	 interests	 to	 eliminate	 competition.	 This	 widespread	 move	 to	
maintain	 the	 streetcar’s	 primacy	 was	 not	 a	 trivial	 consideration	 at	 a	 time	 when	
fewer	 than	 five	percent	of	Americans	owned	an	automobile	and	 the	dissolution	of	
streetcars	would	have	immobilized	American	cities,	which	had	developed	a	spatial	
structure	 that	 access	 to	motorized	 travel	 (Census	 1999,	 pp.	 868	&	 885;	 Schaeffer	
and	 Sclar	 1980).	 In	 all	 fairness	 to	municipalities	 that	 acted	 on	 behalf	 of	 streetcar	
interests,	 jitneys	 were	 habitually	 fickle:	 drivers	 abandoned	 their	 routes	 without	
warning	when	they	found	new	jobs	or	their	cars	needed	repairs.	 	This	uncertainty	







Despite	 this	 regulatory	 pushback,	 which	 nearly	 eradicated	 the	 jitneys	 a	
century	 ago,	 their	 most	 basic	 and	 desirable	 attributes	 remained	 in	 the	 public	
consciousness.	 Low	 fares,	 frequent	 service,	 and	 flexible	 routing	have	 given	 rise	 to	
the	 multi-billion	 dollar	 app-based	 transportation	 industry,	 with	 companies	 like	




eventually	 subject	 to	 a	 series	 of	 public	 takeovers,	 could	 not	 compete	 with	
automobiles	 as	 the	 country	 embarked	 upon	 a	massive	 road-building	 odyssey	 that	
contributed	 to	 the	decentralization	of	 cities	and	 laid	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	rise	of	





	 The	 rise	 of	 the	 dollar	 vans	 is	 typically	 attributed	 to	 the	 11-day	 1980	
Transport	 Workers	 Union	 (TWU)	 and	 Amalgamated	 Transit	 Union	 (ATU)	 strike	
(Sadik-Khan	1993;	Giuliani	v.	Council	of	the	City	of	New	York,	1999;	Daus	et	al.	2016).		
While	 labor	 disputes	 brought	 regular	 transit	 service	 to	 a	 halt	 within	 the	 city,	
entrepreneurs	 in	the	outer	boroughs	stepped	into	the	breach	and	provided	dollar-
van	 service	 to	 keep	 New	 Yorkers	moving.	 These	 services	 proved	 so	 popular	 that	
over	time	they	established	a	regular	customer	base	and	competed	with	the	MTA	for	
more	 riders	 after	 the	 labor	 dispute	 was	 resolved	 (Department	 of	 City	 Planning	
1986;	Department	of	City	Planning	1998).	But	the	opportunity	offered	by	the	strike	
and	 seized	 by	 van	 operators	 underscored	 the	 much	 larger	 issue	 of	 mounting	
dissatisfaction	 with	 MTA	 service	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	 government	
retrenchment.	 Grava	 et	 al.	 (1987)	 concluded	 that	 it	 was	 the	 combination	 of	 the	
strike	and	declining	transit	service	that	allowed	the	vans	to	thrive,	which	follows	a	
similar	narrative	to	the	jitneys	almost	seventy	years	earlier:	
The	 establishment	 and	 growth	 of	 the	 van	 operations	 have	 been	
triggered	 by	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 regular	 transit	 service	 and	 riders’	
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concerns	 about	 personal	 safety	 and	 demand	 for	 better	 accessibility.	
The	 transit	 strike	 of	 1980	 gave	 a	 significant	 boost	 to	 the	 private	
operations,	which	 did	 not	 fade	much	 after	 the	 strike	was	 settled	 (p.	
62).	
	
Hood	 (2004,	p.	 254)	 captures	 the	depth	of	 the	 subway’s	decline	 in	 the	1970s	and	
1980s	when	he	writes,	“Nine	of	every	ten	subway	trains	had	run	on	schedule	during	
the	 1930s	 and	 1940s,	 but	 by	 1983	 on-time	 performance	 fell	 to	 70	 percent.	 The	
average	distance	a	subway	car	traveled	between	breakdowns	dropped	from	34,294	
miles	 in	 1964	 to	 9,000	 miles	 in	 1984.”	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 very	 real	 service	
problems,	 Hood	 connects	 the	 unraveling	 of	 New	 York’s	 transit	 system	 with	 the	
broader	 “urban	 crisis”	 debates	 that	 captured	 a	 generation	 of	 historians,	





declined	 by	 800,000	 residents,	 which	 forced	 the	 City’s	 leaders	 to	make	 decisions	
about	 how	 to	 allocate	 declining	 resources	 (United	 States	 Census	 Bureau	 1998;	
Greenberg	2008).	In	a	detailed	New	York	Times,	Martin	Gottlieb	(1985)	reflected	on	
the	 city	 ten-years	 after	 the	 dramatic	 fiscal	 crisis	 that	 “set	 in	motion	 fundamental	
changes	 in	 the	 fabric	 and	 psychology	 of	 the	 nation’s	 largest	 city,	 changes	 that	
continue	to	shape	New	York’s	government	in	ways	that	few	have	fully	understood.”	
In	order	 to	keep	 the	city	 from	filing	 for	bankruptcy,	 the	City	and	State	 “altered	 its	
approach	 to	 the	 role	 of	 government,	 capping	 off	 and	 frequently	 trimming	
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dramatically	 the	activist	social-welfare	 thrust	 that	had	held	sway	 for	40	years	and	
that,	 in	 its	 breadth,	 separated	 the	 city	 from	 virtually	 every	 other	 in	 the	 country”	
(Gottlieb,	1985).	 	This	meant,	cutting	back	social	services,	charging	tuition	at	once-
free	 universities,	 dismissing	 19,000	 civil	 servants	 in	 one	 evening,	 and	 raising	 the	




strike	 opened	 the	 door	 fot	 the	 vans’	 to	 assume	 a	 permanent	 place	 in	New	 York’s	













classroom,	 I	would	 then	have	 to	wait	 for	a	second	bus	 to	 take	me	to	
the	subway	station.	Again,	the	wait	could	be	as	long	as	fifteen	minutes.	
Almost	always	this	second	bus	would	be	filled	to	capacity,	and	I	would	






Karr’s	 testimony	highlights	 the	onerous	nature	of	 her	 commute:	 she	waits	 for	 the	
bus	twice,	pays	two	fares,	stands	on	the	bus	for	upwards	of	forty	minutes,	drops	off	
her	daughter	at	child	care,	and	then	proceeds	to	the	subway.			 	
After	 a	 year	 of	 this	 routine,	 Karr	 decided	 to	 try	 the	 vans:	 “Now,	when	my	
daughter	and	I	ride	the	vans	in	the	morning,	the	van	drivers	actually	wait	for	me	to	
walk	my	daughter	 into	 the	Education	Center	and	 to	her	classroom,	 then	 I	 reboard	
the	van	to	continue	on	my	way	to	the	subway.	This	 is	a	 total	 fare,	 the	sum	of	($1)	










patterns	and	demographic	 changes.	 Since	public	 transit	predates	 the	MTA,	and	 its	
earlier	iterations,	the	majority	of	today’s	routes	were	planned	before	the	MTA	came	
into	existence	in	1966.		A	1986	DCP	commuter	van	study	explains	that	“many	of	the	
bus	 routes	 being	 operated	 in	 the	 City	 today…have	 been	 in	 existence	 for	 decades	
without	 any	 significant	 modifications	 or	 changes,	 notwithstanding	 major	
demographic	 shifts	 over	 the	 same	 time	 period.	 As	 a	 result,	 many	 of	 today’s	 bus	
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routes	 are	 not	 as	 effective	 as	 they	might	 be”	 (pp.	 58-59).	 	When	we	 combine	 the	
transit	 strike	 with	 this	 lack	 of	 responsiveness	 to	 changing	 land-use	 patterns	 and	
demographics,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 vans’	 value	 not	 only	 comes	 from	 their	
improved	 comfort	 and	 speed,	 but	 also	 from	 their	 deeper	 understanding	 and	
adaptation	to	how	and	where	specific	communities	travel.		In	the	same	study	quoted	
above,	 the	 authors	 examined	 a	 feeder	 line	 van	 line	 operating	 in	 the	 Bronx	 and	
serving	 a	 nearby	 subway	 station:	 “van	 operators,	 aware	 of	 local	 residents’	 travel	
patterns	 and	preferences,	 have	 taken	advantage	of	 the	 absence	of	direct	 local	 bus	
service	in	this	corridor”	(p.	111).		In	addition	to	a	guaranteed	seat,	faster	ride,	more	









vehicles	that	held	fewer	than	20	passengers	and	were	not	taxis.	Thus,	 it	 fell	 to	the	




of	 the	 State	 Department	 of	 Transportation’s	 (State	 DOT)	 Regulation	 Division,	
described	the	considerable	trouble	the	State	had	regulating	the	vans	when	he	wrote:	
The	once	clear	cut	distinction	between	‘bus	line’	running	a	fixed	route	




for	 passenger	 transportation;	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 delivery	 of	
transportation	 systems	 under	 such	 programs	 as	 prearranged	
reservations,	 share-a-ride,	 vanpooling	 and	 dial-a-ride;	 and	 the	
increased	 demand	 for	 for-hire	 transportation	 brought	 on	 by	 traffic	






time	 and	 again	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 vans.	 	 Because	 the	 vans	 hold	 fewer	 than	 20	
passengers,	 they	 do	 not	 qualify	 as	 buses	 and	 are	 thus	 beyond	 the	 City’s	
jurisdiction—at	least	in	1982.		As	a	result	of	this	uncertainty	surrounding	the	nature	
of	the	vans	the	State	DOT	opted	to		“take	a	liberal	approach	in	granting	permits	
to	meet	 the	demand	 for	mass	 transportation	 services	within	New	York	City”	
(emphasis	 in	original)	(p.	7).	 In	addition	to	this	 liberal	approach	to	permitting,	the	







In	a	revealing	 letter	 to	the	editor	of	 the	New	York	Times,	Henry	Peyrebrune	
(1985),	 an	 Assistant	 Commissioner	 for	 Public	 Transportation	 at	 the	 State	 DOT,	
chided	 the	 City	 for	 not	 taking	 the	 lead	 on	 van	 regulations.	 Peyerbrune,	 perhaps	
sensitive	to	a	critical	editorial	 that	appeared	in	the	newspaper	earlier,	argued	that	
the	“regulation	of	city	traffic	belongs	in	most	part	with	the	city.”	Despite	this	obvious	
connection	between	 local	 traffic	 and	 local	 regulation,	he	 criticized	 the	City	 for	not	
assuming	“its	logical	regulation	over	the	vans”	(Peyrebrune	1985).		
As	 the	regulatory	back-and-forth	between	 the	City	and	State	continued,	 the	
van	network	continued	 to	grow	and	challenge	 the	MTA	and	private	bus	operators	
for	 passengers.	 Over	 the	 next	 few	 years,	 the	 labor	 unions	 representing	 transit	
workers	aggressively	lobbied	elected	officials	at	the	local	and	state	level	to	respond	
to	 the	 vans	 and	 stop	 them	 from	 poaching	 their	 passengers.	 In	 an	 interview	 I	
conducted	with	a	former	New	York	City	Council	Member	who	sat	on	the	Committee	
of	 Transportation	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 eventually	 oversaw	 the	 development	 of	 the	
City’s	first	local	law	to	regulate	the	vans,	that	member	told	me	that	the	labor	unions	
“lobbied	 individual	 Council	Members	 over	 the	 vans	 because	 they	were	 concerned	
about	 jobs”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014b).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 unions’	 interest	 in	
protecting	 jobs,	 the	 former-Council	 Member	 also	 mentioned	 that	 concerns	 about	









director	 of	 the	Mayor’s	Office	 of	Transportation,	 public	 safety	 concerns	motivated	
the	City’s	desire	to	regulate	the	vans.	She	described	a	number	of	headline	grabbing	
incidents,	 most	 notably	 from	 1991,	 to	 underscore	 the	 urgency	 of	 this	 matter:	
“Unlicensed	and	uninsured	vans	have	caused	numerous	accidents	and	continue	 to	
present	 serious	 safety	 hazards	 for	 pedestrians,	 motorists,	 and	 van	 passengers”	
(Sadik-Khan	1993,	p.	10).			
With	 the	 City	 eager	 to	 take	 control	 of	 the	 vans,	 the	 State	 passed	 new	
legislation	 to	 transfer	 regulatory	 authority	 to	 the	 City	 in	 1992.	 Within	 this	
legislation,	the	State	included	a	number	of	chapter	amendments	that	restricted	the	
City	Council’s	autonomy	in	drafting	its	own	local	law.	Thus,	the	transfer	was	not	as	
simple	as	 the	State	empowering	 the	City	 to	 regulate	 the	vans	 in	whatever	 fashion	
the	 City	 deemed	 appropriate.	 The	 transfer	was	more	 of	 a	 directive	 to	 the	 City	 to	
regulate	 the	 vans	 but	 to	 do	 so	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 adheres	 to	 State-mandated	
guidelines.	 In	 a	 report	 drafted	 for	 the	 Committee	 on	 Transportation	 by	 Anthony	
Baronci	 (1993),	who	 served	 as	 Counsel	 to	 the	 Committee,	 he	 outlined	 the	 State’s	
demands	in	bullet	form:	
The	legislation	permits	the	city	to	draft	a	local	law	that	does	the	following:		
-	 Designates	 a	 City	 agency	 that	 will	 assume	 responsibility	 for	 van	
regulation	(e.g.,	the	Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission).	
-	 Establishes	 criteria	 and	 regulations	 governing	 the	 issuance	 of	 van	
operating	authority.	






law	 directs	 the	 City	 to	 allow	 NYSDOT	 authorized	 van	 services	 to	
continue	 operation	 pending	 the	 review	 of	 their	 applications	 by	 the	
City.	
-	 Allows	 the	 imposition	 of	 an	 annual	 fee	 by	 the	 City	 for	 operating	
authority.	 Revenue	 from	 the	 licensing	 fee	 can	 be	 used	 to	 fund	 van	
enforcement	functions.	(p.	2)	
	
	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 prosaic	 requirements	 stipulating	 an	 orderly	
administration	of	permits	and	regulation,	the	State	also	adopted	legal	definitions	for	









to	 describe	 how	 a	 van	 operates,	 and	 instead	 seeks	 to	 curb	 a	 specific	 activity,	 the	
street	 hail.	 The	 commuter	 van	 service	 definition	 is	 even	more	 restrictive	 and	 less	
reflective	 of	 reality	 on	 New	 York’s	 streets.	 Baronci	 (1993)	 explains	 the	 definition	
and	also	provides	a	bit	of	context	for	the	purpose	of	the	definitions:		
[A]	 commuter	 van	 is	 permitted	 to	 provide	 service	 on	 a	 prearranged	
daily	 basis	 only,	 over	 non-specified	 or	 irregular	 routes,	 between	 a	
zone	 in	 a	 residential	 neighborhood	 and	 a	 location	 which	 shall	 be	 a	
work-related	 central	 location,	 a	 mass	 transit	 location	 or	 mass	
transportation	facility,	a	shopping	center	or	airport….Subdivision	(b)	
prohibits	 a	 commuter	 van	 from	 soliciting,	 picking	 up	 or	 discharging	
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passengers	 at	 bus	 stops	 along	 routes	 traveled	 by	 a	 bus	 owned	 or	
operated	by	the	New	York	City	Transit	Authority	or	a	company	having	
a	 franchise	 from	the	City.	Subdivision	 (b)	also	prohibits	a	 commuter	
van	from	discharging	passengers	within	thirty	feet	of	a	designated	bus	
stop	 or	within	 thirty	 feet	 of	 an	 entrance	 to	 a	 subway	 station.	 These	
provisions	 are	 intended	 to	 prevent	 vans	 the	 opportunity	 to	 pick	 up	
passengers	who	are	waiting	for	a	bus.	(p.	5)		
	
As	 Baronci	 notes	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 this	 excerpt	 from	 his	 memo	 to	 City	 Council	
Members	 sitting	 on	 the	 Committee	 of	 Transportation,	 these	 new	 definitions	were	
designed	to	protect	bus	ridership	on	City-owned	and	City-franchised	services.	This	
defensive	 posture	 cast	 the	 vans	 as	 a	 menace;	 it	 defined	 them	 in	 opposition	 to	
existing	 transit	 services	 and	 neglected	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 numerous	 benefits	
delivered	by	the	vans.		
This	narrow	understanding	of	the	vans	failed	to	account	for	the	their	positive	
attributes.	 In	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 1986	 DCP	 commuter	 van	 study,	 the	 authors	
argued	 that	 “[t]he	 van	 services	 currently	 operating	 are	 improving	 the	mobility	 of	
and/or	the	quality	of	transport	for	many	people	who	live	and/or	work	in	the	City—
especially	 residents	of	 lower-density	 areas	 in	 Staten	 Island	and	 the	outer	parts	 of	
Queens,	Brooklyn	and	the	Bronx”	(p.	239).		In	addition	to	judging	the	vans	as	a	net	
positive,	they	also	recognized	the	limitations	of	the	existing	transit	options:		
In	 a	 few	 cases…the	 commuter	 vans	 have	 attracted	 patrons	 that	
existing	public	transit	would	have	been	hard	pressed	to	accommodate	
without	 significantly	 increased	 service	 levels—something	 that	might	
have	been	impossible	for	a	variety	of	reasons	(budgetary	constraints,	
lack	 of	 equipment,	 inadequate	 garaging	 and	 maintenance	 facilities,	
etc.).	 In	 more	 cases,	 however,	 the	 vans	 have	 captured	 riders	 that	







the	 City	 Council	 took	 up,	 it	 had	 an	 opportunity	 to	 recognize	 the	 vans’	 positive	
contributions	 and	develop	 a	 regulatory	 framework	 to	 support	New	Yorkers	 living	
beyond	the	reach	of	effective	public	transportation.	Brooklyn	City	Council	Member	
Una	 Clarke	 (1992),	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 Governor	 Mario	 Cuomo,	 acknowledged	 the	
shortcomings	of	the	vans,	but	encouraged	the	Governor	to	reject	any	legislation	that	
would	 unduly	 narrow	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 vans	 and	 prevent	 the	 City	 Council	 from	
shaping	 appropriate	 legislation.	 She	 believed	 that	 “[r]egulation,	 not	 restriction,	 of	
the	 industry	 would	 benefit	 everyone.	 Requiring	 the	 proper	 licensing,	 registration	
and	 insurance	 coverage	 will	 assure	 standards	 in	 the	 industry	 and	 encourage	
passenger	safety”	(p.	1).	 Instead,	she	argued	that	the	State’s	 legislation	would	ruin	
the	 industry	 and	drive	 van	operators	 “out	 of	 business	with	 its	numerous	punitive	
measures.	This	bill	stifles	growth	in	our	community	by	limiting	the	opportunities	for	







the	 vans	 in	 December	 1992,	 the	 City	 Council’s	 Committee	 on	 Transportation	 had	
already	begun	drafting	and	debating	two	bills,	 Intro	519	and	 Intro	115,	 to	regulate	
the	vans.	The	contents	of	the	two	bills	were	more	or	less	the	same—after	all	much	of	
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the	 details	 of	 the	 eventual	 bill	 had	 been	 handed	 down	 by	 the	 State.	 The	 agency	
responsible	 for	 regulatory	oversight	 of	 the	 vans	was	 the	main	difference	between	




sympathetic	 to	 the	 vans	 saw	 the	 legislation	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 eradicate	 the	 vans	
rather	than	create	a	viable	regulatory	framework.	The	language	that	was	eventually	
included	 in	 Local	 Law	 115	 (1993)	 defined	 a	 commuter	 van	 as	 a	 vehicle	 carrying	




routes”	 (New	York	City,	N.Y.,	 Local	 Law	No.	 115	 1993,	 p.	 2).	 This	 language	 is	 very	
similar	to	what	the	State	had	outlined,	and	the	bill	also	included	detailed	application,	
insurance,	licensing,	and	vehicle	seizure	instructions.	
The	 West	 Indian	 van	 community	 from	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens	 came	 out	 to	
support	 their	 interests	and	rally	against	 the	proposed	bills.	Those	who	 testified	 in	
favor	 of	 the	 vans	 invoked	 four	 main	 arguments	 to	 discredit	 the	 legislation	 and	
defend	 the	 vans.	 Van	 loyalists	 argued	 against	 the	 narrowness	 of	 the	 language	
contained	 within	 the	 bill,	 loss	 of	 economic	 opportunities	 created	 by	 the	 vans	 for	
recent	West	Indian	immigrants,	 importance	of	competition	for	passengers,	and	the	
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machinations	 deployed	 by	 entrenched	 interests	 who	 wanted	 to	 protect	 their	
fiefdoms.	
The	language	used	to	describe	the	vans	and	the	service	they	offered	was	the	
largest	 hurdle	 to	 overcome	 for	 the	 van	 community.	 Legal	 definitions	 stripped	 the	
vans	 of	 the	 right	 to	 operate	 conventional	 routes,	 provide	 service	 in	 areas	 with	
existing	 transit	 service,	 or	 accept	 street	 hails.	 Because	 the	 vans	 mimic	 relatively	
conventional	 feeder	 line	 service	 to	 subways,	 many	 operated	 predictable	 routes	
between	a	 subway	station	and	a	main	 street.	George	Carl	Pezold	 (1993),	 a	 lawyer	
representing	a	group	of	van	operators	in	Queens,	provided	a	detailed	point-by-point	
rebuttal	 to	the	proposed	 legislation.	 	 In	doing	this,	he	also	clearly	defined	how	the	
vans,	 at	 least	 the	 vans	 operated	 by	 his	 clients	 worked.	 The	 idea	 that	 vans	 could	
effectively	 serve	 passengers	 without	 treading	 on	 existing	 transit	 routes	 was	















economic	 times.	 Derrick	 Warmington	 (1993),	 a	 resident	 of	 Riverdale,	 Queens	
defended	the	vans	on	the	grounds	of	improved	transit	service,	but	also	invoked	an	
economic	 self-sufficiency	 argument,	 which	 was	 made	 more	 pressing	 by	 a	 lack	 of	
jobs:	
Many	 of	 these	 operators	 were	 formerly	 engaged	 in	 other	 forms	 of	
employment,	 from	 management	 in	 the	 corporate	 world	 to	 people	
earning	 minimum	 wage.	 They	 lost	 their	 jobs,	 the	 very	 means	 of	
providing	 for	 their	 families	 due	 to	 a	 faltering	 economy.	 Rather	 than	
become	economic	refugees,	they	have	decided	to	take	charge	of	their	
lives;	 they	 have	 decided	 to	 become	 self-reliant.	 They	 are	 now	
independent	 business	 people	 actively	 participating	 in	 the	 American	
Dream.	(p.	3)	
	
Roger	 Joseph	 (1993),	 a	 twenty-two	 year	 old	 van	 operator	 from	 Guyana,	 told	 his	




could	 provide	 it.	 I	 started	 by	 renting	 a	 car	 and	 providing	 service	 in	 East	
Flatbush…Today,	I	own	three	vans”	(p.	2).	
Even	 local	 officials	were	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 vans	 and	 understood	 that	 this	




legislation	 for	 not	 going	 far	 enough	 to	 create	 a	 coherent	 surface	 transportation	
policy	 that	 provided	 a	 framework	 for	 regulation,	 but	 also	 enhanced	 service	 for	
passengers.	 Harris	 attacked	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 as	 being	 arbitrary	 and	
inconsistent	when	he	testified:		
New	 York	 City	 needs	 a	 private	 surface	 transportation	 policy	 which	
includes	 tough	 enforcement	 against	 van	 operators	 who	 endanger	
public	safety	and	a	regulatory	framework	that	allows	and	encourages	
vans	to	compete	fairly	against	other	private	transportation	providers.	
While	some	may	argue	 that	achieving	both	of	 these	objectives	 is	 too	
difficult,	 the	 cost	 of	 failing	 to	 address	 this	 issue	 is	 simply	 too	 high.	
Without	 enforcement,	 public	 safety	 is	 at	 risk.	 Without	 fair	
competition,	transit	providers	have	little	incentive	to	provide	the	best	
possible	 service	 at	 the	most	 affordable	 price.	 (emphasis	 in	 original)	
(pp.	3-4)	
	
Undergirding	 these	 concerns	 about	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 was	 the	
influence	 of	 the	 transit	 workers’	 labor	 unions,	 the	 MTA,	 and	 the	 private	 bus	
operators	in	shaping	the	debate	in	Albany	and	City	Hall.	 	While	the	bill	was	sold	as	





her	organization	 intended	 to	 “support	 the	 legislation	under	discussion	 today,”	but	
after	reviewing	it,	she	decided	to	oppose	it	because	“it	must	be	understood	that	first	
and	foremost	this	is	an	MTA	and	private	bus	sponsored	bill.	This	bill	is	designed	to	
protect	 the	monopoly	 that	 the	 MTA	 and	 private	 buses	 enjoy”	 (p.	 1).	 Despite	 this	
rebuke	of	the	bill’s	intentions,	Southerland	went	on	to	argue	that	the	vans	benefited	
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the	 communities	 they	 operated	 in	 but	 still	 needed	 to	 be	 regulated,	 “They	 have	







four	and	was	signed	 into	 law	on	December	31st	1993,	 the	TLC	assumed	 its	role	as	
regulator	of	the	vans.	While	the	Commission	was	granted	the	authority	to	approve	
commuter	van	permits,	 the	City	Council	 routinely	overturned	 those	decisions.	The	
Council	 further	 meddled	 into	 the	 vans’	 business	 and	 bypassed	 the	 TLC	 when	 it	
passed	Local	Law	83	 in	1997.	Local	Law	83	placed	a	one-year	moratorium	on	new	
commuter	van	permits	(Giuliani	v.	Council	of	the	City	of	New	York	1999).12	Not	only	





83	 in	 two	 lawsuits,	Giuliani	v.	Council	of	 the	City	of	New	York,	 1999	 and	Ricketts	v.	
City	 of	 New	 York,	1999.	 The	 Commission	 used	 its	 “bully	 pulpit”	 to	 encourage	 the	
																																																								
12	From	interviews	and	news	reports,	it	appears	that	a	number	of	City	Council	Members	were	acting	
on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Transport	 Workers	 Union,	 the	 union	 representing	 MTA	 employees	 (Personal	
Interview	2014b).	
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public	 to	 speak	 out	 against	 the	 Council’s	 actions,	 which	 undermined	 the	
Commission’s	authority	to	regulate	the	vans	while	the	commuter	van	operators	and	
the	Mayor	pursued	legal	actions	to	strike	down	Local	Law	115	and	Local	Law	83.13		
While	 the	 vans	 have	 never	 amounted	 to	 a	 top	 priority	 of	 the	 TLC,	 the	
Commission	opposed	Local	Law	115	from	the	outset.	During	a	TLC	monthly	meeting	
in	1994,	just	after	the	adoption	of	the	law,	Commissioner	Sandra	Jefferson	Granum	
commented	 that	Chair	Fidel	del	Valle	 should	 “use	his	 good	offices	 to	act	upon	 the	
legislature	to	make	changes	in	this	law.”	She	went	on	to	implore	affected	commuter	
van	passengers	to	“speak	with	the	elected	officials	so	that	we	can	change	this	law,”	
and	 “develop	a	proper	 regulatory	 system	 for	 this	 industry	which	 should	and	does	
exist”	(Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission	1994,	p.	11).	While	Commissioner	Granum	
spoke	 fervently	 about	 the	 vans,	 the	 vans	 did	 not	 appear	 more	 frequently	 in	
subsequent	meetings.	
With	 little	 written	 testimony	 in	 the	 TLC	 archive	 about	 Local	 Law	 115,	 I	
conducted	 an	 extensive	 interview,	 with	 follow-up	 phone	 calls,	 with	 one	 of	 the	
commissioners	from	this	critical	period	in	the	history	of	the	vans.	In	addition	to	the	
commissioner’s	 role	 as	 a	 regulator,	 she	 also	 happened	 to	 live	 along	 the	 Flatbush	
Avenue	 corridor	and	 saw	 the	vans	everyday	 in	 the	1980s,	1990s,	 and	even	 today.		
Thus,	she	understood	right	away	that	the	existing	law	contradicted	daily	practice	on	
Flatbush	 Avenue.	 When	 I	 asked	 her	 about	 the	 convoluted	 nature	 of	 the	 law,	 she	
explained	 that	 political	 considerations,	 specifically	with	 the	 labor	 unions,	made	 it	





arrangement	 stuff	 and	 operating	 along	 bus	 routes,	 hadn’t	 been	 included,	 it	 never	
would	have	passed	the	[City]	Council”	(Personal	 Interview	2014c).	When	I	pushed	
back	and	asked	her	to	speak	directly	about	the	specter	of	the	labor	unions	over	the	
negotiations,	 she	 told	 me	 “the	 TWU	 saw	 the	 vans	 as	 an	 MTA	 plot	 to	 get	 rid	 of	
organized	labor”	(Personal	Interview	2014c).	Similar	to	the	critics	of	the	legislation	
in	1993,	the	former	commissioner	told	me	the	policy	was	designed	to	make	it	illegal	
for	 the	 vans	 to	 operate	 as	 they	 had	 always	 operated	 and	 protect	 transit	workers’	
jobs	from	competition	from	the	vans.	
Gaining	 the	TLC’s	sympathy	was	useful	 to	 the	vans,	but	ultimately	 the	vans	
lived	and	died	with	the	law.	Without	laws	that	reflect	the	reality	on	the	streets,	van	
drivers	were	vulnerable	 to	 tickets	and	vehicle	seizures	by	 the	TLC	and	NYPD.	The	
court’s	 interpretation	of	Local	Law	115	was	mixed.	On	 the	one	hand,	 it	 sided	with	
the	Mayor	when	 it	 found	 that	 the	City	Council	 could	not	 invalidate	 commuter	van	
permits	approved	by	the	TLC.	In	Judge	Louis	B.	York’s	Giuliani	v.	Council	of	the	City	of	
New	York	(1999)	decision,	he	concluded	that	based	on	the	enabling	legislation	from	




In	 the	Ricketts	v.	City	of	New	York	 (1999)	 decision,	 Judge	 York	 proved	 less	
sympathetic	 to	 van	 operator	 Hector	 Ricketts’	 grievances	 against	 Local	 Law	 115.		
Judge	 York	 found	 that	 the	 City’s	 police	 powers	 protected	 the	 City’s	 decision	 to	
regulate	 where	 the	 commuter	 vans	 operated	 and	 how	 they	 picked	 up	 and	
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discharged	passengers.	Here,	 the	Judge	upheld	Local	Law	115’s	prohibition	against	









it	 deemed	appropriate	 and,	unfortunately	 for	 the	vans,	 they	would	 continue	 to	be	





When	 Mayor	 Giuliani	 left	 office	 in	 2001,	 it	 appeared	 that	 the	 vans	 would	
recede	 even	 further	 into	 the	 background	 while	 yellow	 taxi	 fare	 increases,	
environmental	 concerns,	 credit	 card	 payment	 systems,	 and	 advertising	 screens	






in	 the	 three	 cases	 presented	 below,	 the	 Commission’s	 efforts	 were	 poorly	
formulated	and	often	too	narrow	in	scope	to	address	the	concerns	of	the	industry.		
As	 was	 made	 clear	 during	 the	 debates	 over	 Intro	 519	 and	 Intro	 115	 in	 the	 mid-
1990s,	the	commuter	van	interests	wanted	the	legal	right	to	pick	up	street	hails	and	
operate	 along	 bus	 routes.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 issues	 of	 legal	 language,	 the	 van	
operators	have	consistently	complained	about	the	pirates	who	compete	with	them	
for	 passengers	 but	 remain	 uninsured	 and	 unsanctioned	 by	 the	 TLC.	 The	
Commission’s	focus	on	the	vans	coincided	with	the	appointment	of	David	Yassky	as	
the	 new	 chairman,	 wide-ranging	 MTA	 service	 cuts,	 gentrification	 in	 Central	
Brooklyn	and	Harlem,	and	greater	lobbying	efforts	on	behalf	of	the	van	industry.	
In	 the	summer	of	2010,	 the	vans	were	called	upon	to	supplement	MTA	bus	




Commission	 2010a),	 the	 TLC’s	 Policy	 Director,	 presented	 the	 pilot	 project	 to	 the	
TLC’s	 Commissioners	 for	 a	 vote	 at	 the	 agency’s	 monthly	 meeting	 in	 July.	 She	
explained	 that	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 bus	 service	 in	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens,	 passengers	
would	 be	 forced	 to	 “use	 alternatives	 that	 could	 add	 transfers	 and	 increase	 their	
travel	 time,”	 and	 that	 “[t]his	 pilot	 will	 help	 us	 determine	 how	 TLC-regulated	
industries	can	best	fill	gaps	in	the	mass	transit	network	to	improve	mobility”	(p.	78).	






Project	 failed	before	 it	 ever	had	 a	 chance	 to	 build	 consistent	 ridership.	 	 From	 the	
outset,	the	pilot	was	hampered	by	large	obstacles,	such	as	a	two-month	gap	between	
the	 cessation	of	MTA	bus	 service	 and	 the	beginning	of	 group	 ride	 service,	 a	 court	
battle	 with	 the	 TWU	 that	 almost	 upended	 the	 entire	 pilot,	 a	 lackluster	 effort	 to	
promote	 the	 pilot	 in	 these	 new	 neighborhoods,	 and	 a	 general	 sense	 of	 confusion	
(King	 and	 Goldwyn	 2014a).	 At	 the	 Commission’s	 October	meeting,	 Commissioner	
Yassky	(Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission	2010b)	delivered	the	following	assessment	
of	the	pilot’s	disappointing	first	month:	
We	started	with	 five	 [service	areas],	 on	 three	of	 them	 there	 is	 some	
amount	 of	 traffic,	 not	 enough	 to	 be	 self-sustaining	 at	 this	 point	 but	
enough	for	the	operators	to	have	a	desire	to	hang	in	there	and	see	if	
they	will	succeed.	On	two	of	them,	there	has	been	very	little	ridership,	
not	 enough	 for	 them	 to	 justify	 the	 operators	 who	 want	 to	 hang	 in	
there.	Even	on	the	three,	we	have	had	spotty	service,	again	you	have	a	
kind	of	chicken/egg	[situation].	It	is	clear	to	me,	that	for	the	operators	




Within	 the	 first	month	 of	 the	 pilot’s	 launch,	 two	 of	 the	 operators	 had	 abandoned	
service	 and	 the	 other	 three	 struggled	 to	 cultivate	 a	 sustainable	 customer	 base.	
Unsurprisingly,	 the	pilot	 failed	to	garner	even	a	mention	at	 the	Commission’s	next	
meeting	 in	November.	 	While	 the	TLC	 lamented	the	pilot’s	demise,	a	staff	member	




essentially	wasted	 the	 time	and	effort	 of	 the	 few	 sincere	operators	who	diligently	
plied	these	service	areas	for	three-months	at	the	cost	of	providing	service	in	much	
more	profitable	areas	of	the	city.			
	 Since	 2010,	 the	 abortive	 Group	 Ride	 Vehicle	 Pilot	 was	 the	 splashiest	 TLC	
policy	 directed	 towards	 the	 van	 industry,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one.	 The	







the	 TLC’s	 ad	hoc	 approach	 to	 regulating	 the	 vans.	 Instead	 of	 developing	 targeted	
polices	 that	 respond	 to	 the	needs	of	 the	van	operators	or	passengers,	 the	TLC	 re-
purposed	 an	 existing	 initiative	 and	 applied	 it	 to	 the	 vans	 as	 an	 afterthought.		
According	to	the	TLC’s	meeting	minutes	from	March	2010,	the	commuter	vans	were	
among	 the	 very	 last	 group	 of	 vehicles	 under	 the	 TLC’s	 authority	 to	 receive	 a	
passenger	 bill	 of	 rights.	 TLC	 staff	 member	 David	 Klahr	 (Taxi	 and	 Limousine	
Commission	 2010c)	 mentioned	 in	 a	 brief	 aside	 while	 presenting	 to	 the	
Commissioners	 on	 the	 pending	 language	 that	 “[t]here	 has	 already	 been	 a	 Taxicab	







(Taxi	 and	 Limousine	 Commission	 2010a)	 recognized	 the	 longstanding	 lack	 of	
communication	 between	 the	 van	 operators	 and	 the	 Commission,	 but	 expressed	 a	
willingness	to	work	more	closely	with	them	on	the	Bill	of	Rights	language.	“This	is	a	
group	of	people	that	often	does	not	engage	in	with	[sic]	what	we	do	here,	but	they	
were	 interested	 enough	 in	 the	 idea	 that	 we're	 making	 the	 rules	 more	
comprehensible	 to	 come	 in	 and	give	 their	 two	 cents	worth,”	 he	 said	 (p.	 59).	 Even	
though	 Commissioner	 Yassky	 sounded	 hopeful	 about	 cultivating	 a	 closer	
relationship	with	the	commuter	van	interests,	the	guarantees	granted	to	commuter	
van	 passengers	 are	 often	 puzzling	 and	 inappropriate.	 For	 instance,	 right	 number	
seven	guarantees	that	all	passengers	have	the	right	to	“[r]eceive	a	fare	quote	from	
the	 dispatcher	 and	 pay	 that	 amount	 for	 [their]	 ride,”	 (Taxi	 and	 Limousine	
Commission	n.d.,	n.p.).		This	right,	however,	reflects	little	understanding	of	how	the	
vans	 operate.	 Since	 all	 passengers	 receive	 the	 same	 flat	 fare	 and	 vans	 are	 not	
dispatched,	 it	 is	unclear	how	this	right	benefits	passengers.	While	everyone	would	
agree	that	outlining	the	rights	of	the	passengers	is	a	good	idea,	it	has	never	been	an	
issue	 that	 van	 operators,	 passengers,	 or	 drivers	 have	 mentioned	 to	 me	 in	 my	






This	 era	 of	 renewed	 engagement	 with	 the	 commuter	 vans	 reached	 a	
crescendo	 in	 2014.	 During	 the	 August	 Commission	 meeting,	 Assistant	 General	





two	 disparate	 claims	 in	 support	 of	 the	 pilot.	 First,	 she	 argues,	 “There	 are	 a	 few	
challenges	unique	to	commuter	vans.	By	and	large,	commuter	vans	have	small	and	
loyal	 customer	 bases,	 but	most	 of	 the	 public	 really	 doesn’t	 know	much	 about	 the	
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industry	 or	 how	 it	works”	 (p.	 13).	Here,	 Taylor	makes	 the	 case	 that	 the	 branding	
initiative	is	meant	to	appeal	to	the	general	public	who	do	not	use	the	vans.	Later	in	
her	presentation	she	posits	a	second	rationale	for	the	program:		
[T]he	biggest	 challenge	 to	 the	 industry	 comes	 from	 illegal	 vans	who	
pass	 themselves	 off	 as	 being	 legitimate.	 These	 illegal	 vans	 prey	 on	
passenger	confusion	because	many	passengers	can’t	tell	the	difference	
between	legal	and	illegal	vans,	and	even	those	passengers	who	can	tell	




help	 the	public	 identify	 the	vans	by	pasting	a	distinctive	 “NYC	Commuter”	 logo	on	
the	exterior	of	 licensed	vans.	 	 In	 the	 longer	excerpt,	 she	 takes	a	different	 tack	and	
argues	that	the	branding	will	help	existing	passengers	distinguish	between	licensed	
and	 unlicensed	 vans,	which	will	 in	 turn	 encourage	 passengers	 to	 opt	 for	 licensed	
commuter	vans,	though	it	seems	clear	from	her	own	words	that	the	existing	“loyal	
customer	bases”	are	unconcerned	by	 this	alleged	confusion	 [Figure	4].	 	While	 this	
pilot	was	positioned	as	a	solution	to	cracking	down	on	illegal	vans,	it	revealed	how	
disconnected	the	TLC	was	from	commuter	van	passengers’	needs.			
Nothing	 about	 this	 pilot	 program	 takes	 active	 measures	 towards	 reducing	
the	number	of	unlicensed	vans	on	the	road.	This	is	not	to	discount	the	pilot	entirely,	
but	 it	 fails	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 unlicensed	 pirates	 directly.	 As	 one	 former	 TLC	
Chair	 told	me,	 “the	 only	way	 to	 get	 the	 unlicensed	 vans	 off	 the	 road	 is	 to	 set	 up	
police	roadblocks	and	seize	vehicles.	This	is	something	we	did	in	the	90s	and	it	was	









promote	 the	 new	 pilot	 and	 educate	 passengers	 on	 how	 to	 distinguish	 between	
licensed	 commuter	 vans	 and	 unlicensed	 pirates,	 the	 TLC	 printed	 palm	 cards	 in	
English	and	Spanish	 to	 inform	passengers	of	 the	program.	 	Since	 the	vans	operate	
exclusively	in	West	Indian	and	Chinese	neighborhoods,	though	to	be	sure	Spanish-






The	 TLC	 is	 a	 flawed	 regulator	 that	 operates	 from	 a	 significant	 knowledge	
deficit	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 commuter	 vans.	 Despite	 seemingly	 good	 intentions,	 the	
Commission’s	 recent	 policies	 have	 exacted	 either	 a	 negative	 or	 neutral	 impact	 on	
the	 vans.	 It	 was	 in	 light	 of	 this	 consistent	 maltreatment	 that	 the	 West	 Indian	
commuter	 van	 operators	 in	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens	 banded	 together	 to	 retain	 the	
services	of	a	 law	firm	to	advance	its	agenda	and	lobby	the	City	Council	directly.	 In	
this	unprecedented	show	of	unity	among	van	operators,	they	made	it	clear	that	they	
wanted	 to	 see	 the	 City	 Council	 strike	 down	 the	 language	 in	 Local	 Law	 115	 that	
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prohibits	vans	from	operating	as	they	always	have,	and	that	the	operators	also	want	







defined	 my	 terms,	 pointed	 to	 the	 shortcomings	 and	 decline	 of	 the	 bus	 network,	
connected	the	rise	of	the	vans	with	broader	attempts	to	curb	public	spending,	traced	
the	changing	shape	of	regulations,	explored	debates	about	how	to	regulate	the	vans,	
probed	 the	TLC’s	oversight	of	 the	vans,	and	 identified	 the	gap	between	policy	and	
daily	practice.	The	vans	are	the	outgrowth	of	a	spatially	specific	problem	that	was	
exacerbated	 by	 a	 fiscal	 crisis	 and	 continued	 neglect	 by	 the	 City.	 Rather	 than	
addressing	the	issue	of	a	poorly	calibrated	bus	system	and	changing	demographics,	





formation	 in	 New	 York	 City.	 	 These	 interviews	 reveal	 the	 day-to-day	 activities	 of	
planners	 and	 show	 how	 little	 institutional	 knowledge	 there	 is	 of	 the	 vans.	 	 I	 also	
	 68	








planning	 processes	 governing	 dollar	 vans,	 an	 informal	 transit	 network,	 which	
allowed	them	to	flourish	in	some	New	York	neighborhoods	while	others	have	access	
to	 robust	 public	 transit.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 describe	 and	 analyze	 interviews	 I	
conducted	with	MTA	and	DCP	planners	to	learn	how	transportation	planning	works	
and	 how	 transportation	 policy	 is	 developed	 in	 New	 York.	 Since	 neither	 of	 these	
agencies	works	directly	with	 the	vans,	our	discussions	centered	on	 transportation	
planning	methods	and	process,	and	only	occasionally	referenced	the	vans.	 Insights	




in	 this	 section	 that	 I	 hear	 directly	 from	 those	 who	 regulate	 the	 vans.	 The	 TLC	
planners	 tell	 me	 that	 the	 vans	 are	 barely	 a	 known	 quantity	 and	 that	 while	 the	
Commission	 promises	 to	 pay	 closer	 attention	 to	 the	 vans	 going	 forward,	 a	 look	
through	recent	budget	filings	suggests	the	opposite.	I	also	spoke	with	the	planners	
at	the	DOT	who	oversee	the	vans,	and	they	were	equally	blasé	about	the	vans	and	
seem	 unconcerned	 that	 an	 entire	 class	 of	 transportation	 services	 hovers	 in	 an	
awkward	and	confusing	regulatory	purgatory	with	no	resolution	in	sight.		
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Third,	 I	 interview	 actors	 beyond	 local	 government	 and	 focus	 on	 the	 van	
industry	itself.	At	the	first	Commuter	Van	Summit,	a	meeting	that	saw	commuter	van	
interests,	 regulators,	police	officers,	elected	officials,	 and	others	come	 together	 for	
the	 first	 time	 in	anyone’s	memory,	we	 finally	 see	how	all	 of	 these	different	 actors	
interact	when	in	the	same	room.	With	my	focus	now	shifted	from	planners	to	non-
government	 actors,	 I	 recount	 an	 interview	with	 an	 executive	 at	 a	media	 company	
that	sells	advertising	targeted	to	West	Indian	passengers.	In	this	interview,	I	learned	
the	van	industry	has	tried	to	engage	with	the	City,	specifically	the	TLC,	but	has	been	
continually	 rebuffed.	 Finally,	 I	 interviewed	 the	 head	 of	 a	 local	 grass-roots	









	 Because	 other	 cities	 with	 large	 immigrant	 populations,	 such	 as	 Miami,	
Hudson	 County,	 New	 Jersey,	 and	 parts	 of	 California,	 have	 robust	 van	 networks,	 I	
believed	that	shortcomings	in	transportation	planning	methods	employed	by	transit	
agencies	 and	 departments	 of	 transportation	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 these	
groups’	 decisions	 to	 develop	 their	 own	 transportation	 solutions	 (Federal	 Transit	
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Administration	1992;	Valenzuela	Jr.	et	al.	2005;	Hudson	County	Division	of	Planning	




The	 problem	 in	 New	 York,	 however,	 had	 little	 to	 do	 with	 methodological	
biases.	Over	the	course	of	my	interviews,	it	became	clear	that	a	lack	of	organization,	
interest,	 competing	 demands,	 and	 coordination	 stymied	 any	 actual	 planning	 or	
systematic	 thinking	 about	 the	 vans.	 Before	 overhauling	 transportation	 planning	
methods	to	better	capture	variation	in	travel	demand,	it	is	more	important	to	make	




interview.	 In	 a	 large	 conference	 room	 at	 the	MTA’s	 offices	 in	 Lower	Manhattan,	 I	
spoke	with	a	number	of	subway	and	bus	planners	who	had	been	gracious	enough	to	
explain	their	responsibilities	to	me	and	answer	my	questions.	After	an	informative	









walk	of	 transit	service.14	While	 these	are	admirable	goals,	 they	provide	 little	room	






balance	 multiple	 interests	 and	 demands.	 In	 addition	 to	 making	 the	 buses	 and	
subways	run,	the	MTA	is	required	to	respond	to	public	comments	and	requests	from	
public	officials.			
Time	 is	 precious,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 group	 of	 planners	 I	 spoke	 with,	
responding	 to	comments,	 requests,	 and	complaints	consumes	a	 significant	portion	
of	 their	 time.	One	planner	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 say	 that	 her	 job	was	 constrained	 “by	
limited	 time	 and	 political	 considerations”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014d).	 What	 this	
planner	meant	was	that	every	decision	she	makes,	from	the	significant	to	the	banal,	
takes	 place	within	 a	 fishbowl.	 As	 soon	 as	 anything	 is	 decided	 there	 is	 immediate	
push	 back	 that	 must	 be	 addressed	 by	 the	 MTA.	 Responding	 to	 feedback	 and	
criticism	 requires	 as	 much	 care	 and	 consideration	 as	 service	 expansion	 or	








service	 improvement	 to	eliminate	 “merge	conflicts”	between	 the	numbers	2	and	5	
trains	in	the	Bronx	quickly	deteriorated	into	a	political	skirmish	between	the	MTA	
and	the	New	York	State	Legislature	(Personal	Interview	2104d).	As	soon	as	the	MTA	
















track,	 they	 say,	 will	 prevent	 bottlenecks	 involving	 the	 No.	 2	 train,	 which	 also	
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switches	 to	 express	 tracks	 at	 180th	 Street”	 (Critchell	 2000).	 In	 short	 the	 fix	 was	
designed	 to	 improve	 service	 along	 both	 routes	 by	 eliminating	 a	 conflict	 between	
rival	trains	fighting	for	scarce	track	space.	
After	 the	 MTA’s	 announcement,	 Assemblyman	 Jeffrey	 Klein,	 now	 a	 State	
Senator,	 got	 to	 work	 mobilizing	 his	 constituents	 and	 colleagues	 in	 the	 State	
Legislature	 to	 pressure	 the	 MTA	 to	 abandon	 the	 service	 change.	 He	 collected	




dividends.	Within	 two	days	of	handing	over	more	 than	2,000	 signatures	opposing	
the	change	to	the	MTA,	it	announced	a	one-month	delay	to	the	proposed	change	so	it	
could	re-study	the	project	(Critchell	2000).	
While	 the	 opposition	 had	 powerful	 allies	 in	 the	 State	 Legislature	 and	 a	
motivated	 public,	 the	 MTA	 had	 the	 benefit	 of	 sound	 logic,	 expertise,	 and	 the	
presumed	autonomy	to	act.	As	Beauregard	(2015)	explains,	“Planners	remain	under	
the	 influence	 of	 modernism’s	 promise	 that	 knowledge	 can	 overcome	 ignorance,	
resolve	opposing	viewpoints,	and	motivate	those	with	power	to	act	for	the	common	
good”	 (p.	 219).	 In	 September	 2000,	 the	 MTA	 nevertheless	 announced	 it	 would	
abandon	its	plans	to	eliminate	the	merge	conflicts	between	the	2	and	5	trains	in	the	
Bronx	(Kennedy	2000b).	Within	the	span	of	a	season,	the	MTA	announced	a	service	
change	 to	 improve	 service,	 met	 with	 intense	 opposition	 from	 local	 politicians,	
received	more	 than	2,000	signatures	 from	disgruntled	Bronx	 residents,	 re-studied	
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the	 issue,	 and	 abandoned	 it.	 As	 a	 postscript	 to	 this	 story,	 the	 MTA	 eventually	
upgraded	 some	 parallel	 track	 that	 eliminated	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	 southbound	
direction,	 but	 the	 conflict	 still	 persists	 in	 the	 northbound	direction	 14	 years	 later	
(Personal	Interview	2014d).	
It	 is	 not	 a	 surprise	 that	 politics	 and	 power	 often	 shape	 transportation	
decisions	 (Caro	 1974;	 Hall	 1980;	 Wachs	 1990;	 Flybjerg	 2000;	 Dyble	 2007;	 Swift	
2012;	White	2012).	The	initial	siting	of	subway	stations	a	century	ago	often	followed	
political	interests	rather	than	technical	considerations	and	recent	disputes	over	bike	
lanes	 and	 rail	 connections	 to	 local	 airports	 remind	 us	 how	 quickly	 political	
coalitions	coalesce	around	these	infrastructure	interventions	(Gregory	1999;	Hood	
2004;	Grynbaum	2011).	 In	 the	example	recounted	by	 the	MTA	planners,	however,	
the	MTA	 attempted	 to	 initiate	 a	 relatively	 small,	 technical	 improvement,	which	 in	
turn	 triggered	 a	 maelstrom	 of	 opposition,	 scrutiny,	 and	 additional	 work.	
Assemblyman	Klein	 alleged	 that	he	had	 “yet	 to	 find	anyone	outside	of	 the	Transit	





the	MTA.	 As	 Flyvbjerg	 (1998)	 writes,	 “Power	 does	 not	 seek	 knowledge….	 Rather,	
power	 defines	 what	 counts	 as	 knowledge	 and	 rationality,	 and	 ultimately…what	
counts	 as	 reality”	 (emphasis	 in	 the	 original)	 (p.	 27).	 	 Thus,	 what	 seemed	
	 76	
uncontroversial	 and	 technically	 sound	 to	 the	 MTA	 was	 quickly	 assailed	 and	
rebranded	as	unreasonable	by	the	legislators.		




forces	 shaped	 their	 daily	 duties.	 At	 this	 point	 in	 our	 interview,	 however,	 we	 had	
already	been	together	for	over	three	hours	and	our	conversation	had	touched	on	so	
many	 interesting	 subjects	 that	 it	 made	 sense	 to	 digest	 the	 information	 I	 had	
gathered	and	schedule	a	follow	up	meeting	so	we	could	dig	deeper	into	the	issue	of	
route	selection	and	politics.			
As	 I	wrote	 up	my	 summary	 notes	 for	 the	 day	 in	 the	 comfort	 of	 the	MTA’s	
lobby—this	 was	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 notes	 I	 had	 taken	 during	 the	 meeting—I	 was	












[Figure	 6].	 They	 explained	 that	 a	 number	 of	 prompts,	 from	 articles	 in	 the	
newspapers	to	a	recent	rezoning,	persuaded	them	to	roll	out	new	bus	service	along	
Kent	 Avenue	 connecting	 the	 Williamsburg	 waterfront	 with	 Greenpoint	 and	 Long	
Island	 City	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014e;	 Metropolitan	 Transportation	 Authority	
2014).		One	of	the	planners	told	me,	“Momentum	for	a	new	service	builds.	Requests	
come	 in	 from	 people	 in	 the	 community,	 real	 estate	 developers,	 and	 politicians”	









As	 I	 moved	 the	 discussion	 towards	 methods	 and	 the	 decision-making	
process,	the	planners	reminded	me	that	a	lot	of	their	focus	is	in	neighborhoods	that	
are	being	remade	through	large-scale	residential	development	and	re-zonings,	such	




Council)	 has	 good	 travel	 data	 at	 the	 macro-level,	 but	 it’s	 not	 so	 good	 at	 the	
neighborhood	scale,”	 they	told	me	(Personal	 Interview	2014e).	Without	good	local	
travel	 data,	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 for	 the	 planners	 to	 project	 ridership	 into	 the	
future	 with	 any	 confidence	 along	 specific	 routes,	 especially	 when	 economic	
conditions	remain	unclear:	“We	don’t	know	which	neighborhoods	are	going	to	come	
back”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014e).	 What	 they	 did	 stress,	 as	 we	 talked	 about	
fluctuations	 in	 bus	 ridership	 [Figure	 7],	 was	 that	 reliability,	 the	 ability	 of	 a	
passenger	 to	 know	 with	 certainty	 how	 quickly	 the	 bus	 would	 take	 him	 or	 her	
between	 point-a	 and	 point-b,	 was	 the	 key	 to	 building	 and	maintaining	 ridership.		
The	smaller	the	uncertainty,	the	easier	it	is	to	get	people	on	the	bus:	“We	hope	that	
with	 tools	 like	 BusTime	 and	 Select	 Bus	 Service,	 we	will	 be	 able	 to	 provide	more	
reliable	service	and	increase	bus	ridership”	(Personal	Interview	2014e).15				
																																																								
15	BusTime	 allows	 anyone	 to	 see	 where	 all	 the	 MTA’s	 buses	 are	 via	 the	 Internet	 or	 smartphone	







While	 the	MTA	 is	 the	 largest	 transit	 provider	 in	 the	 city,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 sole	
entity	charged	with	studying	the	city’s	transportation	needs.		In	order	to	learn	more	
about	 this	process,	 I	conducted	a	handful	of	 interviews,	with	 follow	up	emails	and	
phone	 calls,	 with	 planners	 at	 the	 Department	 of	 City	 Planning’s	 Transportation	
Division.	 	The	Transportation	Division	works	with	 the	DOT,	who	 I	will	 speak	with	
later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 and	 the	 MTA	 to	 provide	 guidance	 and	 support	 on	
transportation	studies.	Here,	 I	conducted	 interviews	with	three	people	at	different	
stages	in	their	careers.	At	my	first	meeting,	I	spoke	with	a	young	planner	working	on	
two	 neighborhood-planning	 projects	 in	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens.	 The	 young	 planner	
clearly	outlined	the	process	she	followed:	1)	establish	existing	conditions;	2)	meet	




















the	 issues	 facing	 the	 neighborhood;	 4)	 draft	 a	 working	 document	 that	 takes	
everything	 learned	 into	 account	 and	 circulate	 it	 internally;	 5)	 coordinate	 across	
agencies	 to	 make	 sure	 everyone	 is	 onboard;	 6)	 publish	 the	 study	 (Personal	
Interview	2014f).			
The	 young	 planner	 believed	 that	 this	 exhaustive	 process	 had	 a	 number	 of	
merits	but	also	posed	significant	challenges	to	developing	a	plan.	The	biggest	issue	
she	 identified	 was	 planners’	 inability	 to	 capture	 the	 full	 range	 of	 voices	 in	 a	
neighborhood.	“Even	though	we	do	extensive	outreach,”	she	said,	“we	do	miss	entire	
groups	 of	 people	 because	 they	 don’t	 participate”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014f).	 She	
illustrated	this	shortcoming	when	she	described	a	project	she	was	working	on	in	a	
rapidly	changing	neighborhood	in	Queens.	As	more	residents	moved	into	the	area,	
new	 residents	 clamored	 for	more	 bike	 lanes	 and	 slow	 zones	 to	make	 the	 streets	
more	 appealing	 to	 pedestrians	 and	 bicyclists.	 Representatives	 from	 the	 existing	
businesses,	however,	namely	the	 factories	and	warehouses	common	in	portions	of	
this	 industrial	neighborhood,	 failed	to	show	up	to	these	meetings	and	thus	had	no	
direct	voice	 in	 the	process.	Without	a	voice	 in	 the	process,	City	Planning	drafted	a	
study	 that	 marginalized	 industrial	 interests	 and	 painted	 a	 partial	 picture	 of	 the	
neighborhood’s	needs.	
Omitting	 entire	 groups	 from	 the	planning	process	 is	 not	 a	 new	problem	 in	
planning	 (Jacobs	 1961;	 Mohl	 2004;	 Buzbee	 2014).	 In	 another	 interview	 with	 a	
senior	 planner	 from	 the	 Transportation	 Division,	 she,	 too,	 spoke	 of	 this	 enduring	
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problem:	“The	people	who	don’t	participate	are	the	hardest	part	of	the	process.	As	




When	 a	 known	 group	 is	 absent	 from	 the	 process,	 planners	 can	 take	 the	
meetings	directly	to	those	groups.	As	the	Department’s	planners	prepared	a	study	of	
Red	Hook,	 Brooklyn,	 for	 instance,	 they	 noticed	 that	 residents	 from	 the	 Red	Hook	






in	Red	Hook,	other	groups	are	more	difficult	 to	 identify,	and	 it	 is	not	always	clear	
that	 the	 City	 has	 the	 energy	 or	 resources	 to	 find	 every	 niche	 community.	 This	
example	connected	directly	with	a	comment	 from	my	interview	with	the	MTA	bus	
planners	 who	 discussed	 how	 difficult	 it	 was	 for	 them	 to	 assess	 local	 bus	 needs	
because	of	the	lack	of	information	at	the	neighborhood	scale:	“How	much	outreach	
can	 we	 do?	 We	 try	 to	 get	 officials,	 churches,	 and	 everyone”	 (Personal	 Interview	
2014e).	The	inability	to	include	everyone	in	a	study	is	not	a	fatal	flaw.	The	problems	
arise	when	 studies	 are	 presented	 as	 comprehensive	 and	 definitive	when	 they	 are	
																																																								
16	Sandercock	 and	 Forsyth	 (1992)	 also	 point	 out	 that	 even	 when	 people	 show	 up	 to	 planning	
meetings,	there	is	no	guarantee	that	everyone	will	participate	(p.51).	
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clearly	 partial	 and	 suggestive.	When	 factors	 fail	 to	 find	 their	way	 into	 a	 study	 or	
model,	there	is	no	way	to	represent	them	(Black	1990).	
Sophisticated,	 time-intensive	 “predict	 and	provide”	models	are	 the	bedrock	
of	transportation	studies.	Black	(1990)	acknowledges	that	during	his	time	working	
on	 the	 Chicago	 Area	 Transportation	 Study,	 a	 ground-breaking	 large	 scale	
transportation	planning	and	engineering	study	that	produced	a	three-volume	report	
released	 in	 1959,	 1960,	 and	 1962,	 researchers	 failed	 to	 identify	 future	 concerns,	
such	as	congestion	and	pollution,	which	 in	 turn	were	 impossible	 to	operationalize	








Proclamations	 about	 ‘Americans’	 could	 not	 be	 made	 without	
suppressing	 the	voices	and	experiences	of	some,	and	here	surveyors	
more	often	perpetuated	than	challenged	the	assumptions	of	their	day.	
Their	 presumptions	 about	 who	 constituted	 the	 public	 meant	 that	
some	 Americans—African	 Americans,	 immigrants,	 and	 poor	 people,	








While	 transportation	 planning	methods,	 as	 practiced	 in	 New	 York	 City	 did	
not	provide	 the	explanatory	valence	 I	 anticipated	as	 I	pursued	my	question	about	
how	 do	 planners	 and	 policymakers	 construct	 transportation	 policy,	 I	 turned	 my	
attention	 to	 the	 regulators,	 politicians,	 and	 actors	 connected	 with	 the	 industry.	
Specifically,	I	spoke	with	current	and	former	employees	at	the	TLC	and	the	DOT,	van	
drivers	 and	 operators,	 and	 community	members	 interested	 in	 the	 vans.	 	 Because	
interviews	 are	 susceptible	 to	 gaps	 in	 knowledge,	 poor	 recall,	 or	 confusion,	 I	
combined	 them	 with	 ongoing	 archival	 and	 ethnographic	 research	 that	 examined	
meeting	minutes,	legislation,	TLC	budget	documents	and	annual	reports,	newspaper	
articles,	 community	 meetings,	 and	 City	 Council	 meetings	 to	 contextualize	 the	
universe	 of	 the	 vans	 and	 transportation	policy	 and	 verify	 claims	made	during	my	
interviews.	
Mixed	Messages	
After	 combing	 through	 three	 decades	worth	 of	 the	 TLC’s	meeting	minutes,	
looking	 for	 insight	 into	 how	 the	 vans	 were	 perceived	 and	 handled	 by	 the	
Commission,	 and	 turning	 up	 very	 little,	 I	 turned	 to	 interviews	 with	 current	 and	
former	TLC	employees	and	commissioners	to	gain	another	perspective	on	the	vans.		
As	mentioned	 earlier,	 I	 interviewed	 a	 former	 commissioner	 from	 the	1990s,	 but	 I	
also	 spoke	 with	 current	 employees	 working	 in	 the	 policy	 department,	 the	 press	
office,	and	legal	department.	Through	these	interviews,	it	is	clear	that	the	TLC	wants	
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to	 learn	more	 about	 the	 vans,	 but	 that	 it	 knows	 little	 about	 the	 industry;	 namely,	
how	the	vans	operate,	or	how	to	get	a	firmer	grasp	on	the	existing	conditions.	




more	 than	 30	 years.	 	 After	 discussing	 the	 TLC	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 getting	 some	
background	 information	 on	 the	 former	 commissioner,	 I	 asked	 her	 why	 the	 vans	
were	so	popular	on	Flatbush	Avenue:	“As	service	declined	on	the	buses	and	people	
grew	 desperate,”	 she	 explained	 “the	 vans	 sort	 of	 just	 popped	 up.	When	 there	 are	





While	 the	 former	commissioner	confirmed	much	 I	had	 learned	 through	my	
survey	 work,	 archival	 research,	 and	 interviews,	 it	 was	 important	 to	 hear	 that	






Even	 though	 the	 TLC	 was	 uninterested	 in	 regulating	 the	 vans,	 the	 former	
commissioner	assured	me	that	the	Commission’s	experience	issuing	permits	to	for-
hire	 vehicles,	 inspecting	 taxis,	 and	 regulating	 private	 operators	made	 it	 the	 best-
suited	agency	to	oversee	the	vans.	The	vans,	like	taxis	and	for-hire	vehicles,	are	fully	
privatized.	They	 receive	no	direct	 subsidy	 for	 their	 operations	or	 capital	 costs.	As	
such,	the	City	toes	a	careful	line	with	these	operators	rather	than	exerting	too	great	
an	influence	over	them.	This	is	important	because	the	City	and	State,	in	the	shape	of	
the	 MTA,	 hold	 buses	 and	 subways	 to	 a	 very	 high	 operational	 standard	 and	
determine	exactly	where	service	is	provided.	With	the	vans,	the	City	mandates	that	
vehicles	 are	 inspected	 three	 times	 a	 year,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 require	 vans	 to	 be	
wheelchair	 accessible,	 provide	 service	 on	 specific	 streets,	 or	 maintain	 a	 schedule	
(TLC	n.d.,	p.6).	
Besides	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 provision	 of	
transportation	services,	we	also	discussed	regulations	and	enforcement.	One	of	the	








than	 livery,	 taxi,	 or	 gypsy	 [cab]	 enforcement:	 the	 vans	 are	 like	 a	 whale	 in	 a	
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swimming	 pool,	 they’re	 hard	 to	 miss	 and	 they	 aren’t	 spread	 all	 over	 the	 city”	
(Personal	 Interview	2014c).	Since	 the	vans	stick	 to	well-defined	corridors	and	are	
distinctive,	 rather	 than	 personal	 anonymous	 cars,	 it	 is	 relatively	 easy	 to	 set	 up	
checkpoints	and	seize	unlicensed	vans.17			
As	 we	 discussed	 enforcement,	 I	 asked	 her	 to	 explain	 how	 the	 TLC	 could	







former	 commissioner	 speculated	 that	 the	 vans	had	been	 ignored,	 in	part,	 because	
City	officials	did	not	want	to	appear	racist	and	thus	had	allowed	the	vans	to	hover	in	
a	liminal	space	between	legality	and	illegality.	While	her	point	has	merit,	one	could	




wanted	 to	 see	 just	 how	 many	 vehicles	 the	 TLC	 seized	 every	 year.	 The	 former	
commissioner	 told	me	 that	when	 she	worked	at	 the	TLC	 in	 the	1990s,	 the	agency	
																																																								
17	In	 September,	 a	 federal	 judge	 ruled	 that	 it	 was	 unconstitutional	 for	 TLC	 enforcement	 agents	 to	








sold	 off	 in	 three	 tranches	 of	 6,000,	 that	 can	 be	 both	 dispatched	 or	 hailed	 in	 the	
boroughs	and	in	Manhattan	north	of	96th	street	on	the	East	Side	and	110th	street	on	






























In	 a	 separate	 interview	 with	 a	 seasoned	 TLC	 veteran	 who	 possesses	 an	
encyclopedic	knowledge	of	the	agency,	it	became	clear	that	the	Commission	knows	
little	about	the	vans	and	has	no	immediate	plans	to	rectify	this	shortcoming	despite	
announcing	 new	 policies	 concerning	 the	 vans,	 namely	 the	 decal	 program	 and	 the	



























TLC,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 does	 not	 carry	 out	 studies	 or	 serve	 as	 a	 storehouse	 of	
knowledge.	 After	 all	 it	 was	 the	 DCP	 Transportation	 Division	 that	 carried	 out	 the	
commuter	van	study	in	1998	despite	the	TLC’s	role	as	regulator.19		The	TLC	issues	
permits	and	inspects	vehicles,	what	happens	after	that,	according	to	the	logic	of	the	
veteran	 TLC	 employee,	 is	 beyond	 the	 Commission’s	 ken—though	 it	 does	 have	 a	
small	 enforcement	 division	 of	 186	 agents	 (Goldwyn	 2015).	 	 When	 I	 asked	 the	
veteran	TLC	employee	if	this	dissonance	between	knowledge	and	regulation	seemed	
problematic	 to	 her,	 she	 replied	 in	 a	 resigned	 tone,	 “The	 TLC	 is	 here	 for	 better	 or	
worse”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014h).	When	 I	 shifted	my	 questions	 to	 issues	 about	
unlicensed	 vans,	 lapsed	 insurance,	 vans	 operating	 out	 of	 their	 service	 areas,	 and	
other	concerns	mentioned	by	drivers	and	operators,	she	responded,	“Yes,	those	are	
problems,	 but	 we	 don’t	 oversee	 the	 minute-to-minute	 operations	 of	 these	
businesses”	(Personal	Interview	2014h).			
While	the	TLC	veteran	accepts	the	limitations	of	the	Commission	as	an	active	
regulatory	 body	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 vans,	 the	 truth	 is	 more	 complicated	 than	
blithe	neglect.	The	TLC	is	a	small	agency	with	about	700	full-time	employees	and	an	












	 In	 the	 face	 of	 limited	 capabilities	 and	 bandwidth,	 however,	 the	 TLC	 has	
selectively	 taken	on	 tasks	beyond	 inspecting	 and	 licensing	vehicles.	As	mentioned	
earlier,	the	TLC’s	decision	to	initiate	the	Group	Ride	Vehicle	Pilot	Project	was	out	of	
character	 for	 the	 agency,	 but	 over	 the	 last	 five	 years,	 the	 agency	has	 grown	more	
active.	 Part	 of	 this	 is	 the	doing	of	 the	 agency,	 namely	 the	 launch	of	 the	Boro	Taxi	
program,	 and	 part	 of	 this	 is	 the	 changing	 transportation	 landscape	 in	 New	 York,	
such	as	the	rise	of	e-hail	taxis	and	shifting	demographics	across	the	city.	Below	is	a	
chart	showing	just	how	rapidly	the	for-hire	vehicle	market	has	grown	in	New	York,	
which	 in	 turn	 requires	 the	 TLC	 and	 the	 City	 to	 expend	 more	 resources	 on	
inspections,	 ticketing,	 data	 processing,	 studies,	 hearings,	 etc.	 Between	 2010	 and	








While	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 for-hire	 vehicle	 sector	 had	 little	 to	 do	with	 active	
decisions	made	by	the	TLC,	 the	agency	did	 take	a	proactive	step	when	 it	 launched	
the	Boro	Taxi	program	 in	2013.	Without	delving	 too	deeply	 into	 the	details	of	 the	
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program,	the	core	point	is	that	when	the	Commission	began	selling	new	Street	Hail	
Livery	medallions,	 it	 also	 budgeted	 for	 the	 hiring	 of	 140	 new	 employees	 directly	
responsible	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 the	program	(New	York	City	Council	2013).		
The	TLC’s	budget	grew	rapidly	between	2012	and	2015,	nearly	a	150	percent	rate	of	
change,	 because	 the	 agency	 accounted	 for	 the	 new	 jobs	 needed	 to	 ensure	 the	
smooth	deployment	and	adoption	of	this	program.			
A	closer	 look	at	 the	proposed	2016	budget	 reveals	a	number	of	new	needs	
affecting	multiple	areas	of	 the	agency,	but	there	are	no	 line	 items	dedicated	to	the	
vans,	 even	 after	 it	 announced	 that	 its	 decal	 pilot	would	 become	 permanent	 (New	
York	 City	 Taxi	 and	 Limousine	 Commission	 2015).	 The	 agency	 wisely	 allocated	
$279,000	 for	 the	citywide	 traffic	 safety	 initiative,	Vision	Zero;	$294,000	 for	a	data	
analysis	team	to	process	the	terabytes	of	data	created	by	the	76	mobile	application	
enabled	 for-hire	 vehicle	 providers	 like	 Uber;	 and	 $1,231,000	 million	 for	 the	 La	
Guardia	Airport	 Squad	 to	 increase	 enforcement	 against	 illegal	 pickups	 (New	York	
City	City	Council	2015).	 	While	all	of	these	expenditures	are	defensible,	there	is	no	
indication	 that	 the	 new	 budget	 will	 allocate	 one	 dollar	 towards	 improving	 the	
passenger,	 operator,	 or	 driver’s	 experience	 for	 commuter	 vans.	 If	 budgets	 reflect	
priorities	and	values,	as	the	de	Blasio	administration	has	said,	the	vans	are	nowhere	







with	 successive	 TLC	 budgets,	 the	 Commission	 has	 implemented	 two	 minor	 van	
policies.	 In	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 TLC	 employee	 charged	 with	 implementing	 the	
Commuter	Van	Decal	Pilot,	 I	 asked	her	what	 the	 agency’s	 goals	were	 for	 the	 vans	
and	how	this	specific	policy	would	help	achieve	them.	She	assured	me	that	the	“vans	
have	 become	 a	 top	 priority	 since	 the	 new	Commissioner	 took	 over,”	 and	 that	 the	
primary	goals	for	the	vans	were	to	“lend	them	legitimacy	and	build	up	the	industry	
going	forward”	(Personal	 Interview	2014i).	These	responses	reflect	 the	same	level	
of	 uncritical	 hopefulness	 conveyed	 in	 TLC	meeting	 minutes	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	
Two.	 Again,	 there	 is	 little	 explanation	 as	 to	 why	 this	 specific	 policy	will	 help	 the	
industry	 going	 forward,	 and	 as	 budget	 documents	 show,	 this	 optimism	 is	 simply	
assumed	rather	than	part	of	a	concrete	and	paid-for	plan.			
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parties	 bearing	 some	 fault	 so	 perhaps	 this	 small	 program	 is	 the	 start	 of	 a	 deeper	
engagement.	Perhaps	the	2017	budget	will	reveal	a	greater	emphasis	on	the	vans.	
Before	 speculating	 on	 the	 2017	 budget,	 I	 want	 to	 return	 to	 2015	 and	 the	
decal	program.	After	running	a	one-year	pilot	project,	the	TLC	decided	to	make	the	
decal	program	permanent;	thus,	all	licensed	commuter	vans	now	have	to	display	the	
official	 commuter	 van	 decal—in	 addition	 to	 other	 markers	 that	 were	 already	
mandated.	 In	 the	 documents	 posted	 on	 the	 TLC’s	 website	 outlining	 the	 rules	
regarding	the	new	decals,	the	Commission	also	specified	the	objectives	of	the	pilot:		
1) Make	 TLC-licensed	 Commuter	 Vans	 easily	 identifiable	 to	








The	 intent	 of	 these	 three	 goals	 is	 clear;	 it	 is	 still	 unclear	 how	 the	 decal	 program	
helps	achieve	them,	or	how	these	goals	were	generated.	Later	in	the	document,	the	
authors	 describe	 the	 results	 of	 the	 yearlong	 pilot	 project.	 While	 many	 operators	
participated	 in	 the	 program—87	 percent—the	 commission	 provides	 no	 data,	
numeric	or	otherwise,	 that	 shows	 the	decal	program	 led	 to	 increased	 ridership	 in	
licensed	vans,	 attracted	new	 customers	who	had	not	previously	used	 the	 vans,	 or	
helped	 with	 enforcement—in	 fact	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 Figure	 9,	 van	 seizures	 declined	










transportation	 network,	which	 tracks	with	 everything	 else	 I	 have	 heard	 from	 the	
TLC	 and	 observed	 at	 dozens	 of	 City	 Council	 meetings,	 where	 everything	 from	
paratransit	 to	 for-hire	 vehicles	 to	 parking	 regulations	 to	 ferries	 have	 had	 a	
hearing.20	While	 everyone	 recognizes	 the	 utility	 of	 the	 vans	 and	 even	 the	 more	




concerned	 about	 this	 disconnect	 between	 existing	 policies	 and	 practice	 (Personal	
Interview	2014j).		
Despite	 this	 conclusion	 about	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 vans,	 the	 City	 has	 no	
immediate	 interest	 in	 studying	 the	 industry	 more	 closely	 or	 figuring	 out	 how	 to	
integrate	it	 into	the	larger	transportation	network.21	One	of	the	senior	planners	on	
this	 team	 revealed	 that	 no	 one	 at	 the	 DOT,	 TLC,	 or	 City	 Planning	 is	 interested	 in	
“planning	 for	 the	vans	or	 finding	a	 logical	place	 for	 them	 in	 the	system”	(Personal	
Interview,	2014j).	As	a	result	of	 this	 lack	of	 interest,	no	one	 in	the	City	has	a	clear	
idea	 if	 there	 are	 too	 many	 or	 too	 few	 vans	 plying	 the	 streets,	 and	 if	 they	 are	
needlessly	 contributing	 to	 congestion	 and	 collisions,	 or	 doing	 an	 adequate	 job	
serving	people’s	needs.	
The	overall	 lack	of	 interest	 in	the	vans	stems,	 in	part,	 from	the	fact	that	the	
van	 industry	 is	 diffuse	 and	 has	 struggled	 to	 organize	 itself,	 make	 its	 concerns	
known,	and	follow	up	with	the	appropriate	decision-makers	to	ensure	that	the	van	
industry’s	 concerns	 are	 also	 the	 concerns	 of	 elected	 officials	 and	 regulators.	 In	
Chapter	Two,	I	cited	some	comments	from	former	Commissioner	David	Yassky	that	
acknowledged	 the	 communication	 difficulties	 between	 the	 van	 industry	 and	 the	
City.	 This	 issue	 of	 communication	 remerged	 in	 my	 interview	 with	 the	 DOT’s	








idea	what	 I’m	 supposed	 to	 do”	 (Personal	 Interview,	 2014j).	 This	 quote	points	 not	
only	to	a	lack	of	organization	on	the	side	of	the	City,	but	also	to	a	lack	of	organization	
on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 van	 industry.	 The	 yellow	 taxis	 and	 for-hire	 vehicles	 have	
representatives	 who	 attend	 every	 TLC	 meeting,	 advocate	 on	 behalf	 of	 their	
constituents,	lobby	local	and	state	officials,	and	speak	to	the	press	when	issues	over	
safety	or	 legislation	arise—the	current	debate	over	e-hail	 taxis	 is	a	great	case	and	
point	of	this	organizational	differentiation.	
This	 basic	 level	 of	 organization	 allows	 groups	 to	 unify	 around	 a	 cause	 and	
show	elected	officials	that	there	is	a	constituency	whose	needs	must	be	addressed.		
Without	 this	 level	 of	 organization,	 the	 commuter	 van	 industry	 remains	 a	 diffuse,	
inscrutable	industry	that	is	easily	ignored	when	more	pressing	issues	emerge.	This	














clearer	 sense	 of	 the	 issues	 facing	 drivers,	 operators,	 and	 those	 dependent	 on	 the	
industry.	(I	make	this	distinction	between	drivers	and	operators	because	operators	
own	 commuter	 van	 bases,	 which	 allow	 drivers	 and	 vans	 to	 associate	 with	 them.		
Sometimes	an	operator	owns	all	of	the	vans	associated	with	the	base.	This	means	he	
or	she	will	drive	one	van	and	rent	out	the	other	 licensed	vans	to	drivers.	 It	 is	also	
common	 for	drivers	who	own	 their	 van	 to	pay	a	 fee	 to	 join	 an	existing	base.	This	
distinction	means	that	drivers	and	operators	have	different	sets	of	concerns.	Drivers	
worry	about	recouping	the	costs	of	renting	a	van	while	operators	worry	about	the	





first	 Commuter	 Van	 Summit	 in	 Jamaica,	 Queens	 in	 May	 2014.	 The	 goal	 of	 the	
summit,	as	described	by	Ricketts,	“was	to	come	face	to	face	with	our	regulators	and	
neighbors”	 (Ethnographic	 Field	 Notes	 2014).	 The	 meeting	 did	 exactly	 that.	 In	
addition	 to	 the	 operators	 and	 drivers	 from	 Brooklyn	 and	 Queens—just	 bringing	
these	 two	 groups	 together	 is	 a	 feat	 in	 and	 of	 itself—the	 meeting	 also	 featured	
members	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Police	 Department,	 DOT,	 and	 TLC;	 local	 business	
interests;	 City	 Council	 Members’	 representatives;	 lawyers	 working	 with	 van	
operators;	insurance	agents;	and	local	community	members.					
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	 The	 scheduled	 portion	 of	 the	 summit	 gave	 all	 of	 the	 invited	 guests	 an	
opportunity	to	introduce	themselves,	speak	about	their	relationship	with	the	vans,	
and	raise	general	concerns.	It	was	during	this	period	that	van	drivers	and	operators	









rather	 than	 at	 one	 another.	 It	was	 here	 that	 the	 gap	between	 the	 regulations	 and	
day-to-day	 practice	 became	 obvious.	 While	 listening	 to	 a	 group	 of	 operators	
permitted	 to	 serve	 Flatbush	 Avenue—a	 group	 with	 over	 100	 years	 of	 collective	
experience—discuss	 their	 specific	 issues,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 none	of	 them	knew	
how	the	City	decided	where	to	site	commuter	van	loading	zones	or	how	to	get	the	
City	to	move	existing	ones	to	more	useful	 locations.	 	 “Do	we	talk	to	the	TLC	about	
[loading	 zones]?	 Maybe	 Dorothy	 [from	 the	 DOT]	 would	 know,”	 asked	 one	 of	 the	
operators	(Ethnographic	Field	Notes	2014)?		After	a	few	more	moments	of	confused	
conversation,	I	suggested	they	write	a	 letter	 identifying	specific	areas	they	wanted	







(Appendix	 2),	 with	 their	 consultation	 and	 final	 approval,	 outlining	 the	 operators’	
desire	 to	 have	 new	 commuter	 van	 loading	 zones	 installed	 along	 Flatbush	 Avenue	
and	find	the	right	person	within	the	City’s	machinery	to	petition	on	their	behalf.		
	 Up	to	this	point	 in	my	research,	 I	had	carefully	observed	all	of	 the	different	
actors	in	the	industry.	I	had	an	easy	rapport	with	a	number	of	drivers	and	operators,	




my	 role	 is	 important,	 the	 more	 relevant	 finding	 is	 how	 poorly	 the	 City	 and	 van	
interests	communicate.	
	 This	 issue	 of	 communication	 emerged	 during	 my	 interviews	 with	 City	
officials	 and,	 not	 surprisingly,	 persisted	 during	 my	 interviews	 with	 varying	 van	










to	 facilitate	 discussion	 and	 get	 things	 moving”	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014k),	 she	
explained.		
According	 to	 the	 executive,	 the	 TLC	 was	 not	 receptive	 to	 this	 idea	 and	
questioned	the	group’s	motivations.	While	 the	TLC	has	every	right	 to	question	the	
motivations	of	 an	 industry	group,	 it	 is	unfortunate	 that	 the	TLC	has	not	made	 the	
effort	to	create	these	types	of	linkages	with	one	of	the	industries	it	regulates.	After	
all,	 since	 the	 TLC	 operates	 from	 such	 an	 information	 deficit,	 the	 best	 place	 to	 get	
good	 information	 is	 from	 the	 industry	 itself.	 In	 this	 specific	 example,	 it	 is	
particularly	 ironic	because	the	purported	brain	trust	pitched	the	TLC	on	a	rooftop	
light,	similar	to	the	lights	on	top	of	yellow	and	green	taxicabs,	to	distinguish	licensed	
commuter	 vans	 from	 unlicensed	 pirates	 (Personal	 Interview	 2014k).	 While	 the	
particulars	 of	 the	 rooftop	 light	 vary	 from	 the	 Commuter	 Van	 Decal	 Pilot	 that	
launched	in	2014,	which	grew	out	of	a	suggestion	from	the	101st	Police	Precinct	in	
Far	 Rockaway,	 it	 is	 troubling	 that	 the	 TLC	 eagerly	 adopted	 one	 strategy	 for	












licenses.	While	 the	 TLC’s	 requirements	 are	 clearly	 spelled	 out	 on	 its	website,	 the	
irregular	 rhythm	 of	 enforcement	 makes	 strict	 adherence	 to	 the	 rules	 costly	 and	
unnecessary	(Taxi	and	Limousine	Commission	n.d.,	pp.5-18).			
This	 pervasive	 uncertainty	 stretches	 beyond	 the	 van	 industry	 and	 affects	
entire	 neighborhoods	 and	 groups	 of	 people.	 	 In	 an	 interview	with	 the	 leader	 of	 a	
grass-roots	organization	 in	Brooklyn,	she	argued	that	 the	uncertainty	surrounding	
the	vans,	namely	the	distinction	between	licensed	and	unlicensed	vans,	serves	as	a	
justification	 for	 “the	 police	 harassment	 in	 our	 communities”	 (Personal	 Interview	
2014l).	 Since	 vans	 operate	 illegally	 in	 specific	 neighborhoods,	 the	 police	 have	 the	
right	 to	 set	 up	 checkpoints,	 pull	 over	 vans,	 and	 use	 whatever	 tactics	 it	 deems	
necessary	to	uphold	order.			
Her	 work	 with	 the	 vans,	 which	 includes	 documenting	 tickets	 van	 drivers	
receive	 and	 connecting	 drivers	 with	 legal	 counsel,	 grew	 out	 of	 earlier	 work	 to	
combat	police	brutality.	“As	long	as	there	is	uncertainty,”	she	said,	“this	‘traffic’	issue	
isn’t	seen	for	what	it	really	is:	a	civil	rights	abuse”	(Personal	Interview	2014l).	While	
her	 focus	 on	 civil	 rights	 rather	 than	 transportation	 planning	 separates	 her	 from	
other	 interview	 subjects,	 her	 points	 are	 valid	 and	 add	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 the	
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debate.	 The	 struggle	 for	 equal	 rights	 and	 access	 to	 everyday	 necessities,	 which	
transportation	 services	 enable,	 takes	 place	 at	 multiple	 scales	 and	 depriving	
neighborhoods	 of	 service,	 whether	 licensed	 or	 unlicensed,	 “is	 demoralizing”	
(Personal	 Interview	 2014l).	 	 This	 harassment	 exacerbates	 an	 already	 tenuous	




It	 is	 when	 we	 think	 of	 the	 vans	 as	 a	 social	 justice	 issue	 that	 we	 begin	 to	
understand	 why	 new	 regulations	 that	 reflect	 daily	 practice	 are	 needed	 and	 how	
informality	jeopardizes	everyone	connected	to	the	vans.	While	regulations	do	exist,	
the	 van	 industry	 is	 best	 described	 as	 informal.	 I	 use	 informal	 not	 to	 draw	 a	
distinction	 between	 licensed	 and	 unlicensed	 but,	 instead,	 to	 highlight	 the	 veil	 of	
uncertainty	 that	 shrouds	 the	 entire	 industry.	 Roy	 (2009)	 defines	 informality	 as	
“inscribed	 in	 the	 ever-shifting	 relationship	 between	 what	 is	 legal	 and	 illegal,	
legitimate	 and	 illegitimate,	 authorized	 and	unauthorized.	This	 relationship	 is	 both	
arbitrary	and	fickle	and	yet	is	the	site	of	considerable	state	power	and	violence”	(p.	
80).		It	is	the	fickleness	of	informality—one	day	a	van	driver	picks	up	a	passenger	at	
a	 bus	 stop	without	 drawing	 the	 ire	 of	 the	 police,	 but	 a	 day	 later	 she	 has	 her	 van	
impounded	 and	 livelihood	 snatched	 from	 her	 grips	 for	 providing	 the	 exact	 same	
service—that	leaves	van	drivers,	street	vendors,	land	squatters,	and	all	others	who	
hover	 in	the	 liminal	space	of	 informality	vulnerable	to	the	whims	of	 the	state.	Roy	
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(2009)	 argues	 that	 the	 state	 uses	 the	 uncertainty	 that	 defines	 informality	 as	 a	
weapon	to	enact	its	plans:	
It	 is	 this	 territorialized	 flexibility	 that	 allows	 the	 state	 to	 ‘future-
proof’,	 to	 make	 existing	 land	 available	 for	 new	 uses,	 to	 devalorize	








ability	 of	 the	 state	 to	 co-opt	 informality	 and	 use	 it	 against	 those	who	 have	 found	
succor	in	its	fuzziness.	Just	as	development	pressures	in	Calcutta	enabled	the	state	
to	 upend	 those	 de	 facto	 land	 rights	 ten	 years	 later,	 what	 will	 happen	 in	 Central	
Brooklyn	when	capital	 investment	and	 re-zonings	arrive?	What	will	happen	when	
the	 landscape	 needs	 to	 be	 re-ordered	 to	 facilitate	 capital	 accumulation	 (Smith	
1996)?		




of	 the	 city	 that	 conforms	 to	 their	 vision	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 rather	 than	 the	
practices	of	the	exiting	community:		
In	 Terry’s	 story,	 old	 (presumably	 harmless)	 rituals	 are	 being	
disrupted	 by	 the	 gentry	who	 are	 trying	 to	 “take	 over.”	 By	 using	 the	
police	 to	 enforce	what	 they	 deem	 to	 be	 the	 new	 regime,	 the	 gentry	
inspire	resentment.	What	is	even	more	galling	is	that	certain	activities,	
such	as	drinking	 in	public,	are	proscribed	unless	 they	conform	to	he	
gentry’s	 idea	 of	 what	 is	 acceptable.	 Drinking	 outside	 is	 drinking	
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outside.	As	long	as	someone	is	not	disorderly,	what	difference	does	it	
make	whether	 someone	 is	 standing	 on	 a	 corner	 or	 sitting	 behind	 a	





the	 whims	 of	 the	 police	 and	 newcomers	 who	 view	 the	 vans	 as	 ramshackle	 and	
disorderly	(The	Brooklyn	Paper	2014,	Riesz	2014).	Thus,	demographic	shifts	rather	







This	 chapter	 began	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 predict-and-provide	
transportation	 planning	 methods	 marginalize	 the	 van	 community;	 however,	 it	 is	
clear	 that	 the	 gap	 between	daily	 practice	 and	policy	 is	 the	 outgrowth	 of	 a	 lack	 of	
interest	on	 the	side	of	 the	City	and	poor	communication:	neither	 the	van	 industry	
nor	 the	 City	 engages	 with	 one	 another	 effectively.	 The	 other	 responsibilities	 of	
planners	 at	 the	 DCP,	 DOT,	MTA,	 and	 TLC,	 from	 cratering	 taxi	medallion	 prices	 to	





In	addition	to	 these	valuable	 insights	 into	how	the	planning	process	works,	
this	 chapter	 also	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 vans’	 informality	 is	 a	 social	 justice	 issue.		
Since	 the	 laws	 governing	 the	 vans	 are	 applied	 arbitrarily,	 the	 van	 industry	 has	
developed	 its	 own	 practices	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 existing	 laws	 but	 often	 go	
unpunished.	When	police	officers	enforce	the	law,	which	is	their	duty,	they	threaten	
the	 mobility	 of	 a	 community	 and	 criminalize	 citizens	 going	 about	 their	 regular	




















The	 vans	 are	 a	mode	 of	 transportation	 that	 serves	 niche	 communities	 and	
operate	almost	entirely	beyond	the	City’s	scrutiny	for	a	variety	of	reasons	that	were	
identified	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters.	 While	 there	 are	 licensing	 and	 insurance	
requirements,	 a	 number	 of	 vans	 do	 not	 adhere	 to	 those	 requirements,	 and	 even	
among	the	ones	that	are	licensed	and	insured,	the	City	knows	little	about	how	they	
operate,	who	uses	them,	where	they	travel,	and	how	many	of	them	are	on	the	road	




vans	 demonstrated	 how	 poorly	 it	 understood	 the	 industry	 and	 suggested	 that	
without	 a	 serious	 data	 collection	 effort,	 drafting	 policy	 geared	 towards	 the	 vans	
would	 be	 futile.	 In	 short,	 this	 dissertation	 is	 an	 attempt	 to	 make	 “social	 science	
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matter”	 by	 responding	 to	 a	 demonstrable	 policy	 failure	 that	 shows	 no	 sign	 of	
improving	(Flyvbjerg	2001;	Flyvbjerg	et	al.	2012).		
I	 spend	 the	 bulk	 of	 this	 chapter	 interpreting	 the	 results	 of	 my	 survey	 of	
commuter	 van	 passengers	 on	 Flatbush	 Avenue.	 First,	 I	 dive	 into	 the	 survey	 and	
report	 descriptive	 statistics	 that	 render	 a	 clearer	 image	 of	 how	 commuter	 vans	
operate	along	Flatbush	Avenue	and	show	that	the	vans,	like	the	bus	and	the	subway,	
are	 simply	 another	mode	 of	 transit	 rather	 than	 something	 exotic	 and	 beyond	 the	
comprehension	 planners.	 After	 manually	 surveying	 over	 two	 hundred	 commuter	




or	 not	 these	 trips	 are	 part	 of	 a	 longer	multi-modal	 trip,	 and	 who	 are	 the	 people	
traveling	down	Flatbush	Avenue	in	the	hundreds	of	non-descript	14-seat	passenger	
vans.	 The	 answers	 to	 these	 topline	 questions	 are	 relatively	 straightforward	 and	







22	Because	of	 transcription	 issues,	 a	number	of	 surveys	had	 to	be	 excluded	 from	 the	 final	 analysis,	





	 While	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 vans	 is	 sparse,	 one	 thing	 is	 clear	 among	 all	
authors:	 the	vans	are	predominately	used	by	West	 Indian	 immigrants	or	Brooklyn	
born	residents	with	ties	to	the	Caribbean	(Department	of	City	Planning	1986;	Grava	
et	al.	1987;	Department	of	City	Planning	1998;	Richmond	2001;	Best	2016).	While	it	
is	 undeniable	 that	 the	majority	of	 van	 riders	hail	 from	 the	Caribbean	or	Brooklyn	
that	is	only	the	tip	of	the	iceberg	rather	than	the	logical	point	of	conclusion	for	any	
inquiry	 into	 the	 vans.	 To	 better	 understand	 the	 universe	 of	 the	 vans,	 I	wanted	 to	
know	where	 riders	 live,	 if	 they	 own	 cars,	 why	 they	 select	 the	 vans	 over	 the	 bus,	
where	 they	work,	and	 information	about	 their	wages.	The	survey	asked	questions	
related	 to	 each	of	 these	 topics	 and	provides	 invaluable	 insight	 into	who	 rides	 the	
vans,	why	 they	 ride	 the	vans,	 and	where	 they	are	going	 in	 the	vans	 (Appendix	1).		
After	 reviewing	 the	 survey,	what	became	eminently	 clear	 is	 that	 the	vans	are	 just	
another	 form	 of	 a	 transit—after	 all	 167	 of	 198	 passengers,	 or	 84	 percent,	 use	






To	 this	 end,	 the	 survey	 contains	 questions	 about	 gender,	 nativity,	 car	 ownership,	
current	residency,	and	employment.	 	By	probing	these	areas,	 it	 is	clear	to	see	how	
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experiences	 in	 the	vans	resemble	experiences	on	the	bus,	subway,	or	 light	rail.	 	 In	
addition	to	the	obvious	points	of	overlap,	such	as	passengers	eager	to	access	work,	
shopping,	 and	 entertainment,	 the	 vans	 have	 other	 points	 in	 common	 with	
conventional	transit,	such	as	attracting	a	higher	proportion	of	immigrant	passengers	
than	reflected	in	the	general	population,	lower	automobile	ownership	rates,	and	an	
over-representation	 of	 female	 passengers	 (American	 Public	 Transportation	
Association	2007;	Glaeser	et	al.	2008;	Chatman	and	Klein	2009;	Chatman	2014).		In	
short,	 commuter	 van	 passengers	 have	 opted	 for	 the	 vans	 over	 existing	 transit	






the	 American	 Public	 Transportation	 Association	 (2007)	 shows	 that	 women	 are	
more	likely	to	use	transit	than	men.		Thus,	if	the	vans	are	similar	to	other	modes	of	
transit,	 perhaps	 this	 relationship	 also	 holds.	 	 While	 I	 am	 taking	 a	 surface	 level	
approach	 to	 this	 question,	 the	 existing	 literature	 suggests	 that	 the	 positive	
correlation	between	women	and	transit	ridership	 is	not	a	quirky	aberration	in	the	






anxiety	 over	 possible	 victimization	 in	 public	 spaces,	 buses,	 and	 trains	 (p.244).		
While	 Loukaitou-Sideris	 is	 speaking	 generally	 about	 women	 and	 transit,	 popular	
accounts	of	 the	vans	 in	Brooklyn	and	Queens	often	highlight	the	risks	women	face	






As	 noted	 above,	 everyone	 who	 has	 written	 about	 the	 vans	 has	 always	
highlighted	that	the	passengers	tend	to	be	immigrants	from	the	West	Indies,	islands	
like	 Jamaica,	Haiti,	 Trinidad	 and	Tobago,	 and	Guyana.	 	While	 the	 survey	 confirms	
this,	 the	 survey	 also	 reveals	 that	 passengers	 come	 from	 Central	 America,	 Africa,	
Europe,	South	Asia,	East	Asia,	and	other	American	cities.	This	is	an	important	finding	


















finding.	 Since	 the	 survey	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 Brooklyn,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
contextualize	this	rather	than	rely	on	national	level	data.		According	to	the	New	York	
City	 Economic	 Development	 Corporation	 (EDC)	 (2012)	 44	 percent	 of	 Brooklyn	
households	own	a	car.	A	closer	look	at	the	map	produced	by	the	EDC,	shows	that	the	




In	 the	 survey	data,	 there	were	a	 total	59	of	198	passengers,	or	30	percent,	
who	also	owned	a	 car.	This	 coheres	with	Chatman	and	Klein’s	 (2009)	 finding:	we	
would	expect	that	van	passengers	own	fewer	cars	than	a	typical	Brooklyn	resident	
because	 the	 majority	 of	 passengers	 are	 foreign-born.	 To	 dig	 deeper	 into	 the	







car	 ownership,	 I	 found	 that	 35	 of	 108	 foreign-born	 respondents,	 or	 32	 percent,	
owned	 automobiles.	 This	 slight	 uptick	 in	 automobile	 ownership	 rates,	 while	
surprising,	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 drilling	 deeper	 into	 the	 data	 and	 controlling	 for	
years	of	residency.	As	we	saw	above,	the	longer	foreign-born	residents	remain	in	the	
country,	 the	 more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	 adopt	 similar	 travel	 habits	 to	 native-born	
residents,	 which	 means	 the	 more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	 drive	 or	 own	 a	 car.	 Thus,	 in	
stratifying	 the	data	 again,	 I	 found	 that	35	 foreign-born	 respondents	 answered	 the	
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car	 ownership	 question,	 but	 only	 33	 provided	 information	 on	 how	 long	 they	 had	
been	in	the	country.	Of	those	33,	only	six	had	been	in	Brooklyn	for	four	years	or	less,	
and	thus,	82	percent	of	foreign-born	van	passengers	who	owned	a	car	had	been	in	




added	a	 third	 variable	 into	 the	 analysis	 to	 get	 a	better	understanding	of	 how	 this	
population,	car-owning	and	foreign-born,	travel	to	work.	Out	of	32	respondents,	19	
reported	owning	a	car	but	did	not	use	it	to	commute	to	work	in	the	previous	month,	
seven	 reported	 owning	 a	 car	 and	 sometimes	 used	 it	 to	 commute	 to	 work	 in	 the	
previous	month,	and	six	reported	owning	a	car	and	used	it	exclusively	to	commute	
to	work	in	the	previous	month.	
In	 the	 final	 analysis	 of	 nativity,	 car	 ownership,	 and	 commuting	 habits	 over	
the	 previous	 month,	 only	 six	 of	 32	 foreign-born-car-owners,	 or	 19	 percent,	 used	
their	 car	 exclusively	 to	 commute	 to	 work.	 The	 remaining	 26	 respondents,	 or	 81	
percent,	relied	on	the	vans,	subway,	bus,	taxis,	bicycle,	walking,	and	carpool	to	get	to	
work.	Since	I	administered	the	majority	of	the	surveys,	I	had	the	ability	to	ask	follow	
up	 questions	 to	many	 respondents.	When	 I	 asked	 passengers	why	 they	 chose	 the	

















Throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 make	 the	 claim	 that	 van	 passengers	 have	
adequate	access	to	inadequate	transit	service	and	that	the	vans	fill	that	void	rather	
than	provide	access	in	areas	that	are	transit	deprived.	This	thesis	is	apparent	when	











Job	 and	 income	 data	were	 the	 final	 pieces	 of	 demographic	 data	 I	 collected	
from	passengers.	 Later,	 I	will	 address	 the	 geographic	 component	 of	 this	 question,	
where	do	passengers	work,	but	for	now	I	will	stick	to	the	aspatial	questions:	“what	
is	 your	 occupation?”	 and	 “what	 is	 your	 typical	 hourly	 wage?”	 The	 goal	 of	 these	
questions	was	to	get	a	better	sense	of	what	van	passengers	do	for	a	living	and	their	
wages.	 The	 first	 finding	 is	 that,	 164	 of	 197	 passengers,	 or	 83	 percent,	 reported	
having	a	 job.	 	From	here,	 the	 survey	 revealed	 that	 the	health	 sector	was	 the	most	




beauticians,	 and	 baby-sitters.	 Retail	 and	 sales	 followed	 closely	 behind	 the	 service	
sector	and	was	 responsible	 for	26	of	156	 jobs,	or	13	percent.	The	most	 intriguing	
finding	 in	 this	 data	 was	 the	 rich	 mix	 of	 people	 who	 relied	 on	 the	 vans,	 such	 as	





or	 more	 per	 hour.	 	 While	 $19	 or	 more	 was	 the	 most	 common	 wage	 earned,	 the	
second	most	 frequent	response,	with	33	of	146	passengers	or	23	percent,	was	the	
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$10.01	 to	 $13	 per	 hour	 range.	 The	 other	 three	 categories	 drew	 roughly	 equal	
responses	with	20,	 22,	 and	23	 riders	 each	 [Figure	12].	 	While	 this	 income	data	 is	
illuminating,	it	is	important	to	mention	that	the	most	common	answer	to	the	hourly	
wage	 question	 was	 NA.	 	 While	 unemployment	 accounts	 for	 33	 NAs,	 another	 19	







Even	 though	 the	 income	 data	 is	 reported	 as	 a	 categorical	 variable,	 ranges	
rather	 than	 exact	 dollar	 amounts,	 I	 attempted	 to	 calculate	 an	 average	 wage	 to	
















passengers’	wage	 data	 in	 the	 larger	 context	 of	 Brooklyn	wages.	 Since	 the	 income	
variables	 are	 categorical	 and	not	 continuous,	 getting	 an	 average	wage	 takes	 some	
artistry.	By	using	a	weighted	average	from	the	dataset,	I	was	able	to	approximate	an	
average	hourly	wage	of	$15.	To	calculate	this	average	wage,	I	took	the	midpoint	of	
each	category,	 for	 instance	$8.625	 is	 the	midpoint	of	 the	 first	 category,	$7.25-$10,	
and	 multiplied	 that	 by	 the	 number	 of	 respondents	 in	 each	 category	 to	 take	 an	
average	 of	 all	 146	 respondents.23	When	 I	 compared	 this	 against	 data	 from	 the	
Bureau	 of	 Labor	 Statistics	 (n.d)	 for	 2013,	 I	 found	 that	 the	 average	 working	 van	
passenger	made	 less	 than	 the	average	working	Brooklynite’s	 $19	per	hour.	Again,	
because	the	wage	data	 is	skewed	downward,	 this	 finding	 is	suggestive	rather	than	
definitive.		
	 What	I	found	more	interesting	than	the	wage	data	of	van	passengers	versus	
average	 Brooklynites	 was	 the	 distribution	 of	 wages	 within	 each	 sector.	 Since	
healthcare	 encompasses	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	 jobs,	 from	 nurses’	 assistants	 to	




wages	 is	more	pronounced	 in	 the	health	 sector	data	 than	 in	 the	 general	 data	 and	
indicates	 that	while	health	 related	 jobs	are	growing	 in	 the	 region,	 van	passengers	
																																																								
23	Since	the	final	wage	category	is	$19+,	I	used	$19	rather	than	the	midpoint	of	$19	and	infinity.	This	
decision	 skews	 the	 data	 downward.	 Had	 I	 decided	 to	 make	 a	 range	 of	 $19-$25,	 for	 instance,	 the	
midpoint	range	would	be	$22,	and	the	average	hourly	wage	would	become	$16	rather	than	$15.	Since	





The	demographic	data	provides	a	new	lens	 into	van	passengers.	 	 Instead	of	
seeing	 a	 monolithic	 block	 of	 West	 Indian	 passengers,	 we	 can	 now	 make	 more	
precise	 claims	about	passengers.	Most	 important,	 the	data	 from	 the	 survey	 shows	
that	van	passengers,	 like	 conventional	 transit	passengers	 in	New	York,	 are	people	
with	 jobs	who	rely	on	 the	vans	 to	get	 them	around	 the	city,	 especially	 in	 the	area	
near	 where	 they	 live.	 Additionally,	 like	 transit	 passengers	 generally,	 the	 van	
passengers	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 own	 a	 car	 and	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 foreign-born	 and	





With	a	clearer	 idea	about	the	nativity	and	residency	of	van	passengers,	 it	 is	
time	to	dig	deeper	into	why	riders	choose	the	vans	and	whether	or	not	they	also	use	






MTA	 services,	 to	 help	 triangulate	 around	 this	 issue	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 van	
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The	best	way	 to	do	 this	was	 to	 target	 the	MTA’s	most	 committed	 riders	who	 still	
selected	 the	vans	over	 the	bus.	 Since	 the	MTA	offers	 an	unlimited	MetroCard	 that	
entitles	holders	to	swipe	onto	MTA	buses	and	subways	ad	infinitum	 for	a	specified	




an	additional	two	dollars	 for	the	privilege	of	riding	 in	a	van	rather	than	use	a	 free	
swipe	on	their	MetroCard	to	use	the	bus.	Since	the	marginal	cost	of	each	additional	
MTA	ride	is	$0	and	$2	for	the	van,	this	sub-population	should	be	the	least	likely	to	
defect	 from	the	MTA,	which	 in	 turn	makes	 them	the	perfect	group	 to	 target	about	
the	differences	between	the	vans	and	the	MTA.		
Since	 this	sub-population,	unlimited	MetroCard	holders,	represents	a	group	




passengers,	 it	 was	 surprising	 to	 find	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 them,	 56	 of	 62	
unlimited	MetroCard	holders,	 or	 90	percent,	 reported	 that	 they	used	 the	 vans	 for	
either	all,	most,	or	some	of	their	trips.	Only	6	of	62	unlimited	MetroCard	holders,	or	
10	percent,	reported	using	the	vans	almost	never	or	never.	
Given	 the	 popularity	 of	 the	 vans	 with	 unlimited	 MetroCard	 holders,	 I	
expanded	my	analysis	to	see	why	van	passengers	preferred	the	vans	over	the	bus.		
The	four	most	common	answers	to	the	question	“Why	do	you	choose	the	vans	over	
the	MTA”	were:	 speed,	 convenience,	 cost,	 and	 time	waiting	 at	 stop.	 This	 question	
included	other	options,	such	as	weather	and	friendliness	of	passengers	and	drivers,	






ridership	 and	 reliability	 (Ben-Akiva	 and	 Morikawa	 2002;	 Carrion	 and	 Levinson	
2012).		
Even	 though	 the	 bulk	 of	 respondents	 identified	 speed	 as	 the	 main	 reason	
they	 chose	 the	 vans	 over	 other	 options,	 more	 than	 50	 percent	 of	 passengers	
identified	 the	 convenience	 of	 the	 vans	 as	 an	 advantage	 over	 the	 MTA.	 	 Speed,	
convenience,	 and	 time	 waiting	 at	 stop	 work	 together	 to	 capture	 the	 different	
components	 of	 time	 that	 factor	 into	 a	 transit	 trip.	 When	 these	 factors	 are	
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continuously,	 which	 obviates	 the	 need	 for	 passengers	 to	 memorize	 schedules	 or	
waste	 time	 standing	 at	 a	 bus	 stop.	 	 During	 a	 three-month	 period	 of	 observation	
during	the	winter	of	2011	and	2012,	I	counted	one	van	per	minute	during	the	peak	





















vans	 over	 the	MTA’s	 service,	 I	was	 surprised	 that	 it	was	not	 the	most	 compelling	
reason	for	taking	the	vans.	During	the	time	of	 this	survey,	 the	cost	of	an	MTA	fare	
was	$2.50	while	 the	cost	of	a	van	ride	was	$2;	 thus,	 the	bus	was	25	percent	more	
expensive	 than	 the	 vans.	 Redman	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 conducted	 a	 review	 of	 the	 public	
transit	 literature	and	found	that	 the	existing	research	found	price	and	speed	to	be	
two	 the	 leading	 indicators	 of	 passenger	 satisfaction	with	 transit	 service	 (p.	 120).		
While	price	is	a	consideration	for	some	van	passengers,	the	majority	of	riders	rate	
speed	 ahead	 of	 price.	 This	 finding	 helps	 explain	 why	 those	 with	 unlimited	
MetroCards	continue	to	use	the	vans	when	they	have	the	option	of	a	free	bus	ride.			
When	 I	 compared	 the	 answers	 of	 unlimited	MetroCard	 holders	 against	 the	
general	 MetroCard	 holder	 population,	 the	 answers	 remained	 largely	 the	 same.		
Again	 the	 four	most	 common	reasons	 cited	 for	 taking	 the	vans	over	 the	bus	were	





Since	 cost	 appeared	 to	 be	 less	 important	 to	 the	 unlimited	 MetroCard	
population,	 here	 only	 20	 of	 62	 passengers,	 or	 32	 percent	 picked	 cost	 as	 a	
determining	 factor	 when	 choosing	 between	 the	 vans	 and	 bus,	 I	 decided	 to	 ask	
passengers,	independent	of	the	survey,	about	why	they	willingly	paid	the	additional	





inadequate	 service.	 Yes,	 a	 free	 option	 exists,	 but	 when	 compared	 to	 a	 low-cost	






To	 figure	 this	out,	 I	 compared	 the	average	 travel	 time	of	59	van	 trips	 that	 I	 timed	
versus	 BusTime	 data	 from	 the	MTA	 for	 the	 B41.	 Since	 the	 BusTime	 data	 is	 from	
April	 2014	 and	 my	 trips	 occurred	 in	 the	 Summer	 of	 2013,	 I	 am	 not	 comparing	
exactly	alike	things,	but,	presumably	van	riders	in	2014	and	even	today	would	still	
point	 to	 the	 differences	 in	 travel	 time	 as	 a	 reason	 to	 take	 the	 vans	 over	 the	 bus	
(Goldwyn	2015).			
Of	 the	59	 trips	 I	 took	while	 conducting	 the	 survey	portion	of	 the	 research,	
only	 34,	 or	 just	 a	 shade	 over	 50	 percent,	 actually	made	 it	 from	 terminal	 point	 to	
terminal	 point.	 Sometimes,	 a	 van	 driver	 would	 turn	 around	 halfway	 through	 the	
route,	after	all	of	 the	passengers	had	exited,	and	head	back	to	where	he	had	come	
from	 in	 search	 of	 more	 passengers.	 After	 all,	 van	 drivers	 seek	 to	 minimize	
deadheading,	or	riding	without	paying	passengers.	Drivers,	since	they	are	not	bound	




operating	 logic	 of	 the	 more	 senior	 drivers,	 and	 others	 frantically	 turned	 around	
thinking	more	passengers	were	back	in	the	direction	they	came	from.			
Over	the	course	of	59	rides,	I	encountered	a	number	of	anomalous	trips.	On	
one	 occasion,	 I	 was	 in	 a	 van	 that	 refused	 to	 travel	 to	 either	 terminal	 point	 after	
passengers	had	alighted;	instead,	the	driver	focused	his	attention	on	the	portion	of	




through	 a	 cycle	 of	 lights,	 a	 traffic	 violation,	 at	 the	 corner	 of	 Smith	 and	 Livingston	




the	average	 travel	 time	of	34	 trips	was	43	minutes	with	a	standard	deviation	of	5	












regular	stop	and	 limited	stop	service,	 I	organized	my	data	 into	 four	groups:	King’s	
Plaza	 bound	 limited	 stop	 (n	 =	 23),	 King’s	 Plaza	 regular	 stop	 (n	 =	 29),	 Livingston	
Street	bound	 limited	stop	 (n	=	53),	 and	Livingston	Street	bound	regular	 stop	 (n	=	
46).24	King’s	Plaza	bound	limited	stop	service	took	an	average	of	65	minutes	with	a	
																																																								
24	In	 scraping	a	week’s	worth	of	BusTime	data	 from	 the	MTA,	 I	 had	 to	 exclude	 some	observations.		
Because	 the	data	 is	downloaded	every	30	seconds	 rather	 than	when	 the	bus	 starts	 its	 route,	 some	
trips	did	not	register	the	point	of	origin	I	wanted	to	use	for	the	analysis.	These	trips	that	register	after	
leaving	 Livingston	 Street,	 for	 instance,	were	 excluded	 from	 the	 results.	 Another	 set	 of	 trips	 that	 I	
excluded	from	the	dataset	were	those	that	defied	logic.		For	instance,	I	recorded	a	trip	with	a	duration	






















found	a	Livingston	Street	bound	regular	 stop	B41	make	 the	 trip	 in	an	efficient	34	
minutes	and	15	seconds.	Since	this	trip	occurred	at	1:37	AM,	it	is	likely	that	the	bus	

























What	 immediately	 stood	 out	 in	 the	 data	 was	 that	 the	 limited	 stop	 buses	
performed	similarly	to	the	regular	stop	service.		This	finding	has	larger	implications	
for	bus	planning	 in	New	York	 than	 it	does	 for	 this	dissertation,	but	 it	 seems	clear	
that	 skipping	 stops	 is	 not	 the	 best	 way	 to	 speed	 up	 bus	 travel	 along	 Flatbush	
Avenue.		If	the	MTA	wants	to	improve	bus	travel	on	this	route,	it	will	have	to	figure	
out	how	to	mitigate	the	delay	caused	by	congestion	and	passenger	payment.			
The	 variation	 in	 travel	 time,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 range	 and	 standard	
deviation	of	 the	B41,	 gives	 the	vans	a	 leg	up	on	 the	bus	as	 it	 competes	 for	 riders.		
While	 the	 guaranteed	 seat,	 occasional	 DVD	 broadcast,	 or	musical	 accompaniment	




	 Since	 the	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 vans	 serve	 a	 narrow	 spine	 in	 the	 city’s	
transportation	 network,	 I	 wanted	 to	 see	 where	 van	 passengers	 travel.	 There	 are	
clear	destinations	along	the	Flatbush	route	such	as	the	three	shopping	centers	along	
Flatbush	Avenue:	King’s	Plaza,	Atlantic	Terminal	Mall	at	the	Atlantic	Avenue	subway	
stop,	 and	 the	 Junction	 at	 the	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 stop	 [Figure	 16].	 Outside	 of	 these	
obvious	points	of	interest,	I	asked	passengers	about	the	location	of	their	jobs	to	get	a	
better	 sense	 of	where	 their	 trips	 ended	 or	 originated.	 	 After	 all,	 travel	 demand	 is	
linked	 to	 the	 destinations	 it	 connects	 riders	 with.	 While	 work	 trips	 no	 longer	
dominate	 travel	 habits,	 as	 they	 once	 did,	 Small	 (1992)	 reminds	 us	 that	 travel	 “is	
normally	 undertaken	not	 for	 its	 own	 consumption	 value,	 but	 rather	 to	 facilitate	 a	
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complex	and	spatially	varied	set	of	activities	such	as	work,	recreation,	shopping,	and	
home	 life”	 (p.	 5).	 This	 point	 of	 view	 is	 more	 or	 less	 uncontroversial	 in	 the	
transportation	 planning,	 engineering,	 and	 economics	 literature.	 Even	 Mokhtarian	














into	 the	 broader	 transit	 network.	 In	 addition	 to	 connecting	 with	 four	 shopping	
centers,	 the	 vans	 also	provide	 access	 to	 commuter	 rail	 to	 Jamaica,	Queens	 via	 the	
Long	Island	Rail	Road	and	multiple	trains	in	the	subway	network,	including	the	2,	3,	
4,	5,	A,	B,	C,	D,	G,	N,	Q,	R,	and	the	Franklin	Avenue	Shuttle.	Because	the	vans	provide	









city	and	region.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	Hurricaine	Sandy,	 I	 took	a	ride	down	Flatbush	
Avenue,	 before	 I	 began	 surveying	 passengers,	 and	met	 a	 passenger	 from	 Elmont,	
Long	Island	who	had	a	flight	to	catch	in	Philadelphia.	Planes	had	been	grounded	at	
JFK,	 La	 Guardia,	 and	 Newark,	 and	 access	 to	 transit	 was	 severly	 limited.	 This	
passenger	 saw	 the	 vans	 as	 his	 only	 hope	 of	 getting	 to	 a	 curbside	 intercity	 bus	 in	
Manhattan’s	 Chinatown,	 which	 would	 take	 him	 to	 Philadelphia.	 While	 the	 vans	







The	 process	 of	 surveying	 van	 passengers	 and	 recording	 operating	
chracteristics	 of	 the	 vans	 allowed	me	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 vans	 are	 a	 form	 of	
transit	rather	than	something	other	and	beyond	the	comprehension	of	planners	 in	
New	 York.	 Van	 passengers	 share	 much	 in	 common	 with	 transit	 passengers:	 on	
average	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 female,	 foreign	 born,	 transit	 dependent,	 live	 and	 travel	




is	 a	 valuable	 finding	 for	 bus	 planners	 at	 the	MTA	who	worry	 about	 declining	 bus	
ridership	on	the	B41,	and	how	they	can	re-invgorate	 the	system	going	 forward.	 In	
the	following	chapter,	I	will	take	a	deeper	look	at	the	changing	demographics	along	



















	 While	he	had	 a	 logical	 justification	 for	his	 decision	 to	develop	 a	new	 route	
beyond	the	current	eastern	boundary	of	his	route,	he	also	understood	that	he	was	
technically	violating	 the	 rules:	 “This	 is	why	 I	need	your	help.	While	 I’m	 trying	out	
this	new	route,	I	also	want	to	start	getting	letters	together	for	the	DOT	to	ask	for	this	
new	area.	I	want	to	be	ready	with	the	paperwork	in	case	I	need	to	send	something”	
(Personal	 Interview	2014m).	His	uncertain	 tone,	which	was	punctuated	by	 the	 “in	
case	I	need	to	send	something,”	served	as	yet	another	reminder	that	the	commuter	
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vans	 are	 officially	 sanctioned	 but,	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes,	 are	 an	 informal	
service	in	the	eyes	of	the	City.		
	 As	we	discussed	his	new	route,	he	asked	me	to	draft	a	 letter	describing	his	
new	service	area	so	 that	he	could	submit	an	official	package	 to	 the	DOT	at	a	 later	
date.	 To	 start,	 the	 operator	 planned	 to	move	 a	 small	 number	 of	 vans	 to	 the	 new	
route	while	maintaining	his	presence	on	Flatbush	Avenue:	“At	first,	maybe	I’ll	have	
five	vans	on	the	[East	New	York]	route.	I	have	a	few	older	drivers	who	are	willing	to	





the	new	mall	out	 there?	 It’s	big”	 (Personal	 Interview	2014m),	he	 said	 referring	 to	
the	colossal	Gateway	Center,	a	640,000	square	 foot	 shopping	complex	sitting	on	a	
former	 landfill	 in	 East	 New	 York	 (Christian	 2000).	 I	 was	 unfamiliar	 with	 the	
Gateway	Center,	but	as	we	continued	talking	he	told	me	he	wanted	to	connect	 the	
Gateway	 Center,	 which	 had	 recently	 completed	 an	 expansion,	 with	 “the	 Junction,	
which	is	right	in	the	middle	of	my	route”	(Personal	Interview	2014m).		
	 The	Junction	is	one	of	the	key	nodes	along	the	Flatbush	Avenue	route.	At	the	
Junction	 passengers	 have	 access	 to	 shopping,	 Brooklyn	 College,	 and	 the	 subway.	
Instead	 of	 designing	 a	 new	 route	 out	 of	 thin	 air,	 this	 operator	 wanted	 to	 take	
advantage	 off	 an	 already	 busy	 hub	 of	 activity	 and	 extend	 the	 route	 east	 towards	
another	 shopping	 center,	 the	 Gateway	 Center.	 Gateway	 occupies	 50-acres	 on	 the	
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former	230-acre	Fountain	Avenue	 landfill	 that	 is	 the	 site	 of	 rapid	 re-development	






	 This	 operator,	 however,	 saw	 potential	 to	 expand	 his	 business	 and	 hedge	
against	 changing	 demographics	 he	 fears	 will	 eventually	 erode	 his	 customer	 base	





that	permit	him	 to	 ignore	 the	boundaries	of	 service	 area	 and	practice	 “generative	
planning,”	 a	 term	 coined	 by	Uzzell	 (1987).	 Uzzell	 argues	 that	 generative	 planning	
differs	 from	 more	 traditional	 “regulative	 planning”	 by	 substituting	 technical	
knowledge	and	planning	exercises	 that	purport	 to	predict	 future	outcomes	with	a	
mode	of	planning	 that	 relies	on	a	 “thorough	understanding	of	how	a	sociocultural	
system	operates,	carefully	chosen	minimal	 intervention	 in	the	system,	 incremental	
feedback	 on	 the	 consequences	 of	 actions,	 and	 adjustments	 based	 on	 information	
received”	(p.	7).		
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The	 generative	 planning	 paradigm	 allows	 one	 to	 capitalize	 on	 one’s	 deep	









up	 over	 the	 twenty	 plus	 years	 he	 has	 spent	 interacting	 with	 passengers	 and	





Neighborhood	 change,	 specifically	 the	 loss	 of	West	 Indians	 along	 Flatbush	












and	 5-year	 averages	 from	 the	 American	 Community	 Survey	 (ACS).	 Through	 the	
exploration	 of	 this	 data,	 historical	 images,	 and	 planning	 documents	 from	 the	
Department	of	City	Planning,	it	 is	clear	that	neighborhood	change	is	afoot	and	that	
the	operator’s	 local	knowledge	not	only	helps	him	adjust	his	business,	but	also	his	






began	 to	 think	 about	 how	 to	 evaluate	 his	 claims.	 I,	 too,	 spent	 a	 lot	 of	 time	 on	
Flatbush	Avenue	and	saw	a	lot	of	the	changes	he	mentioned,	but	was	that	enough	to	
justify	a	new	service?	The	more	we	spoke	about	his	ideas,	however,	it	became	clear	




In	 addition	 to	my	 concerns	 about	haphazard	decision-making,	 the	Flatbush	
route	was	the	undisputed	crown	jewel	in	the	dollar	van	network.	Flatbush	Avenue’s	
primacy	 had	 gone	 unchallenged	 for	 30	 or	 more	 years	 so	 why	 mess	 with	 a	 good	
thing?	There	was	no	question	 that	 Flatbush	Avenue	 could	 support	 some	 vans,	 but	
could	it	support	the	100	licensed	commuter	vans	with	authorization	from	the	Taxi	
and	 Limousine	 Commission,	 the	 500	 or	 so	 unlicensed	 pirates,	 and	 the	 licensed	




2014,	 the	 B41	 lost	 roughly	 20	 percent	 of	 its	 annual	 riders,	 which	 amounted	 to	






consistently	 complained	 that	 ridership	 along	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 was	 significantly	
down.			
The	B41	 data	 only	 tells	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 neighborhood	 change	 story.	 To	
gain	better	insight	into	the	van	operator’s	hypothesis	about	shifting	travel	patterns,	
I	had	to	take	a	deeper	look	at	the	annual	ridership	data	for	the	B103,	the	MTA	bus	
that	 roughly	 follows	 the	new	 route	 the	 operator	wants	 to	 pioneer.	 Between	2009	
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as	 these	 numbers	 appear,	 it	 is	 all	 the	more	 striking	when	 one	 considers	 that	 bus	
ridership	across	New	York	has	declined	steadily	over	the	same	period	(Metropolitan	
Transportation	Authority	2015).		
While	 the	 ridership	 data	 along	 the	 two	 routes	 confirmed	 the	 operator’s	
observation	about	crowded	buses	on	the	B103’s	route,	I	also	had	to	make	sure	that	







examined	 overall	 population	 change	 at	 the	 Census	 Tract	 level	 between	 2000	 and	
2010	 along	 the	 existing	 Flatbush	 route	 and	 the	 proposed	 route	 out	 to	 Gateway	
Center.25	Before	matching	data	to	each	route,	I	created	a	quarter-mile	buffer	around	





Based	 on	 my	 survey	 work,	 experience	 with	 the	 vans,	 and	 the	 operator’s	






West	 Indians,	 as	 of	 2000,	 lived	 in	 largest	 numbers	 in	 the	 area	 south	 and	 east	 of	






route.	While	 the	 southern	 trend	 is	 apparent	 to	 the	 naked	 eye,	 I	wanted	 to	 better	
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































finding	 is	 counter-intuitive	 based	 on	 popular	 accounts	 of	 the	 frenzied	 real	 estate	







Despite	 an	 overall	 downward	 population	 trend,	 it	 is	 critical	 to	 understand	
how	the	West	Indian	population	changed	between	2000	and	2010	to	better	assess	

























Census	 data	 with	 2008-2012	 ACS	 5-Year	 Averages	 so	 I	 could	 see	 how	 the	 West	
Indian	population	fared	between	the	two	periods.26		
When	 I	 compared	 the	 2000	 Census	 against	 the	 2010	 Census—for	 total	
population	 data—and	 the	 2008-2012	 ACS	 5-Year	 Averages—for	 West	 Indian	
population	 data—it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 West	 Indian	 population	 along	 Flatbush	
Avenue	decreased	at	a	rate	greater	than	overall	population	decline.	In	Figure	20,	we	
can	 see	 that	 the	 West	 Indian	 population	 declined	 across	 all	 five	 Census	 Tracts	
illustrated	in	Figure	19.	In	Figure	21	we	see	that	the	percentage	of	West	Indians	in	
these	 Tracts	 also	 declined,	 on	 average,	 between	 2000	 and	 2010.	 Thus,	 the	 West	












Flatbush	 route.	 In	 short,	 the	 operator	was	 correct:	 The	 Caribbean	 population,	 the	
bulk	of	his	customers,	had	declined	along	Flatbush	Avenue	between	2000	and	2010.		
Now	that	I	have	reconciled	the	anecdotal	and	empirical	data	on	Flatbush	Avenue,	I	
































maps	 exploring	 West	 Indian	 population	 change	 along	 the	 Gateway	 Center	 route.	
Figures	22	and	23	show	the	new	route,	which	connects	to	the	Flatbush	route	at	its	













































































































































there	were	only	a	handful	of	Census	Tracts	with	more	 than	1,000	West	 Indians	 in	
them.	In	order	for	this	new	route	to	prosper,	I	expected	to	see	an	increase	of	West	
Indians	between	2000	and	2010	along	this	route.	Figure	23	confirms	this:	the	map	























































































































As	 with	 the	 changes	 in	 bus	 ridership,	 the	 operator	 correctly	 identified	
population	 change	 along	 the	 two	 routes.	 In	 general,	 the	 West	 Indian	 population	
declined	along	the	Flatbush	route	and	increased	along	the	proposed	Gateway	Center	
route.	 Of	 greater	 consequence,	 areas	 of	 concentration	 were	 diluted	 along	 the	
Flatbush	 route	while	 they	were	 fortified	 along	 the	Gateway	 route.	 These	 patterns	







































use	 component	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 Gateway	 Center	 and	 adjacent	 residential	
development	provides	the	final	piece	of	this	story.				
East	New	York	is	the	paradigmatic	example	of	urban	pathology	and	decline	in	
Brooklyn.	Greg	Donaldson’s	 (1994)	 fine-grained	 look	at	policing	 in	urban	America	
settled	on	this	patch	of	Brooklyn	because	“it	is	so	dangerous	the	bars	have	been	shut	
down	 for	 years,	 there	 are	 no	 movie	 theaters,	 and	 some	 newly	 renovated	 city-




In	 spite	 of	 these	 unflattering	 portraits	 of	 East	New	York,	 it	 is	 still	 a	 site	 of	
interest	 for	 residents	 looking	 to	 land	 somewhere	 in	 an	 increasingly	 expensive	
Brooklyn,	zoning	changes,	and	capital	investment	(Sheftell	2008;	Department	of	City	
Planning	 2014;	 Rice	 2015).	 After	 analyzing	 the	 2010	 Census	 data,	 City	 Planning	
(2012)	 concluded	 that	 East	 New	 York	 was	 an	 area	 of	 the	 borough	 experiencing	
rapid	growth	and	development:		
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East	New	York	was	 the	 second	 fastest	 growing	neighborhood	 in	 the	
borough,	gaining	8,700	persons	over	the	last	decade,	with	most	of	the	




attraction	 of	 this	 neighborhood	 as	 a	 destination	 for	 those	 leaving	
other	parts	of	Brooklyn.	(p.21)	
	






such	 as	 an	 exit	 from	 the	Belt	 Parkway	 and	 green	 space.	 In	 2003,	 the	 City	 opened	
Spring	Creek	Park,	which	it	bragged	had	“[t]he	very	first	field	dedicated	solely	to	the	





	 All	 of	 this	 investment	 and	 interest	 in	 East	 New	 York	 has	 made	 it	 a	





clear	 that	 he	 had	 identified	 a	 densely	 populated	 corridor	 anchored	 by	 a	 bustling,	
expanding	 shopping	 complex.	 More	 important,	 however,	 was	 the	 pace	 of	 new	
residential	 development	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 train	 or	 adequate	 bus	 access	 to	 Flatbush	
Avenue.	In	the	space	of	a	decade,	this	former	dumping	ground	had	taken	on	a	new	
identity.		







driving	southeast	on	Berriman	Street	 towards	Schroeders	Avenue.	 In	 the	distance,	
we	can	make	out	the	white	frame	of	the	next	batch	of	attached	townhouses	that	will	
look	 exactly	 like	 the	 row	of	houses	on	 the	 right	 side	of	 the	 image,	which	 faces	 an	
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undeveloped	 lot.	 	When	we	 return	 to	Berriman	Street	 two	years	 later,	we	 see	 the	
pace	 of	 development	 has	 been	 swift	 [Figure	 26].	 Not	 only	 has	 the	 white	 shell	 in	
Figure	 25	 transformed	 into	 a	 row	 of	 East-New-York-expectation-defying-pre-
fabricated	homes,	but	also	the	entire	strip	across	the	way	has	been	developed	in	the	
same	 fashion.	 By	 2016,	 this	 area	 of	 East	 New	 York,	 now	 dubbed	 Spring	 Creek	






	 This	 is	 not	 the	East	New	York	of	 the	1990s.	This	 is	 a	 neighborhood	 that	 is	
rapidly	 changing:	 from	demographics	 to	 land-use	 to	 capital	 investment,	 East	New	
York	 is	 the	site	of	 intense	activity.	To	keep	pace	with	and	promote	 these	changes,	
the	 City	 has	 invested	 in	 new	 schools,	 parks,	 and	 streets,	 but	 what	 about	
transportation	services?		
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The	 MTA	 has	 responded	 to	 changes	 in	 East	 New	 York,	 as	 best	 it	 can,	 by	
extending	 bus	 service	 to	 Gateway	 Center,	 but	 the	 van	 operator	we	 have	 followed	
throughout	 this	 chapter	 still	 sees	a	 ripe	opportunity	 to	pluck,	as	evidenced	by	 the	
passengers	on	the	B103	who	are	unable	to	find	a	seat	and	are	forced	to	stand	in	the	
aisle	with	 their	hands	pressed	against	 the	 ceiling	 to	brace	 themselves	 against	 any	
herky-jerky	movements	(Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	2007).	Just	like	the	
van	operator’s	service	on	Flatbush	Avenue,	which	promises	a	seat	and	a	faster	ride	







identified	 a	 potentially	 profitable	 business	 opportunity	 and	 service	 need	 by	
developing	 a	 route	 from	 the	 Junction	 to	Gateway	Center	 [Figure	27].	While	 dollar	
vans	and	commuter	van	operators	exist	on	the	fringe	of	the	transportation	planning	
and	policy	universe	in	New	York,	in	part	because	they	worry	over	a	tiny	sliver	of	the	
larger	 transportation	 network,	 they	 plan	 in	 the	 same	 sense	 that	 professional	
planners	plan:	they	analyze	population	change,	identify	activity	centers,	and	observe	
existing	transport	services.		Freidmann	and	Hudson	(1974)	defined	planning	“as	an	
activity	 centrally	 concerned	 with	 the	 linkage	 between	 knowledge	 and	 organized	
action”	 (emphasis	 in	original)	 (p.	2).	While	 the	van	operator	draws	his	knowledge	
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consulting	 with	 a	 van	 operator	 about	 the	 wisdom	 of	 developing	 a	 new	 route.	 	 I	
included	 this	 chapter	 because	 it	 demonstrates	 how	 one	 operator	makes	 sense	 of	
changes	along	his	existing	route	and	opportunities	for	expansion.		This	perspective	
allowed	me	to	contrast	his	method	of	planning	versus	planning	carried	out	by	 the	
City	and	State.	Uzzell	 (1990)	explains	 the	difference	between	 formal	planners	and	
planners	 like	 the	 van	 operator	 when	 he	 writes,	 “[P]eople	 engaged	 in	 informal	
activities	tend	to	fashion	plans	from	the	world	as	they	find	it,	in	contrast	with	formal	
planners,	who	 tend	 to	 reify	models	of	 the	worlds	 they	 invent”	 (p.	 114).	While	 the	
van	 operator	 did	 “fashion	 plans”	 for	 the	world	 he	 inhabits,	 it	was	 encouraging	 to	




very,	 very	 astute	 observations	 about	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 and	 changes	 in	 East	 New	
York.	The	bus	planners	 I	spoke	with	at	 the	MTA	spoke	about	Brooklyn	as	a	whole	
rather	 than	 singling	 out	 specific	 routes	 or	 thinking	 about	 changes	 on	 a	 route-by-
route	 basis,	 unless	we	discussed	 a	 specific	 intervention	 like	 Select	Bus	 Service	 on	





The	 different	 goals	 and	 knowledge	 of	 each	 group	 of	 planners	 begs	 the	
question,	“How	can	the	City	and	State	benefit	from	the	fine-grained	planning	being	
carried	 out	 by	 van	 operators?”	 The	 stepwise	 nature	 of	 formal	 planning	 makes	 it	
impossible	 for	 institutions	 like	 the	 MTA,	 TLC,	 or	 DOT	 to	 respond	 to	 changing	
neighborhood	dynamics	as	quickly	or	nimbly	as	the	van	operators.	Thus,	it	behooves	






While	 my	 research	 is	 over,	 I	 still	 spend	 a	 lot	 of	 time	 on	 Flatbush	 Avenue	
watching	the	vans,	listening	to	their	distinctive	horns,	and	climbing	into	them	when	
I	need	 to	 take	a	 ride	 to	 the	 Junction.	 I	 still	attend	 the	City	Council’s	Committee	on	
Transportation’s	hearings	to	keep	up	with	the	latest	transportation	policy	issues	in	
the	city.	 I	 still	 speak	on	 the	phone	with	different	people	 in	 the	van	 industry	about	
fledgling	routes,	potential	policy	changes,	and	new	developments.	The	current	trend	
among	van	operators	is	to	put	bigger	vehicles	on	the	road.	Instead	of	the	reliable	14-










have	 moved	 their	 vehicles	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 TLC.	 This	 seemingly	 banal	
distinction,	for	the	time	being,	has	the	City	scrambling.	The	TLC	does	not	believe	it	
has	 the	 authority	 to	 police	 buses,	 the	 State	 DOT	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 an	
enforcement	team	camped	out	on	Flatbush	Avenue,	and	van	operators	are	thinking	
about	 scrapping	 their	 old	 vehicles	 for	 newer,	 bigger	 minibuses,	 which	 has	
implications	for	the	economics	of	the	industry	(Personal	Interview	2016).			
As	 this	 latest	 wrinkle	 in	 the	 vans’	 rumpled	 story	 gets	 ironed	 out,	 I	 have	
compiled	a	list	of	recommendations	from	my	time	studying	the	vans.	As	I	developed	
this	list,	I	returned	to	the	6	research	questions	that	motivated	my	research.	Many	of	















contradict	 daily	 practice	 because	 the	 regulations	 were	 intentionally	 developed	 to	
hinder	the	vans’	growth	and	protect	bus	ridership.		





When	 I	 have	 a	 problem	with	 the	 liveries,	 I	 know	who	 to	 contact.	When	 I	 have	 a	
problem	 with	 the	 vans…I	 have	 no	 idea	 what	 I’m	 supposed	 to	 do”	 (Personal	
Interview,	 2014j).	 This	 inability	 to	 resolve	 basic	 knowledge	 gaps	 makes	 it	
impossible	for	the	City	to	construct	policy	that	adequately	serves	the	van	industry.	
As	 long	 as	 policy	 and	 daily	 practice	 remain	 at	 odds,	 the	 van	 industry	 and	 the	
passengers	 who	 rely	 on	 it	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 displacement.	 Blame	 runs	 in	 both	
directions:	 neither	 the	 City	 nor	 the	 van	 industry	 has	 done	 a	 good	 enough	 job	
developing	this	critical	relationship.		




In	 chapter	 five,	 I	 investigated	 the	 claims	of	 van	operator	who	worried	 that	
demographic	 change	 along	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 created	 an	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 a	
new	service	connecting	the	 Junction	and	the	Gateway	Plaza	Mall.	Based	on	Census	







	 Throughout	 this	dissertation,	 I	have	highlighted	how	informality	permeates	
all	 levels	 of	 the	 van	 industry.	 This	 ongoing	 legal	 uncertainty	 speaks	 to	 a	 glaring	
weakness	 in	 New	 York’s	 transportation	 policy:	 there	 is	 no	 unified	 surface	
transportation	policy.	The	New	York	City	DOT	regulates	many	of	the	City’s	streets,	
MTA	plans	the	buses,	TLC	issues	permits	for	livery	cabs,	State	DOT	certifies	private	
buses,	 New	 York	 Metropolitan	 Transportation	 Council	 allocates	 money	 from	 the	
federal	government	 for	projects	 to	 reduce	congestion	and	 improve	air	quality,	 the	
City	 Council’s	 Committee	 on	 Transportation	 holds	 hearings	 on	 all	 of	 these	 topics,	




permitting	of	 commuter	 vans	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 foster	dialogue	between	
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agencies	when	the	will	exists.27	Without	a	clear	idea	of	how	surface	transportation	
in	 New	 York	 should	 operate,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 know	 if	 the	 TLC	 should	 issue	more	
permits	 for	Uber	and	Lyft,	 if	 the	State	DOT	should	withhold	bus	 licenses,	or	 if	 the	
Department	 of	 City	 Planning	 should	 reduce	 parking	 requirements	 as	 it	 rezones	
neighborhoods	across	the	city.			
	 My	 first	 recommendation	 is	 that	 the	 City	 Council’s	 Committee	 on	
Transportation	 spearhead	 the	 effort	 to	 develop	 coherent	 surface	 transportation	





the	 actions	 of	 existing	 agencies.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Committee	 has	 a	 staff	 of	 policy	
analysts	and	 lawyers	who	work	on	 these	 issues	year	round.	Council	Members	and	
their	staff	could	also	contribute	time	and	resources	to	this	work.	The	findings	of	the	
Council	would	not	be	binding,	but	they	would	steer	debate	and	provide	logic	to	the	
Committee’s	 actions.	 This	 is	 a	 small	 step	 towards	 transparency	 and	 developing	 a	
useful	base	of	knowledge	to	guide	legislative	decisions.		
	 Other	 cities,	 like	 London	 and	 Paris,	 already	 coordinate	 much	 of	 their	
transportation	 policy	 through	 a	 single	 entity	 that	 has	 the	 authority	 to	 set	 transit	
fares,	adjust	parking	violations,	license	taxis,	and	build	bus	lanes.		This	means	that	if	






no	authority	 to	build	a	bus	 lane	to	accommodate	high	passenger	 loads	and	reduce	
the	delay	caused	by	traffic.		
	 My	second	recommendation	stems	from	my	experience	researching	the	laws	
that	 govern	 the	vans	and	 talking	 to	planners,	 van	operators,	 and	 legislators	 about	
them.	Rarely	did	anyone	seem	to	know	the	exact	letter	of	the	law.	The	van	operators	
were	 the	most	 knowledgeable,	 but	 even	 they	 held	 a	 few	 erroneous	 beliefs	 about	
what	is	legal.	As	such,	the	City	needs	to	re-regulate	the	vans	if	it	wants	the	vans	to	
continue	operating	on	its	streets.	This	ongoing	contradiction	between	law	and	daily	




and	 down	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 and	 arrest	 any	 vans	 suspected	 of	 operating	 illegally.	
Based	on	the	experience	of	squatters	in	Calcutta,	street	vendors	near	Penn	Station,	
and	gypsy	cab	drivers	in	Washington	Heights,	this	possibility	is	not	as	remote	as	it	
sounds.	 Clear	 laws	 that	 are	 regularly	 enforced	 will	 bring	 certainty	 to	 the	 daily	
operations	 of	 the	 vans.	 This	 clarity	 will	 allow	 operators	 to	 plan	 their	 businesses	
according	to	those	regulations	and	move	forward	knowing	that	they	are	operating	








like	sitting	down	with	a	van	 industry	 “brain	 trust”	on	a	regular	basis,	an	 idea	 that	
surfaced	 in	 chapter	 three.	 The	 van	 operators	 should	 mimic	 the	 organizations	 of	
other	 transportation	 advocacy	 and	 industry	 groups	 like	 the	 Livery	 Roundtable,	
Black	 Car	 Assistance	 Corporation,	 Greater	 New	 York	 Taxi	 Association,	
Transportation	 Alternatives,	 Streets	 PAC,	 Riders	 Alliance,	 and	 the	 New	 York	 Taxi	
Workers	Alliance.	With	greater	organization	on	the	part	of	the	van	industry	comes	
greater	responsiveness	from	the	TLC,	City	Council,	and	the	Mayor.		
The	 TLC	 knows	 very	 little	 about	 the	 vans’	 daily	 operations.	 It	 currently	
collects	 terabytes	 of	 trip	 data	 on	 the	 yellow	 and	 green	 taxi	 industries	 and	 is	
improving	 its	 livery	 cab	data	 collection	 efforts,	 too.	 	None	of	 these	data	 collection	
efforts	have	been	extended	to	the	vans.	Without	some	baseline	data	about	who	rides	
the	vans,	where	the	vans	are	going,	and	how	many	passengers	there	are,	however,	
the	 TLC	 has	 no	 idea	 if	 it	 has	 issued	 too	 many	 or	 too	 few	 permits,	 if	 it	 should	
aggressively	 recruit	more	 operators,	 or	 how	 large	 the	 dollar	 van	 phenomenon	 is.		
																																																								
28	This	belief	is	based	on	the	idea	that	the	MTA	will	not	improve	frequencies	on	routes	served	by	the	





	 My	 fourth	 recommendation	 trickles	 up	 to	 the	 State	 of	New	York.	 Since	 the	
passage	 of	 Local	 Law	 115	 in	 1993,	 definitions	 established	 at	 the	 State	 level	 have	
shaped	 local	 regulations.	 Without	 the	 State’s	 willingness	 to	 amend	 definitions	 it	
imposed	on	the	City,	the	TLC	will	never	have	any	authority	over	the	larger	vehicles	
operating	 on	 Flatbush	 Avenue	 or	 the	 flexibility	 to	 adapt	 existing	 definitions	 to	
reflect	 daily	 practice.	 In	 short,	 the	 State	 and	 the	 City	 need	 to	 work	 together	 to	
improve	the	laws	that	regulate	the	vans.	





e-hailed,	 it	 may	 override	 prohibitions	 against	 operating	 on	 routes	 served	 by	 the	
MTA.	Because	van	drivers	will	be	responding	to	an	e-hail,	one	could	argue	that	the	
van	 drivers	 are	 honoring	 the	 law	 and	 operating	 over	 non-specified	 routes	 rather	
than	servicing	a	fixed	Flatbush	Avenue	route.	
	 My	final	recommendation,	recommendation	six,	moves	beyond	the	realm	of	






achieve	 that,	 however,	 is	 to	 eliminate	 the	 delays	 caused	 by	 traffic	 and	 lengthy	
boarding	 queues	 that	 slow	 down	 service	 as	 each	 passenger	 dips	 his	 or	 her	
MetroCard	into	the	bus,	reader	before	boarding.29		
A	true	Bus	Rapid	Transit	(BRT)	roll	out	on	Flatbush	Avenue	would	solve	the	
problems	 of	 unreliable	 bus	 service	 by	 eliminating	 the	 vagaries	 of	 traffic	 and	
reducing	passenger	 load	 times.30		By	solving	 these	 two	problems	with	a	dedicated	
bus	 lane	 and	 pre-boarding	 payment,	 the	 need	 for	 the	 vans	 would	 disappear.	 	 As	




concerns	 to	 deploying	 BRT	 on	 Flatbush	 Avenue,	 namely	what	will	 happen	 to	 van	
drivers	and	the	tighter	road	geometries	on	the	southern	portion	of	Flatbush,	those	




of	 communication	 between	 the	 van	 industry	 and	 the	 City,	 promote	 coordination	














York,	 but	 it	 also	 provides	 insights	 into	 the	 practice	 of	 informality,	 the	 process	 of	
gentrification,	 and	 what	 some	 refer	 to	 as	 planetary	 urbanization.	 In	 Andy	
Merrifield’s	 (2014)	 book,	 The	 New	 Urban	 Question,	 he	 describes	 planetary	
urbanization	 as	 “a	 process	 that	 produces	 skyscrapers	 as	well	 as	 unpaved	 streets,	
highways	as	well	as	back	roads,	by-waters	and	marginal	zones	that	feel	the	wrath	of	
the	world	market—both	 its	absence	and	 its	presence”	 (p.	5).	My	work	affirms	 the	
stark	 divides	 identified	 by	 Merrifield,	 but	 also	 provides	 a	 more	 substantial	
understanding	of	how	these	contrasts	are	built	and	sustained	by	examining	the	vans	
in	detail.	
To	 find	 the	 material	 form	 of	 these	 theories,	 I	 would	 expand	 my	 existing	
research	 and	 bring	 in	 cases	 that	 allow	 me	 to	 toggle	 between	 the	 neighborhood,	
citywide,	 and	 global	 scales	 to	 show	how	 they	 are	 linked	 together.	 The	 theories	 of	
gentrification,	 informality,	 and	planetary	urbanization	manifest	 themselves	 clearly	
when	 examining	 the	 precarious	 position	 of	 dollar	 vans	 traveling	 along	 Flatbush	
Avenue	 in	 Brooklyn,	 the	 dwindling	 number	 of	 gypsy	 cab	 drivers	 in	 Upper	
Manhattan,	 the	 newly	 minted	 green	 taxi	 drivers	 operating	 citywide,	 and	 the	
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triumphant	 e-hail	 drivers	 who	 have	 disrupted	 the	 taxi	 industry	 on	 a	 global	 scale.		
The	thread	connecting	these	cases	is	the	uneven	application	of	the	law.	






demands	 improved	 infrastructure	 and	 services.	 This	 is	 an	 example	 of	 how	 the	
devalorization	 process	 described	 by	 Smith	 (1996)	 is	 coordinated	 between	 public	
and	private	actors.	The	decay	of	services	in	a	neighborhood	is	not	a	natural	event;	it	
is	the	outcome	of	coordinated	activities	by	public	and	private	actors.	Smith,	borrows	
this	 framework	 from	 Bradford	 and	 Rubinowitz	 (1979),	 who	 argue	 that	
devalorization	is	“the	result	of	identifiable	private	and	public	investment	decisions,	
made	by	 identifiable	public	actors	and	members	of	 the	real	estate	 investment	and	
development	industry”	(p.	79).	For	our	purposes,	the	New	York	City	fiscal	crisis	 in	
the	 mid-1970s	 triggered	 a	 number	 of	 austerity	 measures	 that	 starved	 outer-
borough	neighborhoods	of	transit	service	(Tabb	1982).	
The	 case	 of	 e-hail	 taxis,	 however,	 offers	 an	 interesting	 counter	 to	 these	
theories.	These	companies	have	found	sustenance	 in	the	same	municipal	 fuzziness	
as	the	vans	and	gypsy	cabs,	and	successfully	fought	regulators	while	expanding	their	
businesses	 in	 the	 face	 of	mounting	 scrutiny.	 E-hail	 taxi	 companies	 differ	 from	 the	
informal	 operators	 in	 two	 important	 ways:	 first,	 e-hail	 taxi	 companies	 have	 used	
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their	billions	of	dollars	in	venture	capital	to	combat	lawsuits,	lobby	government,	and	
promote	 their	 services.	 Second,	 they	have	 appealed	directly	 to	 active	 riders	when	
regulators	have	tried	to	curb	their	operations.	By	marshaling	the	political	power	of	
venture	 capital	 and	 users,	 e-hail	 taxi	 companies	 have	 rejiggered	 the	 regulatory	
paradigm	and	partnered	with	 governments	 to	 redefine	 regulations	 rather	 than	be	
swept	away	like	other	informal	actors	before	them.	
Transportation	planning	and	policy	provide	a	lens	into	the	broader	workings	
of	 cities.	 This	 is	 an	 area	 of	 study	 that	 is	 under-developed	 but	 ripe	 for	 analysis.		
Through	 this	dissertation	and	 future	 research,	 the	 idiom	of	 informality	provides	a	
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